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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the long-debated question of courts’ proper role in enforcing constitutional 
social rights; and it does so from a new perspective – that of political trust. Its central argument 
is that the concept of political trust – as it has been conceptualised and theorised in the relevant 
social science literature – has normative potential for defining such a role for courts. Specifically, 
I argue that courts, in enforcing constitutional social rights, can, and should, use political trust as 
an adjudicative tool, employing it to develop a standard to which government, in its provision of 
social goods and services to the public, can and will be held. To make out this argument, I draw 
on both theoretical and empirical social science scholarship on trust and how it functions in 
contemporary societies. I suggest, based on that scholarship, that we can expect constitutional 
social rights adjudication by courts to be able to impact (and in the right circumstances, to foster) 
political trust. And following from this impact, in combination with the well-recognised value of 
political trust by social scientists as well as a host of other principled reasons, I make the claim 
that political trust can, and should, lie at the very centre of social rights enforcement by courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars and jurists have long engaged in a vibrant conversation around the proper role of 
courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. This conversation has come to pass in a series of 
two waves.1 In its “first wave”, the conversation centred on justiciability – that is, whether 
constitutional social rights are enforceable by courts. That wave reached its peak during the late 
1980s-early 1990s when the new democracies of the Global South and the former-Soviet Union 
sought to decide whether to include express (and enforceable) social rights provisions in their 
constitutions. In its “second wave” – the current wave – the conversation has a slightly different 
focus. That focus is not whether social rights are enforceable by courts, but, assuming they are, 
how courts should go about enforcing them.2 Many new democracies, after intense debate, opted 
for the inclusion of express and enforceable social rights provisions.3 In more established 
democracies, several courts have read social rights into their constitutions. And scholars, jurists 
and politicians (for the most part) have come to accept the justiciability of constitutional social 
rights. Thus, as a not-so-surprising consequence of this combination of circumstances, the last 
20 years have witnessed a significant rise (or as some have called it, an “explosion”) in social 
rights litigation.4 And courts require some guidance on how to deal with this explosion. 
 In this thesis, I join the above conversation and I seek to offer some guidance in this 
regard. I do so by introducing a new concept and a new vocabulary to the conversation – that of 
political trust. And I use this concept and this vocabulary to carve out a role for courts in 
enforcing constitutional social rights. By “political trust”, I mean, broadly speaking, the trust 
which the public holds in its government.5 In steering the conversation towards the concept of 
political trust, I draw inspiration, at least in significant part, from a relatively new line of research 
                                               
1 Richard Stacey, ‘Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement 
of Economic and Social Rights’ (2017) 31 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 85, 85-86. 
2 David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 189, 196; 
Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2008), 29; Marius 
Pieterse, ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 383, 404-05; Anashri Pillay, ‘Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Developing Principles of 
Judicial Restraint in South Africa and the United Kingdom’ [2013] Public Law 599, 599. 
3 In this regard, see the Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights dataset which is available at 
<http://www.tiesr.org/data.html>. It documents the presence of various economic and social rights in 195 national 
constitutions across the globe, as well as the status of these rights as justiciable or aspirational. See also Courtney 
Jung, Ran Hirschl and Evan Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions’ (2014) 62 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 1043. 
4 Daniel M Brinks and Varun Gauri, ‘The Law’s Majestic Equality? The Distributive Impact of Judicializing Social 
and Economic Rights’ (2014) 12 Perspectives on Politics 375, 376. See also Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘The Right 
to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?’ (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights 33. 
5 I use the term “government” not in the U.K. sense of “Government” as representing the executive branch of 
government. Instead, I use it to refer to both the executive and the legislature, or the elected branches of 
government. Accordingly, I use the terms “government” and “elected branches of government” interchangeably. 
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which focuses on the real-world effects of social rights adjudication by courts.6 That research 
makes use of empirical data on the impact of social rights adjudication, and who benefits from it, 
to develop normative arguments vis-à-vis the proper role of courts in this area. Inspired by that 
research, this thesis is concerned, again in part, with the impact which social rights adjudication 
by courts, in its various shapes, can have (or at least can be expected to have) on political trust. 
 The central argument which I make in this thesis is that the concept of political trust has 
normative potential for defining the proper role of courts in enforcing constitutional social 
rights. Specifically, I argue that courts – in so enforcing – can, and should, use political trust as 
an adjudicative tool, employing it to develop a standard to which government, in its provision of 
social goods and services to the public, can and will be held. To make out this argument, I draw 
on both empirical and theoretical social science scholarship on trust and how it functions in 
contemporary societies. I suggest, based on that scholarship, that we can expect constitutional 
social rights adjudication by courts to be able to impact (and in the right circumstances, to foster) 
political trust. And following from this impact, in combination with the well-recognised value of 
political trust by social scientists as well as a host of other principled reasons, I make the claim 
that political trust can, and should, lie at the very centre of social rights enforcement by courts. 
 
The Recognised Value of Political Trust 
A reader may reasonably ask: why introduce the concept of political trust? Dating back at least 
50 years, social scientists have stressed the importance of public trust in government to well-
functioning democracies. They have theorised about the consequences of political trust, arguing 
that it is tied to such valuable ends as social stability, economic welfare and effective 
governance.7 This tie is explained as follows: when citizens have greater trust in government, 
they are more likely to regard government actions as legitimate and to cooperate with them, 
tolerating the political regime and voluntarily complying with laws and government demands. 
Such cooperation is critical because it allows the state to focus its limited resources for coercion 
                                               
6 Brinks and Gauri (n 4); Ferraz (n 4); Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘Harming the Poor through Social Rights 
Litigation: Lessons from Brazil’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1643; César Rodriguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the 
Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law 
Review 1669. 
7 Russell J Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies (OUP 2004); Pippa Norris, ‘Conclusion: The Growth of Critical Citizens and Its Consequences’ in Pippa 
Norris (ed), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (OUP 1999); Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter 
(Cambridge University Press 1998). In addition to the instrumental value of political trust, it has also been argued 
that political trust is intrinsically valuable: Matthew Harding, ‘Trust and Fiduciary Law’ (2013) 33 OJLS 81; Colleen 
Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
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on the relatively few disobedient.8 As Russell Dalton has identified, ‘democracy functions with 
minimal coercive force because of the legitimacy of the system and the voluntary compliance of 
the public. Declining feelings of political trust and political support can undermine this 
relationship and thus the workings of democracy’.9 Accordingly, as voluntary compliance with 
laws and government demands becomes the norm, cooperation translates into social stability.10 
 The link between political trust and public cooperation is well-supported by empirical 
research. For instance, Tom Tyler, in his work on trust, has consistently demonstrated that 
individuals’ trust in authority figures increases their cooperation with those figures. Specifically, 
based on data collected in a series of interviews, Tyler has convincingly shown that trust 
increases individuals’ willingness to accept authority decisions, their feelings of obligation to 
obey organisational rules and laws, and their performance evaluations of those in positions of 
authority.11 These findings have been replicated across a range of contexts and groups, including 
legal authorities.12 In a similar vein, Russell Dalton, using the 1995-98 World Values Survey, has 
shown a positive correlation between levels of political support (a concept closely tied to trust) 
and people’s willingness to obey the law.13 Building on a categorisation developed by David 
Easton, Dalton divided political support into four categories: institutional support (support for 
the institutions of governance), authority support (support for those who control the 
institutions), support for democratic values, and community support (support for the nation or 
the political system in broad terms). Dalton found that all four categories correlated in a positive 
direction with willingness to obey the law, with institutional and community support having the 
strongest correlation. And as a final example, Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, in a similar study 
to that of Dalton but using the European Values Survey 1999-2001, obtained similar findings to 
those of Dalton.14 They found that respondents with higher levels of political trust (specifically 
trust in political institutions) were significantly less likely to have permissive attitudes towards 
                                               
8 Russell Hardin, ‘Trust in Government’ in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds), Trust and Governance (Russell 
Sage Foundation 1998), 10. 
9 Dalton (n 7) 159. Some writers have described this benefit of trust as reduced “transaction costs” for governments: 
Dalton (n 7) 159; Eva-Maria Trüdinger and Uwe Bollow, ‘Evaluations of Welfare State Reforms in Germany: 
Political Trust Makes a (Big) Difference’ in Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe (eds), Political Trust: Why Context Matters 
(ECPR Press 2011), 189. 
10 Dalton (n 7) 165. 
11 For a summary, see Tom R Tyler and Peter Degoey, ‘Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of 
Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions’ in Roderick M Kramer and Tom R Tyler (eds), Trust in 
Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research (Sage Publications 1996), 336. 
12 Tom R Tyler and Yuen J Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (Russell Sage 
Foundation 2002). 
13 Dalton (n 7) 165-66. 
14 Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, ‘Does Political Trust Matter? An Empirical Investigation into the Relation 
Between Political Trust and Support for Compliance’ (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research 267. 
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law-breaking (the inverse of Dalton’s willingness to obey the law)15 than those with lower levels 
of trust. In fact, Marien and Hooghe found that this relationship held even when they controlled 
for variables such as the respondents’ age, gender, level of education and religious practice.16 
 In addition to the recognised value of political trust generally, social scientists have taken 
note of its particular importance vis-à-vis social policy. Specifically, two inter-related points have 
been made on this front. First, political trust is of the utmost importance to financing the welfare 
state.17 The social goods and services provided by the state in a social democracy depend on 
resources which citizens themselves provide. Citizens pay taxes to the state and, using the 
revenue collected from those taxes, the state administers social programmes. Thus, taxes paid by 
citizens are a prerequisite to state-provided social goods and services. In the apt words of Eric 
Uslaner, ‘Taxes are the economic glue of social program[mes], the source of government’s ability 
to transfer resources – and, indeed, to function at all’.18 For this reason, it has been argued that 
the ‘future of the welfare state is likely to hinge on the ability for nation states to levy taxes … on 
their populations’. 19  Given the above-described relationship between political trust and 
compliance with law, writers have argued that citizens’ willingness to pay their taxes depends on 
their trust in government.20 In other words, under this argument, citizens are less likely to pay 
their taxes if they do not trust their governments. Moreover, such tax non-compliance, it has 
been argued, creates a vicious, self-perpetuating circle: if citizens do not pay their taxes, 
governments cannot provide social goods and services to them, leading citizens to become even 
less trustful of government than before.21 In this regard, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has claimed, tying the 
concept of political trust to the notion of social stability, that ‘[s]uch a cumulative downward 
spiral could erode support for democracy as a form of governance’.22 
                                               
15 Dalton used the same type of survey items but used those items to create what he calls a “willingness-to-obey-the-
law index”: Dalton (n 7) 166. 
16 For further empirical support, see Martin Lindstrom, ‘Social Capital, Political Trust and Purchase of Illegal 
Liquor: A Population-Based Study in Southern Sweden’ (2008) 86 Health Policy 266; Norris (n 7). 
17 Laurence E Lynn, Jr, ‘How Do Trust and Confidence Affect the Governing of America?’ in Sue Llewellyn, 
Stephen Brookes and Ann Mahon (eds), Trust and Confidence in Government and Public Services (Routledge 2013), 21; 
Joseph S Nye, Jr, ‘Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government’ in Joseph S Nye, Jr, Philip D Zelikow 
and David C King (eds), Why People Don’t Trust Government (Harvard University Press 1997), 4; Bo Rothstein, Marcus 
Samanni and Jan Teorell, ‘Explaining the Welfare State: Power Resources vs. the Quality of Government’ (2012) 4 
European Political Science Review 1, 10-11; Stefan Svallfors, ‘Introduction’ in Stefan Svallfors (ed), The Political 
Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages and Orientations (Stanford University Press 2007). 
18 Eric M Uslaner, ‘Tax Evasion, Trust, and the Strong Arm of the Law’ in Nicolas Hayoz and Simon Hug (eds), 
Tax Evasion, Trust and State Capacities (Peter Lang 2007), 19. 
19 Nathalie Morel and Joakim Palme, ‘Financing the Welfare State and the Politics of Taxation’ in Brent Greve (ed), 
The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State (Routledge 2013), 407. 
20 Norris (n 7) 264. 
21 Nye, Jr (n 17) 4; Eric M Uslaner, ‘Corruption, the Inequality Trap and Trust in Government’ in Sonja Zmerli and 
Marc Hooghe (eds), Political Trust: Why Context Matters (ECPR Press 2011), 141-42. 
22 Nye, Jr (n 17) 4. 
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 This relationship between political trust and tax compliance also finds support in 
empirical research. John Scholz and Mark Lubell have shown a positive relationship between 
trust and tax compliance using a U.S. Internal Revenue Service survey which asked a sample of 
taxpayers in New York about tax compliance and civic values.23 In an analysis of that survey data 
combined with in-person interviews, they found that trust in government significantly increased 
the likelihood of respondents’ tax compliance. This relationship persisted even after they 
controlled for the influence of self-interested fear of getting caught and an internalised sense of 
duty. Based on their results, Scholz and Lubell concluded that ‘trust in government … 
significantly influence[s] tax compliance’.24 Further, Steven Sheffrin and Robert Triest, in a study 
analysing the same survey data as Scholz and Lubell, found that respondents’ attitudes towards 
government (including a belief that tax money is wasted by government) was the best predictor 
of underreporting income and overstating deductions.25  Such attitudes were even a better 
predictor than the probability of detection and whether fellow citizens paid their fair share.26 
Second, and relatedly, political trust is said to impact citizens’ attitudes toward – and 
support for – social policies.27 The idea here is that if citizens do not trust government, they will 
not support the policies their governments develop and implement. In this regard, several 
scholars have contended that trust functions as a cognitive heuristic which citizens rely upon 
when forming opinions about social policies. 28  Faced with the complex institutional 
arrangements of the welfare state and the uncertain consequences of social policies, citizens turn 
to trust: ‘Other things equal, if people perceive the architect of policies as untrustworthy, they 
will reject its policies; if they consider it trustworthy, they will be more inclined to embrace 
them’.29 And if citizens do not support governmental policies, they cannot possibly succeed. In 
particular, political trust is necessary to grant governments the flexibility they need to effectively 
carry out their policies. The more citizens trust their government, the more likely they are to 
                                               
23 John T Scholz and Mark Lubell, ‘Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action’ 
(1998) 42 American Journal of Political Science 398. See also John T Scholz, ‘Trust, Taxes, and Compliance’ in 
Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds), Trust and Governance (Russell Sage Foundation 1998); John T Scholz and 
Neil Pinney, ‘Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior’ (1995) 39 American 
Journal of Political Science 490. While tax compliance was self-reported in the study and thus not directly measured 
(a point which Scholz and Lubell acknowledge (402)), as Dalton (n 7) 169 and Uslaner, ‘Tax Evasion, Trust’ (n 18) 
22 emphasise, it is difficult to objectively measure compliance with government regulations. 
24 Scholz and Lubell (n 23) 412. 
25 Steven M Sheffrin and Robert K Triest, ‘Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer 
Compliance’ in Joel Slemrod (ed), Why People Pay Taxes (University of Michigan Press 1992). 
26 For further empirical support, see Dalton (n 7) 158-59; Uslaner, ‘Tax Evasion, Trust’ (n 18).  
27 Jonas Edlund, ‘Trust in the Capability of the Welfare State and General Welfare State Support: Sweden 1997-
2002’ (2006) 49 Acta Sociologica 395. 
28 Marc J Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism (Princeton 
University Press 2005); Thomas J Rudolph, ‘Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Tax Cuts’ (2009) 73 
Public Opinion Quarterly 144, 144-45; Trüdinger and Bollow (n 9) 191. 
29 Hetherington (n 28) 51. 
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grant it what Margaret Levi has called “contingent consent”.30 Put concisely, they are more likely 
to support a governmental policy (or at least to tolerate it) even if they perceive the likely 
outcome of that policy to be unfavourable for them – that is, they are more likely to 
“contingently consent” to that policy.31 For example, citizens who trust their government are 
more likely to agree to a tax increase in support of a policy or to a proposed reform thereof. For 
this reason, it has been suggested that aside from trust’s relevance as an influence on citizens’ 
provision of critical resources in the form of tax money, trust is also – as a heuristic linked to 
citizen support for social policies – in and of itself ‘a critical resource for government’.32 
Once again, the claim that political trust impacts citizens’ attitudes toward/support for 
social policies is backed by empirics. Virginia Chanley and her colleagues have offered 
convincing evidence on this front.33 Specifically, using U.S. survey data, their study examined the 
relationship between public trust in government and what they refer to as “policy mood” (a 
measure reflecting ‘the extent of public support for increased government spending and activity 
across a range of domestic policy areas, including education, health care, welfare, aid to cities, 
and the environment’). 34  They found a positive correlation: greater trust in government 
correlated with greater policy mood. Chanley and her colleagues concluded that their findings 
were ‘consistent with theoretical expectations concerning the importance of trust in government 
for public willingness to commit public resources for policy ends’.35 A study conducted by Stefan 
Svallfors using Swedish survey data yielded similar findings to those of Chanley and her 
colleagues.36 In fact, Sven Steinmo – in his work on welfare states – has persuasively argued that 
the difference in the size of the welfare state in Sweden as compared with that of the United 
States is attributable to a difference in political trust (rather than a difference in citizen want for 
government spending, as is usually presumed).37 In interviews he conducted with citizens of 
Sweden, Britain and the United States, Steinmo found that the vast majority – including 
Americans – said that they would agree to an increase in their taxes if they ‘could be guaranteed 
                                               
30 Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent and Patriotism (Cambridge University Press 1997). 
31 Oscar W Gabriel and Eva-Maria Trüdinger, ‘Embellishing Welfare State Reforms? Political Trust and the Support 
for Welfare State Reforms in Germany’ (2011) 20 German Politics 273, 275. 
32 Trüdinger and Bollow (n 9) 189. 
33 Virginia A Chanley, Thomas J Rudolph and Wendy M Rahn, ‘The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in 
Government’ (2000) 64 Public Opinion Quarterly 239. 
34 ibid 245. 
35 ibid 253. 
36 Stefan Svallfors, ‘Political Trust and Support for the Welfare State: Unpacking a Supposed Relationship’ in Bo 
Rothstein and Sven Steinmo (eds), Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2002). 
37 Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (Yale 
University Press 1993). See also Sven H Steinmo, ‘American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?’ 
in Lawrence C Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds), The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Westview 
Press 1994). 
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that increased government spending would be efficiently and effectively used to address society’s 
problems’.38 He found, however, that American respondents were especially likely to follow up 
their response saying that they did ‘not believe that revenue from higher taxes would be used 
efficiently or effectively and therefore they would not approve tax increases’.39 Moreover, Eva-
Maria Trüdinger and Uwe Bollow have demonstrated a positive relationship between political 
trust and support for welfare state reforms.40 In their interviews with over 1,800 Germans, 
respondents were asked to report the level of trust they had in various political 
institutions/actors and to evaluate the direction of recent reforms on health care, pension and 
family policy. Trüdinger and Bollow ‘found significant effects of political trust’: the more 
respondents trusted government, the more likely they were to agree with the relevant reforms.41 
The tax compliance and social policy support which follow from political trust are 
especially important today given present-day circumstances which make the public funding and 
delivery of social goods and services ever-more challenging. In 2001, Paul Pierson wrote that the 
welfare state in affluent democracies faces a context of “permanent austerity”.42 By this he meant 
that owing to a set of circumstances which have generated much fiscal stress for countries 
(including changes in the global economy, a slowdown in economic growth, aging populations 
and reduced fertility rates), it is increasingly difficult for governments to finance previously-made 
commitments to social goods and services. Contrary to then-popular beliefs, Pierson prophesied 
that given persistent citizen support for the welfare state, the consequence of these pressures 
would not be the entire dismantling of the welfare state, but rather, moderate cost-cutting efforts 
by governments. According to Pierson, ‘neither the alternatives of standing pat or dismantling 
are likely to prove viable in most countries’.43 Instead, it was Pierson’s prophecy that ‘we should 
expect strong pressures to move towards more centrist – and therefore more incremental – 
responses. Those seeking to generate significant cost reductions while moderni[s]ing particular 
aspects of social provision will generally hold the balance of political power’.44 
Over the past 15 years, we have witnessed these sorts of cost-cutting efforts in affluent 
and developing democracies alike.45  And the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has not helped 
                                               
38 Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy (n 37) 199. 
39 ibid 199. 
40 Trüdinger and Bollow (n 9). 
41 ibid. For further empirical support, see Eun Young Nam and Myungsook Woo, ‘Who is Willing to Pay More 
Taxes for Welfare? Focusing on the Effects of Diverse Types of Trust in South Korea and Taiwan’ (2015) 44 
Development and Society 319. 
42 Paul Pierson, ‘Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies’ in Paul 
Pierson (ed), The New Politics of the Welfare State (OUP 2001). 
43 ibid 417. 
44 ibid 417. 
45 James Connelly, ‘Conclusion: Remaining the Welfare State?’ in James Connelly and Jack Hayward (eds), The 
Withering of the Welfare State: Regression (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Staffan Kumlin, ‘Overloaded or Undermined? 
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matters.46 While the period immediately following the crisis saw most countries increase public 
spending (by introducing fiscal stimulus programmes), by 2010, that trend reversed itself and 
premature budget cuts – in the form of “austerity” measures – became widespread.47 A review of 
austerity trends in 187 countries between 2010-20 found that by 2011, the majority of sampled 
countries (113 total) reduced their budgets, with an average reduction of 2.3 percent of GDP.48 It 
was projected that this contraction in public spending would intensify at least into 2020. 
Moreover, such contraction is not limited to affluent democracies; on the contrary, public 
spending contraction has been, and is projected to be, most severe in developing democracies.49 
Given the current state of events, it may be that now – more than ever – governments 
need their citizens to pay taxes and to support their social policies. If not, these two factors, 
coupled with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis and the circumstances which have given 
rise to “permanent austerity”, will seriously endanger governments’ ability to provide social 
goods and services. Accordingly, political trust may be imperative to the future of social welfare.  
That said, having explained political trust’s value, a brief word of caution is warranted. 
Given its connection to public support for social policies, political trust also presents a sort of 
danger. That danger is that citizens will support regressive social policies. For example, in the 
earlier-described study conducted by Trüdinger and Bollow which found ‘significant effects of 
political trust’ on public support for policy reforms, the reforms in question had neither raised 
social benefits nor offered greater social protection.50 On the contrary, they involved losses with 
costs frequently having been distributed unevenly. Consequently, political trust may have the 
effect of encouraging citizens to accept the erosion of social welfare (thereby making such 
erosion all the more likely). And for this reason, it may appear problematic to root courts’ 
enforcement of social rights in the concept of political trust (as I am proposing in this thesis). 
However, I think that it is important to recognise that public support for regressive social 
policies is not necessarily a bad thing. Where a government faces difficult financial circumstances 
(such as those following the Global Financial Crisis), it may have no choice but to make cuts to 
social goods and services. And in such circumstances, I suggest, public support for regressive 
                                                                                                                                                  
European Welfare States in the Face of Performance Dissatisfaction’ in Stefan Svallfors (ed), The Political Sociology of 
the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages, and Orientations (Stanford University Press 2007). 
46 Aoife Nolan, ‘Introduction’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights After the Global Financial Crisis 
(Cambridge University Press 2014), 1-4. 
47 Isabel Ortiz et al, ‘The Decade of Adjustment: A Review of Austerity Trends 2010-2020 in 187 Countries’ 
(International Labour Organization, ESS Working Paper No 53, 2015) <http://www.social-
protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=53192> accessed 11 August 2017, 9. See 
also ibid 3. 
48 Ortiz et al (n 47) 2. 
49 ibid 53. 
50 Trüdinger and Bollow (n 9). 
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social policies is not a bad thing. Rather, it is important that citizens support these necessary 
policies. That said, because such support can be a bad thing (for example, where regressive 
policies are not absolutely necessary but instead reflect a government’s biases or incompetence), 
we do need to introduce some degree of caution into our embrace of political trust in the social 
rights context. To start off, we do not want citizens to blindly trust government in introducing 
such regressive policies. However, as I will explain later in the thesis, my proposal that we root 
social rights enforcement in political trust would have courts ensure that governments, in 
exercising their control over social goods and services (including their introduction of any such 
regressive social policies), act in a trustworthy manner – that is, that they act in a manner which 
warrants citizens’ trust in them.51 As such, it guards against this sort of blind trust in government. 
At the same time, we must also recognise that the protection of social rights does not – 
and should not – stop at the courts. The role of courts in social rights protection is necessarily 
constrained by their limited legitimacy and capacity in allocating public resources.52 In light of 
such limitations, I use political trust in this thesis to carve out a defensible role for courts. But as 
I will elaborate in later chapters, social rights enforcement by courts is only one of many means 
by which social rights are protected (and ultimately realised) in contemporary social democracies. 
First of all, it is imperative that we acknowledge the distinction between the judiciary’s role in 
enforcing constitutional social rights and the substance of those rights more broadly. As Sandra 
Fredman has stressed, ‘the existence of a right does not mean that the court needs to make 
primary decisions about the allocation of resources’.53 Human rights have several roles and 
functions beyond the courts, including ‘an expressive and educational role, signalling the values a 
society stands for, regardless of the method for their enforcement’ as well as a ‘proactive 
function, guiding political and executive decision-making so that legislation, policy, and 
administration are formulated to meet human rights demands’.54 Further, but relatedly, there is 
scope for social rights protection (and realisation) beyond that provided by national 
constitutions. For example, a state (assuming it is a signatory to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) has international obligations, including those pertaining to 
the use of retrogressive measures.55 Importantly, the foregoing additional means by which social 
rights are protected (and realised) supplement the role which courts play in this area. And since 
                                               
51 I elaborate upon this idea of “warranting” trust later in this Introduction as well as in Chapter 4. 
52 I elaborate upon such legitimacy and capacity limitations in Chapter 4. Further, Chapter 3 focuses on the many 
parties and relationships involved in social rights protection. 
53 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008), 182. See also Matthias 
Klatt, ‘Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 354, 356. 
54 Fredman (n 53) 32-33. 
55 General Comment No 3. 
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these means will not centre on political trust, they can help to mitigate any dangers which the 
concept presents, including its potential, via public support for policies, to erode social welfare. 
 
Research Objectives and Method 
Despite the recognised value of political trust – both generally and specifically to social policy – 
no legal scholar to date has used political trust as a basis for studying social rights adjudication by 
courts. That said, the concept of trust is not new to law. Prominent scholars in other legal fields, 
ranging from contracts and trusts to medical and fiduciary law, have long recognised the 
importance of trust to law and have used the concept to better understand and advance their 
respective fields.56 For instance, and most recently, Matthew Harding has used the concept of 
trust in his study of fiduciary law. In that work, Harding has advanced the claim that legal 
scholars’ frequent references to the concept ‘suggests that trust may be an important organi[s]ing 
idea when thinking about what law is, what effect it has and what it ought to be doing’.57 
Drawing inspiration from Harding (as well as the other scholars referenced above), this 
thesis aims to similarly use trust as an “organi[s]ing idea” for social rights law. More specifically, 
its principal objective is to define and develop a trust-based perspective for the adjudication of 
constitutional social rights by courts. Before elaborating on this perspective, I think that the term 
“constitutional social rights” requires some clarification. As Jeff King has helpfully catalogued, 
there are many different senses in which we may use the term “social rights”.58 Not only are 
there both moral and legal senses to the term, but when social rights are used in their legal sense, 
they may have different sources, including international law, national legislation and national 
constitutions. In this thesis, my focus is the latter – that is, constitutional social rights. Thus, when 
I refer to “social rights” in this thesis, unless otherwise stated, I mean constitutional social rights. 
In particular, I am concerned mainly with a defined, but large, subset of constitutional social 
rights: rights to health, housing, education and social security.59  Moreover, in referring to 
“constitutional” social rights, I do not mean only those rights set out expressly in a constitutional 
                                               
56 Anthony J Bellia, Jr, ‘Promises, Trust, and Contract Law’ (2002) 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25; 
Margaret M Blair and Lynn A Stout, ‘Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law’ 
(2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1735; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Trusting in Law: Legal and Moral 
Concepts of Trust’ (1993) 46 Current Legal Problems 75; Frank B Cross, ‘Law and Trust’ (2005) 93 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1457; Mark A Hall, ‘Law, Medicine, and Trust’ (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 463; Mark A Hall, ‘The 
Importance of Trust for Ethics, Law, and Public Policy’ (2005) 14 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 156; 
Matthew Harding, ‘Manifesting Trust’ (2009) OJLS 245; Matthew Harding, ‘Responding to Trust’ (2011) 24 Ratio 
75; Harding (n 7). 
57 Harding, ‘Manifesting Trust’ (n 56) 245. 
58 Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012), 18-19. 
59 For a study with a similar focus, see ibid. In line with a well-established orthodoxy in the social rights literature, I 
am not concerned with labour rights (or what are often termed “economic” rights). 
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document.60 In using the term, I also refer to social rights which have been read into general 
constitutional provisions (eg rights to life, human dignity or security of the person) by courts.61 
And finally, it is well-recognised that social rights give rise to a tripartite set of duties on 
government: to respect (a duty of non-interference), to protect (a duty to prevent interference or 
denial by third parties) and to fulfil (a duty to positively provide).62 The latter duty is my primary 
concern in this thesis as it raises the greatest issues of public resource allocation, thereby making 
it the principal reason why social rights, and their enforcement by courts, are controversial. So, 
“social rights”, as used in this thesis, also refers specifically to positive social rights of this nature. 
In the trust-based perspective defined and developed herein, trust serves two broad ends. 
First, it provides an overall analytical lens through which we can examine the adjudication of 
constitutional social rights by courts. Thus, such adjudication is analysed in this thesis in terms of 
the concept of political trust. Second, political trust serves as the basis for a normative argument 
about the proper role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. In particular, political 
trust is used to suggest how courts can, and should, go about enforcing social rights. As will be 
recalled from the outset of this Introduction, the latter is the thesis’s central argument. 
This trust-based perspective applies slightly differently to those countries in which social 
rights have been constitutionalised as opposed to those countries in which that is not the case. In 
the former set of countries, the trust-based perspective represents what I will describe as an 
“actual” argument: it provides a means of analysing their courts’ adjudication of constitutional 
social rights and it offers a suggestion as to how their courts can, and should, enforce those 
rights. This is the case for South Africa, for example (a country which is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5). In the latter set of countries (those in which social rights have not been 
constitutionalised), the trust-based perspective represents an argument with both actual and 
hypothetical components. As for the actual argument, despite the non-constitutionalised status 
of social rights, this perspective nonetheless provides a means of analysing their courts’ 
adjudication of social welfare matters. On the hypothetical side, the trust-based perspective 
offers a suggestion as to how these countries’ courts – if they were to constitutionalise these 
social rights (either via constitutional amendment or by courts reading them into general 
                                               
60 For example, see sections 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the South African Constitution. 
61 For example, see the social rights which are protected under the right to dignity in Israel’s Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty (although the scope of such rights is contested): Aeyal Gross, ‘The Right to Health in Israel 
between Solidarity and Neoliberalism’ in Colleen M Flood and Aeyal Gross (eds), The Right to Health at the 
Public/Private Divide (Cambridge University Press 2014), 165. 
62 Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press 1980), 52; Henry 
Shue, ‘The Interdependence of Duties’ in Philip Alston and Katarina Tomasevski (eds), The Right to Food (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1985), 86. See also David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of 
Socio-Economic Rights (OUP 2007), 184; King (n 58) 35. 
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provisions) – could, and should, enforce them. This is the case for Canada, for instance 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6). And because of this hypothetical argument, for the 
latter set of countries, the trust-based perspective, on top of contributing to the conversation 
around how courts should enforce constitutional social rights, also contributes, albeit indirectly, 
to the conversation around whether to constitutionalise social rights in the first place. 
Furthermore, in advancing my normative argument, I am cognisant of the problems 
raised by proposing a uniform approach to social rights adjudication across jurisdictions with 
different socio-economic structures, constitutional cultures and political climates.63 And owing to 
such differences, I recognise that my argument (which – consistent with the orthodoxy in the 
social rights literature – is presented at a rather general level) will apply slightly differently to each 
jurisdiction which falls within this thesis’s scope. That said, given political trust’s tie to social 
stability, economic welfare and effective governance (ends which are not, at least to my mind, 
jurisdiction-specific) as well as the reasons which I present in Chapter 4, I think that the concept 
of political trust (and thus, my normative argument) has some level of broad currency. 
Also, to clarify, I submit in this thesis that political trust should be the dominant 
structuring principle for social rights enforcement by courts. This may seem an overly ambitious 
submission. However, given the breadth of political trust (as I conceptualise it in Chapters 1 and 
2) – to encompass considerations of transparency, participation by citizens, equality, competence 
and fiduciary responsibility – granting political trust such a dominant role, I think, makes sense. 
 To define and develop this thesis’s trust-based perspective for social rights adjudication 
by courts, I necessarily adopt an interdisciplinary approach. As my discussion of the recognised 
value of political trust should have suggested, trust has been the subject of a voluminous and 
complicated body of academic scholarship in the social sciences, including in political science 
and theory, sociology, philosophy and psychology. In parallel to the work of the above-
referenced scholars on trust and law, I draw on this social science scholarship on trust – and 
import and integrate it into the relevant legal literature on social rights adjudication by courts – in 
order to understand and define, in the social rights context, what trust is, how it functions and 
how it can be used to analyse and contribute to the study of such adjudication. Moreover, to 
illustrate the trust-based perspective in concrete terms, I draw on two specific examples: the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in South Africa during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and the reduction of wait times in Canada’s public health system during that same 
time period. These two examples serve as illustrations rather than case studies: as such, I use 
                                               
63 Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The Problematic of Social Rights – Uniformity and Diversity in the Development of Social 
Rights Review’ in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative 
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them for the modest purpose of illustrating my trust-based perspective. I have chosen these 
examples for a few reasons. First, both circumstances generated controversial court decisions: 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign in the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
(“TAC”),64  and Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General) in the Supreme Court of Canada (“Chaoulli”).65 
Second, because these decisions were controversial, they were the subject of much scholarly 
debate across disciplines, thereby making them ideal examples in order to illustrate the trust-
based perspective which is defined and developed herein. Third, as I elaborate in Chapters 5 and 
6, I have chosen these two examples because I think that they offer good counterbalances for 
one another. Whereas TAC involved a vulnerable group challenging a governmental decision 
which had a negative impact on that group, Chaoulli involved the reverse: a relatively less 
vulnerable group challenging a decision which had a positive impact on the most vulnerable 
segments of society. Consequently, the two cases depict two very different functions which 
courts can – and do – serve in social rights adjudication. Fourth, I have chosen these two 
examples because they enable me to illustrate contrasting positions which courts can adopt in 
terms of the promotion of government trustworthiness. In TAC, I will argue, the South African 
Constitutional Court did promote government trustworthiness (though, I will suggest, it did not 
go far enough). However, in Chaoulli the Canadian Supreme Court did not do so – in any respect. 
And lastly, I have chosen the jurisdictions of South Africa and Canada (as opposed to other less-
researched jurisdictions like those in Latin America or elsewhere) for practical reasons. Those 
reasons are as follows: (i) my linguistic abilities – because I am an English speaker I have chosen 
jurisdictions whose case law is published in English; (ii) my familiarity with Canadian law – I am 
a Canadian-trained lawyer and so I have a background in its law; and (iii) my target audience – in 
this thesis, I seek to communicate principally with scholars and jurists working on these 
jurisdictions, as well as jurisdictions with related systems (eg the UK). And while I am aware of 
scholarly criticisms of the prevalent pattern in social rights scholarship to focus on certain 
jurisdictions (like South Africa), my choice of a South African example here is not despite – but 
rather, because of – this pattern.66 Given the novelty of political trust, both as a concept and as a 
vocabulary for the social rights world, it makes sense, I think, to illustrate it (and the trust-based 
perspective on adjudication) with reference to a familiar case from a familiar jurisdiction. 
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Scope of the Thesis 
In the interests of greater clarity, I will take a moment here to outline the scope of the thesis. 
Specifically, because political trust is frequently associated and confused with other, related 
concepts, I find it is helpful to identify in this section that which I am not addressing in the thesis. 
 
Political Trust, not Social Trust 
In the political arena, the literature on trust has recognised four categories of relationships in 
which trust operates: the trust of citizens in their fellow citizens (what is often referred to as 
“social trust”); the trust of citizens in political elites (including both political/legal institutions 
and those who staff them) (what is often referred to as, and what I am calling, “political trust”); 
the horizontal trust among political elites; and the top-down vertical relationship where political 
elites form beliefs and expectations about the behavioural dispositions of citizens.67 This thesis 
does not really address the category of social trust. It focuses predominantly on political trust 
and to some, but a much lesser extent, the latter two categories. While I acknowledge that social 
trust and political trust are related (as many writers on trust have argued), there are also 
significant differences between the two, including with respect to their foundations and their 
consequences.68 Therefore, I leave the concept of social trust aside for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
Political Trust, not Political Satisfaction 
Further, political trust in this thesis should be distinguished from what may be termed “political 
satisfaction”. There is a tendency (among laypeople and writers on trust alike) to conflate 
citizens’ trust in government with their satisfaction with the outcomes which the government 
produces. As I elaborate in Chapter 1, this conflation follows from what I suggest are erroneous 
definitions of trust. Some writers on trust define the concept in terms of outcome – that is, I 
trust you if I expect that you will produce an outcome which is favourable to me.69 By this 
definition, if I am satisfied with the outcomes which you have produced in the past, I should 
expect you to produce outcomes which are favourable to me in the future and it necessarily 
follows from that expectation that I trust you. However, for reasons I describe in Chapter 1, 
                                               
67 Claus Offe, ‘How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?’ in Mark E Warren (ed), Democracy and Trust (Cambridge 
University Press 1999), 44. 
68 For a consideration of the difference between social trust and political trust, see Kenneth Newton, ‘Social and 
Political Trust in Established Democracies’ in Pippa Norris (ed), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic 
Government (OUP 1999), 179. 
69 For a critique of this definition, see Oliver Williamson, ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’ 
(1993) 36 Journal of Law and Economics 453. 
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such a definition of trust is problematic. Instead, trust is better defined in terms of procedure – 
that is, I trust you if I expect that you will follow a certain procedure in your interaction with me. 
 Accordingly, throughout this thesis, I maintain a sharp distinction between political trust 
and satisfaction. In the political context, this distinction is especially important as governing 
necessarily involves balancing competing demands and setting priorities, and frequently one 
demand is fulfilled at the expense of another. For this reason, we can expect governments to 
frequently produce outcomes which are unfavourable to one or more citizens, leaving those 
citizens dissatisfied with the outcome. Such dissatisfaction with the outcome does not necessarily 
mean that those citizens do not trust their government. Nor does it mean that the citizens who 
received a favourable outcome – and so, should be satisfied therewith – do trust government. 
 
“Warranted” Trust, not Blind Trust 
It has been argued that public trust in government is not always beneficial. As I elaborate in 
Chapter 4, some scholars have suggested that political trust may in fact be detrimental in some 
cases (ie where government is not trustworthy); in such cases, citizen distrust or scepticism is 
beneficial because it ‘keeps constituents alert, and therefore public officials responsive’.70 I do 
not dispute this argument. However, I do draw a distinction between what Mark Warren has 
called “warranted” trust and blind trust.71 I elaborate upon this distinction later in the thesis. 
That said, when I refer to the recognised value of political trust, I mean warranted trust. 
 
Theoretical Argument, not an Empirical Investigation 
Additionally, I want to say something about the nature of the argument which I advance in this 
thesis. Like most fields of study, the literature on trust is comprised of two principal categories. 
First, there is a body of theoretical work. Scholars across the social sciences have conceptualised 
what trust is, have theorised how we can expect trust to function and have made theoretically-
grounded predictions on the consequences of increased and/or decreased trust. Second, 
scientists have conducted empirical investigations of trust. In an effort either to test untested 
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theoretical arguments or to understand more generally the social determinants and consequences 
of trust, they have examined the relationship between trust and a variety of variables. 
 This thesis falls into the former category. It does not offer an empirical investigation of 
trust. Rather, it advances a theoretical argument: specifically, a theoretical argument about the 
impact which we can expect social rights adjudication – in its various shapes – to be able to have 
on public trust in government. Of course, this argument is not derived from nothing. It is rooted 
in both the theoretical and empirical research on trust. Extrapolating from the arguments 
developed and the findings made in that research to the specific context of social rights law and 
adjudication, I develop herein my own theoretical argument about trust and how it can be 
expected to function in this area. And as I said earlier, I use this theoretical argument to develop 
a normative argument about the proper role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. 
 
Limitation to Social, Constitutional and Common Law Democracies 
Lastly, the scope of this thesis is limited in three further ways. First, since the focus herein is on 
positive social rights (specifically, the provision of social goods and services by the state to its 
citizens), the thesis is necessarily limited to countries which are social democracies (at least in 
some respect). Second, given the thesis’s obvious focus on the enforcement of constitutional social 
rights – seeking to contribute to the conversation outlined at the outset regarding the proper role 
of courts in this specific area – it is also necessarily limited to constitutional democracies with a 
system of judicial review. And finally, as will become obvious in my discussion in Chapter 4 of 
the expected impact which social rights adjudication can have on public trust in government via 
court judgments, I am assuming a system of common law where courts write judgments which have 
precedential value. Thus, the scope of this thesis is also limited to jurisdictions which follow a 
common law tradition – at least with respect to the field of constitutional law.72 
 
Outline of Chapters 
The thesis proceeds in six chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 provide a necessary conceptual foundation 
for the thesis’s central argument vis-à-vis constitutional social rights enforcement by courts. In 
Chapter 1, based on my reading of the trust literature, I conceptualise trust in the social rights 
context. I conceptualise it as a relational concept, meaning that trust may only arise in a 
relationship which contains certain elements (what I call a “trust relationship”), and I define trust 
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in such a relationship as a set of three expectations held by the truster in the relationship about 
the trustee. Then, in Chapter 2, I apply this conceptualisation to the relationship between citizens 
and the elected branches of government with respect to social rights (what I call the “citizen-
government relationship”): in doing so, I characterise that relationship as a trust relationship 
(and therefore, as a relationship in which trust may arise) and I explain precisely what it means to 
say that citizens “trust” their elected branches of government with respect to social rights. 
 In Chapter 3, following on from my characterisation of the citizen-government 
relationship as a trust relationship, I apply what may be described as the “network conception of 
trust” to that relationship. According to the network conception, trust arises in and depends on 
complex structures or networks of relationships. Applying this conception to the citizen-
government relationship, I contend that in contemporary societies, the citizen-government 
relationship exists in a rich social context (which necessarily includes courts) and I suggest that 
trust in the citizen-government relationship depends on the other relationships in that context or 
network (including the relationship between citizens and courts arising out of social rights 
adjudication). From this suggestion, I arrive at the conclusion that we can expect social rights 
adjudication to be able to impact (including, in the right circumstances, to foster) political trust. 
 Chapter 4 brings it all together. Using the theoretical foundation laid in Chapters 1, 2 and 
3 as building blocks, I advance the thesis’s central argument: that political trust has normative 
potential for defining the proper role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. I argue – 
based on that theoretical foundation in tandem with other principled reasons – that courts, in 
enforcing constitutional social rights, can, and should, use the concept of political trust as an 
adjudicative tool. I put forward the specific claim that courts should hold the elected branches of 
government to a standard of trustworthiness (a concept which follows from trust); and in doing 
so, I carve out a role for courts as what I call “mediators of government trustworthiness”. 
 The final two chapters (5 and 6) offer illustrations of this central argument, as well as the 
broader theoretical foundation from Chapters 1-3. Using the concrete examples of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV in South Africa (litigated before the South African Constitutional 
Court in the TAC case) and the reduction of wait times in Canada’s public health care system 
(argued before the Canadian Supreme Court in Chaoulli), I briefly illustrate how the network 
conception of trust applies and then, focusing on my central argument, I assess whether in those 
cases the court mediated (and if not, how it could have mediated) government trustworthiness. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Conceptualising Trust in the Social Rights Context 
Before we can use the concept of political trust as an adjudicative tool for social rights 
enforcement (as I argue we can, and should, in Chapter 4), we must first do some work to 
understand what trust is. Developing an answer to that question is the goal of this chapter. 
Specifically, I offer herein a conceptualisation of trust in the social rights context. Writers on 
trust generally agree that trust is a context-specific concept.1 Put simply, what trust means in one 
context may not necessarily hold in another. Accordingly, Russell Hardin has emphatically 
stressed that it is inaccurate and unhelpful to provide an all-encompassing or “true” definition of 
trust. He has warned: ‘No matter how enticing it may sometimes be, to engage in that debate is 
foolish’.2 Hence, my goal in this chapter is a more modest one than that. Based on my reading of 
the literature on trust, I put forward ‘a workable notion’ of the concept of trust which I think is 
useable in the social rights context, including for the purpose of a social rights enforcement 
tool.3 I do so in two principal stages. First, I conceptualise trust as relational, meaning that it may 
only arise in a relationship constituted by three elements – control, discretion/uncertainty and 
vulnerability. These three elements make up what I refer to as a “trust relationship”. Then, 
second, using these constituent elements of a trust relationship, I define trust in this context as a 
set of positive expectations held by the truster regarding the manner in which the trustee will 
exercise the control he maintains over a good or service which the truster either needs or wants. 
 
Trust as a Relational Concept: Defining a “Trust Relationship” 
Following the lead of several prominent writers on trust, I choose to conceptualise trust as 
relational. By this I mean that trust is a property of a social relationship.4 That relationship is of a 
three-part form comprised of a trustee (A), a truster (B) and a good or service (X), where the 
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relationship takes the form of ‘B trusts A with respect to X’.5 This relational view of trust is to be 
distinguished from a competing view of the concept which instead considers trust a trait or a 
disposition of an individual actor.6 In that view, the unit of analysis is the individual – that is, the 
truster (B). I elaborate further on this particular distinction in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
Based on my reading of the literature on trust, I suggest that three elements are essential 
for trust to arise in that relationship between A and B: (i) A must maintain control over a good or 
service (X); (ii) A must hold discretion in exercising his control over X, thus rendering B uncertain 
of how A will exercise said control; and (iii) B must need or want X, which coupled with A’s 
control and discretion over X, renders B vulnerable to A. These three relational elements 
constitute a “trust relationship”. To be perfectly clear, by “trust relationship” I do not mean a 
relationship in which trust exists (what may be distinguished as a “trusting relationship”). Rather, 
I mean a relationship in which is it possible for trust to arise. In other words, though trust may 
theoretically arise in a “trust relationship”, it may or may not, in actuality, exist therein. 
In the social rights context, the identities of the trustee and the truster (A and B) as well 
as the definition of the good or service (X) depend on the relationship on which we are focusing 
and the specific sub-context with which we are dealing. In subsequent chapters, in my 
consideration and application of trust to specific relationships, I will be able to address more 
closely the identities of A and B, as well as the precise definition of X. However, I will make 
some general remarks here to provide some perspective for the discussion in this chapter.  
The potential actors which A and B may represent include both individuals and 
institutions. Many notable scholars, including Rom Harré,7 Guido Möllering,8 Henry Farrell,9 
Jörg Sydow10 and Bernard Barber11 have forcefully argued that institutions can be, and frequently 
                                               
5 Karen S Cook and Alexandra Gerbasi, ‘Trust’ in Peter Hedstrom and Peter S Bearman, The Oxford Handbook of 
Analytical Sociology (OUP 2009); Evan Fox-Decent, ‘The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority’ (2005) 31 
Queen’s Law Journal 259, 263, citing Annette Baier, ‘Trust and Antitrust’ (1985) 96 Ethics 231, 236-37; Evan Fox-
Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (OUP 2011), 105; Russell Hardin, ‘The Street-Level Epistemology 
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are, parties to trust-based relationships.12 Institutions can and do occupy both A and B roles. As 
I explain later in this chapter, trust may be defined as a set of expectations regarding the manner 
in which the trustee (A) will exercise his control over X. Given this definition, there is no reason 
(at least to my mind) why an institution cannot be a trustee. Institutions can and do exercise 
control over goods and services through their personnel, the exercise of which is determined by 
the policies and procedures of that institution. Thus, based on such policies and procedures, a 
truster can develop such expectations about – and in turn, trust – an institution. On this point, 
Rom Harré has said that ‘the trust relation between a person and an institution is a species of the 
person-to-person relation … Our beliefs about, as well as our affective and social relations to, 
the personnel account for standing in a trust relation to the institution they staff’.13 By the same 
token, an institution should be able to be a truster in a trust relationship. Once again, the 
personnel who staff that institution may form expectations of other actors, including other 
institutions, and implement the institution’s policies and procedures on behalf of the institution 
based on those expectations. For example, Bernard Barber has stressed that ‘what holds for 
individual actors with regard to larger systems also holds between systems at the same level or 
different levels: with proper caution, it makes sense to talk of the various kinds of expectations 
and trust that supraindividual systems have of one another’.14 Thus, A and B may represent both 
individuals (including individual citizens and residents, service providers, political officials and 
judges) and institutions (including not only the executive and legislative branches of government 
and the courts, but also, as I describe in Chapter 3, the media and special interest groups). 
As for X, its definition really depends on both the relationship and the sub-context of 
social rights which is at issue. For example, in the relationship between citizens and the elected 
branches of government with respect to social rights (what I call the “citizen-government 
relationship” and which I describe in greater detail in Chapter 2), X may represent any one of the 
myriad of social goods and services which are the subject of social rights. Understandably the 
precise nature of those social goods and services depends on the specific social right with which 
we are dealing. For instance, those social goods and services will be very different in the right to 
health, on one hand, as compared with rights to education, housing or social security, on the 
other. Generally, though, X in the citizen-government relationship denotes physical goods, 
personnel, infrastructure, equipment and benefits or services. Therefore, in the right to health, 
just by way of example, those goods and services include pharmaceuticals (physical goods), 
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trained doctors, nurses and other health care providers (personnel), hospitals and clinics 
(infrastructure), machines and beds (equipment) and various medical procedures. 
 
(i) The Trustee’s Control Over a Good or Service 
The first element of a trust relationship is that the trustee (A) maintains control over a good or 
service (X) (which the truster (B) needs or wants). Different circumstances may give rise to A’s 
control over X. These include the cost of X (such that A but not B has the financial means to 
afford X), the scarcity of X (such that A but not B has access to X) and B giving control of X to 
A (such that B has given A the responsibility of taking care of X). Many writers on trust 
erroneously assume that A’s control over X stems from the latter – B giving him control. Russell 
Hardin has criticised this assumption, identifying it as a slippage between “trusting” and 
“entrusting” (where the latter – B giving A control – is better encapsulated by the concept of 
“entrusting”).15 I agree with Hardin’s criticism here. As he has explained, ‘I can trust you to do 
something that I have not (even could not have) entrusted to you … trusting and entrusting are 
not equivalent or even parallel, although we might use the two terms as though they were 
interchangeable, especially in contexts in which both might apply’.16 Therefore, although A must 
maintain control over X, the source of A’s control need not be a grant of control from B. 
 Two sets of distinctions are noteworthy here. First, the trustee may maintain either direct 
or indirect control over the good or service (X). Direct control refers to situations where the 
trustee controls the good or service itself. Indirect control, in contrast, covers those circumstances 
in which the trustee does not control the good or service itself, but controls some means of 
gaining access to the good or service at issue. For instance, in the citizen-government 
relationship, the elected branches may maintain indirect control by operating social funding 
programmes. Second, the control maintained by the trustee may be either exclusive or partial. 
This distinction relates to the availability of the good or service to the truster from a source other 
than the trustee. Whereas exclusive control denotes that the trustee is the truster’s only possible 
source of obtaining the good or service, partial control means that the trustee is one of multiple 
sources. I elaborate upon this distinction and its importance under the vulnerability element. 
 
(ii) The Trustee’s Discretion in Exercising Control and the Truster’s Corresponding Uncertainty 
The trustee (A), in addition to maintaining control over the good or service (X), must also hold 
discretion in exercising that control. For the sake of simplicity, I may also refer to such discretion 
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as discretion over the good or service (X). Although writers on trust describe this element in slightly 
different ways, the substance is the same: A must not be so constrained by external factors that 
he no longer has free will in exercising his control. Diego Gambetta has said that trust 
necessitates that ‘agents have a degree of freedom to disappoint our expectations’ and that there 
‘be the possibility of exit, betrayal, defection’.17 For Roger Cotterrell, trust requires discretion to 
act ‘in unforeseen circumstances or in relation to new situations’.18 And according to Matthew 
Harding, trust ‘recogni[s]es and responds to the freedom of individuals to make choices’.19 
 A’s discretion in exercising control over X creates corresponding uncertainty for B. 
Uncertainty reflects the inability of B to predict the outcome of her interaction with A.20 Thus, B 
is uncertain whether she will obtain X from A. Discretion and uncertainty are directly related: 
more discretion afforded to A yields a wider range of possible courses of action for A in 
exercising his control over X which, in turn, yields a greater degree of uncertainty for B. 
By imposing external constraints on A, we reduce A’s discretion and, in turn, reduce the 
degree of uncertainty for B: B is better able to predict the outcome of her interaction with A 
based on her knowledge that A is constrained by external factors. Trust based on this knowledge 
has been called “impersonal trust”21 or “secondary trust”.22 Where no constraints have been 
imposed on A, in trusting A, B must rely only on beliefs she holds about A’s person or character. 
These beliefs will stem from information which B possesses about A such as his past behaviours. 
Trust based on these types of beliefs has been called “personal trust”23 or “primary trust”.24 
The range of possible courses of action available to A may be referred to as the “sphere” 
of discretion.25 This “sphere” understandably lies along a spectrum. At one end, A may have no 
external constraints imposed upon him and so, have absolute or unfettered discretion. At the 
other extreme, A may have so many external constraints imposed upon him so as to dictate the 
outcome of his interaction with B and leave him with no discretion. But the latter extreme (ie no 
discretion) is not trust. To repeat, for trust to arise, discretion and uncertainty (at least of some 
degree) must be present in the relationship. Uncertainty arises out of what Niklas Luhmann has 
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called trust’s ‘problematic relationship with time’.26 As he and other scholars have emphasised, to 
trust is to anticipate or hypothesise future events. However, the future cannot be accurately 
predicted. In Luhmann’s words, ‘the future contains far more possibilities than could ever be 
reali[s]ed in the present and hence be transferred into the past. The uncertainty which is bound 
to exist is simply a consequence of the very elementary fact that not all futures can become the 
present’.27 Given this prospect for multiple futures, trust is our response (or our “solution”, if 
you prefer) to uncertainty in the trust relationship. By trusting we anticipate ‘an unknowable 
future’.28 As Guido Möllering has put it, a key idea to the concept of trust is that it ‘requires a 
leap of faith’.29 In other words, we trust in spite of the uncertainty in the trust relationship. 
If the trustee’s exercise of control is so constrained by external factors to the point of 
eliminating his discretion and dictating outcome, trust has been removed from the equation. 
Without uncertainty in the relationship, there is no room left for trust: we no longer need to 
anticipate or hypothesise the future – we know it.30 In the apt words of Helen Nissenbaum: 
‘Where people are guaranteed safety, where they are protected from harm via assurances … trust 
is redundant; it is unnecessary. What we have is certainty, security, and safety – not trust’.31 
Those circumstances in which the outcome of A and B’s interaction follows entirely from 
external constraints are more accurately encapsulated by the concept of reliability.32 The truster 
may be able to predict said outcome not because he is trustworthy but because he is reliable. 
Of course, as the “sphere” of discretion lies along a spectrum, circumstances can and will 
fall in between the two extremes of absolute/unfettered discretion and no discretion. The trustee 
may have some external constraints placed upon his exercise of control but nonetheless maintain 
some discretion in exercising that control. In such circumstances, the truster’s ability to predict 
the outcome of her interaction with the trustee will be based on a mixture of the information she 
holds about the trustee and her knowledge of the external constraints which have been imposed 
upon him. Of note, this intermediate position between absolute/unfettered and no discretion is 
pivotal to my discussion in Chapter 4 of courts as “mediators of government trustworthiness”. 
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(iii) The Resulting Vulnerability of the Truster 
Lastly, the good or service (X) is something which the truster (B) either needs or wants. This 
fact, coupled with the other two elements, renders B vulnerable to the trustee (A). Since X is of 
necessity or value to B, its provision to B contributes to B’s well-being. And because A has 
control and discretion over X, B is placed in a position of vulnerability: it is possible that A may 
act in a way which is in B’s interests (so as to further her well-being) but since A is a free agent 
with discretion, he may also act to harm B’s interests in their interaction.33 As Annette Baier has 
stressed, ‘Where one depends on another’s good will, one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits 
of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts’.34 Put simply, 
A may provide B with X (a good or service which she needs or wants) but because A has 
discretion in exercising his control over X, it is also possible that A may not provide B with X. 
The extent of B’s vulnerability to A depends principally on two factors: the availability of 
X to B from sources other than A, and the personal attributes and life circumstances of B.35 I use 
the term “principally” because I do not wish to suggest that these factors exhaustively determine 
the extent of B’s vulnerability. We may certainly imagine other factors which may have some 
bearing on B’s vulnerability. I focus here on these two because they enable me to elaborate upon 
the elements of control and discretion/uncertainty to which I have referred in defining a trust 
relationship and because they will be of relevance to the citizen-government relationship later. 
First, B’s vulnerability depends on whether or not she can obtain X from sources other 
than A. This factor is linked with the control element in the trust relationship and, more 
specifically, the distinction drawn there between exclusive and partial control.36 If A is B’s only 
source of X, A maintains exclusive control over X. This exclusive control, depending on the 
extent of A’s discretion in exercising that control, opens B up to extreme vulnerability. B is at the 
mercy of A with respect to X. Should A refuse to provide B with X, B is denied X – a good or 
service which she needs or wants. But if B has the option of obtaining X from an alternative 
source, A’s control over X is only partial and B’s vulnerability is less. In that case, should A 
refuse to provide B with X, she may suffer harm (as a result of inconvenience, time or cost, for 
example) but she is not denied X. B has the option of turning to the alternative source of X. 
It may be argued that what I am calling vulnerability is more accurately described as 
“dependence”. This may be true. However, the work of scholars including Martha Albertson 
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Fineman, Susan Dodds and Margaret Urban Walker suggests that vulnerability and dependence 
are closely connected.37 In fact, both Dodds and Walker have defined dependence as a form of 
vulnerability. Both of them have drawn a distinction between vulnerability in a general sense (ie 
as a result of our embodiment) and vulnerability to a specific person given a certain relationship. 
Dodds and Walker have identified the latter form of vulnerability as dependence. For Dodds, 
‘Dependence is vulnerability that requires the support of a specific person (or people) … In this 
way dependence can be contrasted with those vulnerabilities that do not involve immediate 
reliance on specific individuals’.38 Similarly, Walker has distinguished between vulnerability in a 
general sense (what she has called “vulnerability-in-principle”) – which she has described as 
‘susceptibility to injury’ or ‘being under threat of harm’ – and vulnerability to a particular actor 
(what she has called “dependence-in-fact”).39 For Walker, in the case of dependence, the actor 
who ‘holds control of the vulnerability stands in a particular sort of relation to the one who has 
the vulnerability’.40 In a trust relationship, the vulnerability to which the truster is exposed is not 
of a general sort but rather is vulnerability to a specific actor – the trustee. Thus, although the 
trust literature uses the term vulnerability, I think that it is really dependence (as a form of 
vulnerability) in which we are most interested vis-à-vis trust. Nevertheless, to be consistent with 
the trust literature, I will continue to use the term vulnerability rather than dependence. 
Second, the extent of B’s vulnerability to A depends on certain personal attributes and 
life circumstances of B. These attributes and circumstances are those which have some bearing 
on the extent to which B needs or wants X, such as B’s health, age, talents and socio-economic 
status.41 In other words, these attributes and circumstances increase B’s stakes in the transaction 
between her and A.42 For example, consider a scenario where A is a health administrative agency 
which determines coverage under a government-funded health insurance plan and X is a 
particular treatment (eg a chemotherapy drug). The value of X to B in this scenario heavily 
depends on B’s health. Assume three potential trusters: B1 (an individual who has been 
diagnosed today with a malignant tumour), B2 (an individual who has been diagnosed today with 
a benign tumour), and B3 (an individual who was diagnosed a year ago with a malignant tumour, 
who has not responded to any drugs and who has been advised by her oncologist that she will 
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likely not respond to X). Given their respective health statuses, the chemotherapy drug is of 
greater value to B1 and B3 than to B2. Let us further assume that B3 is persuaded by her 
doctor’s advice and thus, X is of greater value to B1 than to B3. In this scenario, given the health 
statuses of the three trusters as well as the drug’s value to each of them given the information 
from B3’s doctor, B1 is most vulnerable to A followed by B3 and B2, in that particular order. 
Since this factor is tied to the identity of B, as opposed to the relationship or X itself 
(which was the case for the previous factor), it has the potential to discriminate. By this I mean 
that one truster may be rendered more vulnerable to a trustee than another even though the two 
are parties to the same relationship with A involving the same good or service. Further, B’s 
attributes and/or circumstances may also overlap (eg health or race with socio-economic status) 
to exacerbate B’s vulnerability to A and further discriminate.43  And further still, this second 
factor may interact with the first factor (the alternative availability of X) such that although two 
trusters may equally need or want X, they may unequally need or want X from A. For instance, 
consider a scenario where X is available from a source other than A but at a significant cost. 
Although X is technically available to B from an alternative source, in actuality, X is only 
available to B where B has the financial means to take advantage of that alternative source of X. 
To demonstrate this interaction, let us return to the scenario of B1, B2 and B3 and the 
chemotherapy drug. Assume that in the scenario, a private insurance company offers plans 
which cover the chemotherapy drug for an annual charge. B1, B2 and B3 therefore have access 
to an alternative source of X (the private insurance company) but only where they are in a 
financial position to afford to pay the annual charge levied by those companies. One who is not 
in that financial position is more vulnerable to the health administrative agency and its coverage 
decision. Thus, if B1 is of a lower socio-economic status than B2 and B3, B1’s socio-economic 
status interacts with the availability of X such that, aside from her differential health status as just 
discussed, she is more vulnerable to A than B2 and B3 because she is less able to afford what it 
costs to take advantage of the alternative source of X (the private insurance company). 
 
Defining Trust 
To recap: where the three elements of control, discretion/uncertainty and vulnerability are 
present in a relationship, trust may arise therein. These elements do not guarantee trust but set 
the stage for it to be possible. But that does not tell us what trust is (which, as I said earlier, we 
need to answer before we can use political trust as a social rights enforcement tool for courts). In 
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this part of the chapter, building on the three constituent elements of a trust relationship, I 
define trust as a set of positive expectations held by the truster (B) regarding the manner in 
which the trustee (A) will exercise the control he maintains over the good or service (X). This 
definition of trust will serve as a key theoretical building block for the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Cognitive Versus Affective Trust 
To develop this definition of trust, and for the purpose of clarity, I will start with a common 
categorisation used in the trust literature. Trust is frequently divided into two categories: affective 
trust and cognitive trust.44 On one hand, affective trust is emotional in nature.45 It is a matter of 
our having ‘trustful affects, emotions or motivational structures’ towards another actor.46 We can 
think of affective trust as “feeling” trust towards the trustee. Cognitive trust, on the other hand, 
is more conscious and reasoned than affective trust.47 It is a matter of our beliefs (or, as I will 
elaborate shortly, our expectations) about how another will behave towards us.48 
In most circumstances, trust will be a combination of these two categories.49 That said, 
my focus in this thesis is on cognitive trust. This is so for at least two reasons. First, as writers on 
trust have recognised, affective trust usually arises in relationships of shared interests between 
the truster and the trustee which can merge into a shared identity.50 For example, we see this 
kind of trust most frequently in parent-child or marital relationships. Cognitive trust, in contrast, 
arises more in relationships which occur at a distance and lack the affective convergence of 
interests and identities, such as trust in professionals, authorities, political officials and 
institutions.51 Thus, given this thesis’s emphasis on political trust and the citizen-government 
relationship, it makes sense for it to focus on the latter. Second, cognitive trust is more 
contingent than affective trust on external circumstances.52 Our beliefs and expectations of 
others are likely to change depending on those circumstances. To assert that B trusts A cognitively 
suggests that B expects A will do C in situation S; to assert that B trusts A affectively suggests that 
B’s emotional attitude towards A is trustful (regardless of the situation in which she finds 
                                               
44 Lawrence C Becker, ‘Trust as Noncognitive Security about Motives’ (1996) 107 Ethics 43, 44-45. These 
components are not separated into watertight compartments; or as Becker has observed ‘a fuzzy boundary’ exists 
between them. However, it is worthwhile to maintain a distinction between them (44-45). 
45 Cross (n 42) 1459. 
46 Becker (n 44) 44. 
47 Cross (n 42) 1459. 
48 Becker (n 44) 44. 
49 Annette Baier, ‘Trust and Its Vulnerabilities’ in Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Harvard University 
Press 1995), 132; Becker (n 44) 44-45. 
50 Warren (n 43) 330. 
51 ibid 330. 
52 Cross (n 42) 1468. 
 
34 
herself).53 Accordingly, it should be possible to change B’s cognitive trust in A by changing S (at 
least more so than affective trust which is less adaptable). Thus, owing to this thesis’s concern 
with the impact which social rights adjudication can be expected to have on the public’s trust in 
its government, it once again makes sense for it to focus on the category of cognitive trust. 
 
Trust as a Set of Expectations 
Many writers have defined trust (at least cognitively speaking) in terms of the truster’s 
expectations vis-à-vis the trustee’s behaviour.54 In this thesis, I do so as well. The expectations of 
which trust is comprised may be divided into three groups: (i) an expectation that the trustee will 
exercise good will towards the truster; (ii) an expectation that the trustee has the technical 
competence to fulfil his role – that is, to exercise his control over the good or service in a 
competent manner; and (iii) in certain relationships which are of a fiduciary nature, an 
expectation that the trustee will fulfil the fiduciary responsibility which he owes to the truster. 
 First is the truster’s expectation that the trustee will exercise good will towards her.55 This 
expectation is a very broad one; it has been characterised in different ways by different writers on 
trust. Karen Jones has focused on how the trustee will respond to his being trusted, describing it 
as an ‘expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favourably 
moved by the thought that you are counting on her’.56 For John Dunn, it is an ‘expectation of 
benign intentions in another free agent’ thereby emphasising a lack of ill will on the part of the 
trustee (rather than the presence of good will).57 Bernard Barber’s account makes the expectation 
even broader, characterising it as an ‘expectation of the persistence and fulfi[l]ment of the natural 
and the moral social orders’ where those orders encompass an expectation that one will exercise 
good will towards another in the absence of reasons to the contrary.58 I think the expectation of 
good will is probably best described as a combination of these various characterisations. It may 
be summed up as an expectation that the trustee will exercise good will towards the truster, in 
the absence of conduct from the truster giving the trustee reason to exercise ill will towards her. 
 The second expectation of which trust is comprised is an expectation held by the truster 
that the trustee has the technical competence (ie knowledge and skills) to fulfil his role and thus, 
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to exercise his control over the good or service.59 This expectation necessarily supplements the 
good will expectation because as Jones has justifiably pointed out, ‘optimism about goodwill is 
not sufficient, for some people have very good wills but very little competence, and the 
incompetent deserve our trust almost as little as the malicious’.60 The trustee’s competence may 
come from a number of sources, including expert knowledge, technical facility or daily routine 
performance.61 Competence helps explain in part why trust involves a three-part relationship 
revolving around a particular good or service (X). Although we may expect that one has the 
competence to deal with one good or service, this expectation does not necessarily carry over to 
a different good or service. Where X changes, B’s expectations of A’s competence may change 
and, in turn, the extent to which B trusts A with respect to the new X may change. Trudy Govier 
has vividly made this point by stating ‘trust is often relative to particular contexts and ranges of 
action: we might trust someone in the role of snow-shoveller but not that of baby-sitter’.62 
 In addition to the expectations of good will and competence which apply universally, in 
certain relationships, trust is also comprised of a third expectation. It arises only in relationships 
which may be characterised as fiduciary in nature. This expectation stems from the work of 
Bernard Barber. According to Barber, because there are cases where the truster may not be able 
to comprehend the trustee’s technical competence, society instills a moral sense of fiduciary 
responsibility in those who possess special knowledge and skills (and accordingly wield power).63 
Such trustees include parents, government officials, professionals and institutions. As Barber has 
pointed out, we can only monitor technically competent performance from these individuals and 
institutions ‘insofar as it is based on shared knowledge and expertise’.64 Where the trustee’s 
knowledge and expertise are not shared by the truster, something more is necessary. Fiduciary 
responsibility is that something more. Accordingly, trust by way of the fiduciary expectation is ‘a 
social mechanism that makes possible the effective and just use of the power that knowledge and 
position give and forestalls abuses of that power’.65 The expectation is that the fiduciary will fulfil 
the responsibility which society has instilled in him. And that responsibility is, as Barber has 
summarised it, ‘to demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above their own’.66 
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 As I will elaborate in the next chapter, there is considerable support for characterising 
political relationships like the citizen-government relationship as fiduciary in nature. And as such, 
trust in such relationships would be comprised of an expectation of fiduciary responsibility. Not 
only has Barber explicitly recognised the application of this expectation to political officials and 
institutions, but the recent work of public law scholars, including Evan Fox-Decent and Evan 
Criddle, advances the argument that relationships between the state (including state institutions 
such as the elected branches of government and the courts) and those subject to its/their power 
are properly characterised as fiduciary in nature.67 If we accept this argument that the state, its 
institutions and those who staff them are fiduciaries to those subject to their power, the latter’s 
trust in the former will consist of an expectation that these bodies and staff will fulfil their 
fiduciary responsibility to them – that is, they will put those trusters’ interests above their own.  
 
A Behavioural Aspect to Trust? 
The definition of trust which I have set out – as a set of expectations held by the truster – may 
lead a reader to rightfully ask: but is trust not also a behaviour on the part of the truster? And the 
answer to this question would be yes. It is well-recognised in the trust literature that (affective 
trust aside) trust exists on two interconnected levels: one cognitive and the other behavioural. 
Cognitive trust refers to an aspect of trust which is internal to the truster. As the term 
suggests, it occurs at the level of thoughts or beliefs held by the truster about the trustee and his 
behaviour. The definition of trust which I have set out in the previous section captures trust at a 
cognitive level. Behavioural trust, in contrast, is the outward manifestation of those thoughts or 
beliefs by the truster, in the form of actions. Behavioural trust signals to the trustee, as well as 
the world at large, that the truster trusts the trustee. Extrapolating from the definition of trust 
which I have set out, trust at the behavioural level may be defined as the truster’s acting upon the 
expectations of good will, competence and fiduciary responsibility which she holds if/when she 
trusts the trustee at a cognitive level, thereby manifesting her trust in the trustee.68 
Some writers on trust argue (or at least seem to suggest) that both levels – cognitive and 
behavioural – are necessary for there to be trust at all.69 I disagree. While trust at the cognitive 
level may surely be manifested in behaviour (and that behaviour could be rightfully included 
within the concept of trust), in my view, the absence of such behaviour does not mean that trust 
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somehow ceases to exist. Why must I act on my expectations of good will, competence and 
fiduciary responsibility in order to “trust” you? I can see no reason why this must be the case. 
On the contrary, defining trust as requiring both the cognitive and behavioural levels has 
problematic consequences. It may lead, and in actuality has led, many writers to the erroneous 
conclusion that trust represents a “choice” – that is, the truster chooses (at a cognitive level) to 
trust the trustee. This conclusion, however, as Russell Hardin has stressed, is incorrect: one does 
not choose to trust at a cognitive level, but rather one chooses to act on that trust. Hardin has 
explained: ‘I do not typically choose to trust and therefore act; rather, I do trust and therefore 
choose to act’.70 Thus, it is the truster’s behaviour in response to her trust at a cognitive level (ie 
behavioural trust) which represents a choice. This error is not by itself devastating for the 
definition of trust. What is devastating in my view is the following: because the “choice” 
characterisation attaches to the behavioural level of trust (as I have just explained), and this 
definition requires both levels for trust to exist, writers have suggested that where the truster has 
no choice of behaviour, trust cannot exist.71 In these writers’ view, trust necessitates that it be 
‘possible for us to refrain from action. If it were only others who enjoyed freedom, while we had 
no alternative but to depend on them, then for us the problem of trust would not arise’.72 In 
other words, “choice”, it has been suggested by these writers, is a requirement of trust. 
This suggestion is problematic because it excludes from the ambit of trust, a number of 
relationships, including (and important for my purpose) political relationships like the citizen-
government relationship. In general, such political relationships are characterised by little or no 
choice because citizens’ subjection to governmental power is inevitable. As Philip Pettit has said, 
‘Wherever I choose to live, I will find myself subject to a government and in a position of 
vulnerability to government agents’.73 Accordingly, citizens have very limited choices (limited to 
choices in voting for their elected officials and whether to remain in their country).74 Now, in the 
context of social rights, wealthy (and potentially middle-class) citizens do have a choice which 
low-income citizens do not: they have the option to turn to the private market for social goods 
and services. As I will explain in greater detail later in this thesis, low-income citizens are at the 
mercy of politicians and bureaucrats for social goods and services. To define trust as requiring 
both cognitive and behavioural levels (and choice necessarily present at the behavioural level) 
suggests that whereas wealthy and middle-class citizens can trust their elected branches with 
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respect to social rights, for low-income citizens, trust is not possible. In my view, this conclusion 
cannot be correct. Despite having no choice but to depend on the elected branches for social 
goods and services, low-income citizens may nonetheless trust them at a cognitive level. 
For these reasons, I have chosen to define trust as a cognitive concept, separate from its 
behavioural manifestation. In this choice I am supported by notable writers on trust.75 To be 
clear, this does not mean that trust does not have a behavioural aspect. A truster may act on her 
expectations of good will, competence and fiduciary responsibility and, in so doing, manifest her 
trust in the trustee. What it means is that, simply, such behaviour is not a requirement of trust. 
 
Trust’s Focus on Procedure 
The three expectations which I have set out above regard the manner in which the trustee 
exercises his control over the good or service – in other words, the procedure by which that 
exercise of control takes place. But there is an additional expectation which the truster may hold: 
an expectation regarding the outcome of her interaction with the trustee. Put concisely, the truster 
may have an expectation about whether the trustee will, in the end, provide her with the good or 
service which she needs or wants. These two expectations are without doubt interconnected. It 
makes sense that if I expect you to exercise good will, act competently and fulfil your fiduciary 
responsibility to me, I should be more likely to expect (or perhaps more accurately “hope” for) a 
favourable outcome from our interaction (ie that you will provide me with the good or service at 
issue). The reverse should also be true: if I do not expect good will, competence and fulfilment 
of fiduciary responsibility, I should be less likely to expect a favourable outcome. However, 
despite the interconnection between these two expectations, it is imperative that we not conflate 
them so as to equate the latter – the expectation of a favourable outcome – with trust. 
To explain why I think that this is so, consider what it means to say that a trustee has 
“abused” or “breached” a truster’s trust. Under the definition of trust which I have set out 
herein (ie trust as expectations of good will, competence and fiduciary responsibility), where the 
trustee acts contrary to these expectations (ie does not exercise good will, act with the requisite 
competence or fulfil his fiduciary responsibility), the trustee will have “abused” or “breached” 
the truster’s trust in him. In my view, this conclusion makes sense. Now, contrast that with a 
definition of trust as an expectation of a favourable outcome (whatever that outcome may be). 
That would mean that if the trustee acts contrary to that expectation by producing an 
unfavourable outcome (even though he exercised good will, acted competently and fulfilled his 
fiduciary responsibility to the truster), the trustee will have “abused” or “breached” the truster’s 
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trust. Can this be correct? I do not think so. The truster may be dissatisfied with the outcome, 
yes, but it cannot be reasonably said that there has been an abuse or a breach of trust. It is for 
this reason, as will be recalled from the Introduction to this thesis, that I draw a distinction 
between political trust (focusing on procedure) and political satisfaction (focusing on outcome). 
Moreover, this conclusion that trust focuses on procedure as opposed to outcome is 
supported by empirical research. From the Introduction, we know that the value of political trust 
is its tie to public cooperation, including the public’s willingness to accept authority decisions, its 
feeling obligated to obey laws and its performance evaluations of those in positions of authority. 
This tie explains, in turn, why public trust in government is considered a means to the valuable 
ends of social stability, economic welfare and effective governance. However, and importantly, 
the work of scholars like Tom Tyler, Margaret Levi, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse 
has shown that citizens’ assessments of government legitimacy – and the cooperation which 
follows from such legitimacy – are much more influenced by citizens’ judgments of the 
procedure by which government actors make decisions than by the outcome of their decision-
making.76 In fact, these scholars have concluded that procedure is the “central” or “dominant” 
consideration for citizens vis-à-vis legitimacy and cooperation.77 To be clear, the outcome of the 
interaction between citizens and government actors is not irrelevant. Outcomes are very relevant, 
especially to citizens’ satisfaction with government; but this body of research supports the 
conclusion that outcomes have minimal importance to citizens’ assessments of government 
legitimacy and their cooperation with government actors.78 And seeing as the principal basis for 
political trust’s value to contemporary democracies is citizen cooperation with government 
actors, I suggest that it is better to conceptualise trust in terms of the three expectations which I 
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have outlined above (which are procedural and whose connection with cooperation finds strong 
empirical support) rather than as an expectation of a favourable outcome.79 
 
Chapter Summary 
The conceptualisation of trust which I have offered in this chapter forms the foundation for the 
subsequent analysis in this thesis. From it, two principal points may be taken. First, trust arises in 
a three-part relationship between a truster, a trustee and a good or service which the truster 
needs or wants. That relationship – referred to as a “trust relationship” – is constituted by three 
elements: control, discretion/uncertainty and vulnerability. Second, trust in a trust relationship 
may be defined as a set of positive expectations held by the truster regarding the manner in 
which the trustee will exercise the control he maintains over the good or service. Thus, trust is a 
cognitive (rather than behavioural) concept and focuses on procedure, specifically that by which 
the trustee exercises his control (rather than outcome). With this conceptualisation of trust made 
out, I now proceed in Chapter 2 to apply it specifically to the citizen-government relationship. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Citizen-Government Relationship 
In Chapter 1, I laid the conceptual groundwork for understanding trust in the social rights 
context. In this chapter, I apply that groundwork specifically to the relationship between citizens 
and the elected branches of government with respect to social rights (what I will refer to from 
here forward as the “citizen-government relationship”). Paralleling the structure of Chapter 1, 
the application in this chapter proceeds in two principal stages. First, applying the three 
constituent elements of a trust relationship (control, discretion/uncertainty and vulnerability) to 
the citizen-government relationship, I characterise that relationship as a trust relationship. As 
such, I establish it as a relationship in which it is possible for trust to arise. Second, extrapolating 
from the definition of trust developed in Chapter 1 to the citizen-government relationship, I set 
out in this chapter what it means to say that citizens “trust” their elected branches with respect 
to social rights. Specifically, I define trust in the citizen-government relationship as a set of 
positive expectations held by citizens regarding the manner in which the elected branches will 
exercise the control they maintain over the social goods and services which citizens need. 
 
Establishing the Parameters of the Citizen-Government Relationship 
Before I get to this characterisation and definition, I shall first elaborate upon what I mean by 
the citizen-government relationship. In social democracies, there exists a relationship between 
citizens and the elected branches of government with respect to social welfare. Citizens pay taxes 
to the state and using the revenue collected from those taxes, the state provides citizens with a 
range of social goods and services by delivering a certain set of social programmes. 
Constitutional social rights afford citizens constitutional protection vis-à-vis such social goods 
and services (and establish corresponding obligations for the state to its citizens).1 When I speak 
of the citizen-government relationship, I am generally assuming that that relationship exists in a 
system in which social rights are constitutionalised. Thus, the citizens in that relationship, under 
their constitution, possess the relevant rights to health, housing, education and social security.  
As social rights scholars have consistently emphasised, both of the elected branches play 
an important role in protecting social rights.2 The legislative branch contributes amendments to 
                                               
1 Such rights may either guarantee citizens the social goods and services themselves or they may guarantee citizens 
“access” (or some equivalent) to those social goods and services. 
2 Cécile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (OUP 2003); Jeff King, Judging Social 
Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012); Patrick Macklem, ‘Social Rights in Canada’ in Daphne Barak-Erez and 
Aeyal M Gross (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing 2007); Mark Tushnet, Weak 
 
42 
and promulgates the primary legislation which defines the parameters of state-delivered social 
programmes.3 It also endorses the budget which allows the state to fund, and accordingly deliver, 
the programmes at issue. The executive – in which I include civil servants therein and the 
various administrative agencies relevant to the identified areas of social welfare – prepares the 
bulk of primary legislation which is introduced to the legislature, and then supplements, amplifies 
and implements that social welfare legislation through a broad range of administrative action.4 
 Two points of clarification on this relationship are warranted. First, when I say “citizens” 
I do not mean it in the sense of citizenship as legal status. Rather, I use the term to refer to those 
individuals who, under the relevant constitution, are afforded the protection of social rights. 
Thus, depending on the jurisdiction at issue, “citizens” – as I use the term here – may include 
residents and/or individuals of other legal status. That said, it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to consider who, as a matter of international and constitutional law, should be afforded social 
rights protection. Second, I should explain why I have chosen to collapse the legislative and 
executive branches of government into one actor (what I have called the elected branches) and, 
in what follows, into one trust relationship (the citizen-government relationship). I have made 
this decision for a few reasons. The primary reason relates to what I seek to achieve in this 
thesis. One of my main objectives, as I indicated in the Introduction, is to analyse the impact 
which we can expect constitutional social rights adjudication to have on public trust in 
government. This analysis is built upon a distinction between, on one hand, the legislature and 
the executive (as elected bodies) and, on the other, the judiciary (as an unelected body). Although 
I do recognise that there is an important distinction to be drawn between the legislature and the 
executive, I do not want that distinction to overshadow the distinction between the elected 
branches and the courts which is far more central to my analysis. Further, and relatedly, in 
conducting this analysis, I strive to contribute to the current debate on the proper role of courts 
in enforcing constitutional social rights. The orthodoxy in that literature is to focus on the 
tripartite relationship between citizens, the elected branches and the courts. Because I situate my 
thesis in that literature, it makes sense to follow that orthodoxy – at least to some extent. Finally, 
from a purely practical perspective, most of the social science theoretical scholarship on political 
trust, upon which I am relying for my analysis herein, does not draw much of a distinction 
between the legislature and the executive. Rather, there is a tendency in that scholarship to speak 
of the relationship between citizens and their government at a more general level. Thus, I think 
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that it is best for me to maintain my analysis in this thesis at an equally general level, referring to 
the distinction between the legislature and the executive only where necessary. 
 
The Citizen-Government Relationship: A Trust Relationship 
The citizen-government relationship encompasses all three elements of what I have called a trust 
relationship. In this part of the chapter, I explain how. But before proceeding to this analysis, let 
us quickly reconfigure the citizen-government relationship to fit the three-part form (ie the A-B-
X relationship) that I outlined in Chapter 1. A and B (the trustee and the truster) represent the 
elected branches and citizens, respectively. The elected branches (A) include, as I have said, both 
the legislature and the executive. X represents any one of the myriad of social goods and services 
which I outlined in Chapter 1 as being the subject of social rights. To repeat, they include 
physical goods, personnel, infrastructure, equipment and benefits or services, and they relate to 
the rights of focus in this thesis: health, housing, education and social security. 
 
(i) The Elected Branches Maintain Control over Social Goods and Services 
The first element of a trust relationship – control – is quite manifest in the citizen-government 
relationship. In any social democracy, the elected branches maintain some degree of control over 
social goods and services which citizens need and/or want. Social rights are said to promise 
social goods and services which citizens need in order to lead a decent life.5 Accordingly, I will 
proceed under the assumption that in the citizen-government relationship, the social goods and 
services at issue are needed by citizens. The elected branches’ control over these social goods and 
services is exercised via the various legislative and administrative steps which I described earlier, 
including the preparation, development and promulgation of primary legislation, the preparation 
and approval of the budget, and subsequent administrative action. These legislative and 
administrative steps, taken together, are prerequisites to the state-delivered social programmes 
which grant citizens access to the social goods and services which they need. In concise terms, 
without such steps, these programmes would be neither created nor implemented and, in turn, 
citizens would not have access to such social goods and services – at least not from the state. 
Granted, the nature of the elected branches’ control is nuanced. For one thing, the 
source of that control is debatable. There is a good argument that the source of the elected 
branches’ control is citizens’ taxes. In this regard, Charles Reich argued long ago that owing to 
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citizens’ obligation to pay taxes to the state, social rights should be seen as property rights.6 For 
Reich, since social goods and services are supported by taxes, they are best viewed as ‘substitutes 
for, rather than supplements to, other forms of wealth’.7 The tax money which citizens pay to 
the state ‘is no longer available for individual savings or insurance. The taxpayer is a participant 
in public insurance by compulsion, and his ability to care for his own needs independently is 
correspondingly reduced’. 8  If we accept Reich’s argument, citizens are giving the elected 
branches control over these social goods and services, thereby entrusting them with the social 
goods and services which they need. However, as I said in Chapter 1, while such giving of 
control (or entrusting) is one source of control – and so, sufficient for this element of a trust 
relationship – it is not necessary. All that a trust relationship requires is that the elected branches, 
by whatever means, do exert control over those goods and services. This is indeed the case here. 
 For another thing, the two sets of distinctions which I outlined in Chapter 1 with respect 
to control do play out in the citizen-government relationship. First, the elected branches may 
maintain direct or indirect control over the social goods and services. In some countries and with 
some social rights matters, the elected branches maintain direct control over social goods and 
services: they produce physical goods, employ personnel, own equipment and infrastructure, or 
administer benefits and services directly to citizens. In other cases, the elected branches maintain 
indirect control by, for example, operating funding programmes and through regulation. Second, 
the elected branches’ control may be exclusive or partial: the elected branches may be citizens’ 
only possible means of obtaining social goods and services (exclusive control) or they may be 
one of multiple means (partial control). The Canadian public health system (which is described in 
further detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis) offers a fitting example of a government having 
exclusive control. Under the federal Canada Health Act, provinces are effectively required to 
provide their residents with a health care insurance plan which insures all “medically necessary” 
health care services. Several provinces, in complying with this requirement and providing plans, 
have chosen to legislatively prohibit residents and health care providers from privately 
contracting for services which are already covered by the public plan. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has described the effect of such legislation as generating what it refers to as ‘a virtual 
monopoly for the public health scheme’.9 Accordingly, such provinces may be said to have 
exclusive control over “medically necessary” care. However, this Canadian example represents, 
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for social goods and services more generally, the exception rather than the rule. In contemporary 
social democracies, providers of social goods and services rarely find themselves confined to a 
single, public system. In some cases, a provider will have the opportunity to offer her goods and 
services concurrently via both the public system and privately; in other cases, the provider may 
be compelled to choose one system or the other. Regardless of which applies, the opportunity 
for providers to offer their goods and services privately has important implications for citizens. 
It means the availability of a private market, the effect of which is that citizens are not 
(technically speaking) wholly dependent on the elected branches for the social goods and 
services which they need; they may have the option of obtaining them from a source alternative 
to the elected branches (ie a private provider). Where such a private market is available, the 
elected branches maintain partial control over the social goods and services. The relevance of 
such partial control will become evident shortly. That said, and like I explained regarding the 
source of the elected branches’ control, neither of these two distinctions (direct/indirect and 
exclusive/partial) changes the critical fact that the elected branches do indeed maintain control 
over social goods and services – they merely alter the type of control which is maintained. 
Thus, the first element of a trust relationship is duly satisfied in the citizen-government 
relationship: regardless of the nuanced nature of the elected branches’ control, including that 
control’s ultimate source as well as its precise type, the elected branches in social democracies do 
maintain some degree of control over social goods and services which citizens need. 
 
(ii) The Elected Branches Exercise Discretion and Citizens are Correspondingly Uncertain 
In any social democracy, the elected branches, on top of maintaining control over social goods 
and services, also hold discretion in exercising that control. Of course, this includes discretion 
with respect to those social goods and services which citizens need. I do not think that this point 
is especially controversial; however, in the interest of comprehensiveness and for the purpose of 
my subsequent analysis, I will elaborate briefly. Also note that, for the moment, I am leaving 
aside any constraints on the elected branches’ discretion which may be imposed by courts. As we 
will see, such judicial constraints on government are the focus of my argument in Chapter 4. 
In his highly influential book Discretionary Justice, Kenneth Culp Davis has defined 
“discretion” in politics as follows: ‘A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits 
on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction’.10 
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The elected branches, in exercising their control over social goods and services, are indeed left 
free to make such a choice.11 The precise nature of that choice, however, depends on the branch 
of government of which we are speaking. Robert Goodin, in his discussion of discretion in the 
welfare state, has pointed out that in any social democracy (or welfare state) there ‘must 
inevitably be legislative discretion in deciding which rules to adopt in the first place’ as well as ‘a 
certain amount of administrative discretion in bringing particular cases under general rules’.12 
The legislature undoubtedly exercises much discretion.13 Both in exercising its power of 
the purse and in promulgating primary legislation, the legislature is, to use Davis’s words, left 
‘free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction’. Among other things, it can 
choose to approve (or not) the executive’s proposed budget and it can choose to promulgate (or 
not or propose amendments to) legislation put before it. While the legislature’s discretion can be 
restrained by constitutional limits, including express social rights language, given the vagueness 
with which social rights are often formulated, such restraint is likely to be minimal.14 
The executive also has a wide margin of discretion.15 Lorne Sossin has helpfully classified 
three levels of discretion which administrative decision-makers exercise.16 The first is legal 
discretion. It refers to legislative grants of authority in which administrative decision-makers are 
given an express choice. Here, the legislature expressly delegates its discretion to administrative 
decision-makers because those decision-makers may be in a better position to make the decision 
at hand (although the legislature usually specifies an overall purpose). Second, administrative 
decision-makers exercise interpretive discretion. Unlike its legislative counterpart, interpretive 
discretion is not expressly delegated by the legislature but arises from vague or ambiguous 
language in the relevant social welfare statutes. As explained by Henriette Sinding Aasen and her 
colleagues, ‘Legislation pertaining to welfare is often formulated in general or vague terms and 
with broad object clauses, which leave room for a substantial degree of professional discretion in 
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the application of the law’.17 Thus, administrative decision-makers are left with the discretion to 
interpret such general or vague statutory language. Finally, administrative decision-makers 
exercise discretion through what Sossin has called “administrative choices”.18 These choices 
include how a citizen applies for benefits, which documents must be produced and verified, how 
decisions on eligibility are reached by decision-makers, the requisite training and qualifications of 
decision-makers and the extent of personal contact between decision-makers and applicants. At 
each level, decision-makers are, to use Davis’s definition again, given a ‘choice among possible 
courses of action or inaction’ – whether that choice be express, implicit or “administrative”. 
The discretion exercised by both elected branches of government gives rise to inevitable 
uncertainty for citizens. This uncertainty too exists on multiple levels. Inescapably, whenever a 
political decision is made, there is the uncertainty that a citizen will not receive what she wants 
from the political process. Governing necessarily involves balancing competing demands and 
setting priorities, and frequently one demand is fulfilled by the elected branches at the expense of 
another.19 Conor Gearty has called this form of uncertainty the ‘defect in politics’.20 In social 
rights matters, there is a limited budget available to the elected branches in funding and/or 
delivering social goods and services to their citizens. Governments cannot fund and/or deliver 
every social good and service to every citizen.21 Thus, as an inevitable consequence thereof, some 
citizens will be left unhappy or dissatisfied with the political process’s ultimate outcome. 
However, and in my view more importantly, there is an additional type of uncertainty: 
that a citizen’s interests will be discounted, or worse, disregarded. In those cases where a citizen 
has not received what she wants from the political process, it does not necessarily follow that her 
interests have been discounted or disregarded: her interests may have been duly considered by 
the elected branches but, in making their political decisions (ie exercising their control dutifully 
which involves balancing competing demands and setting priorities), the elected branches may 
have decided that what the citizen wanted was not the “right” or “best” decision. Nevertheless, 
because the elected branches do have the discretion which I have just described, the reverse may 
be equally true: the citizen’s interests may have been indeed discounted or disregarded. First of 
all, the elected branches may discount or disregard a citizen’s interests in favour of their staff’s 
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own interests. As Margaret Levi has emphasised, both bureaucrats and politicians have their own 
interests when they make political decisions: for bureaucrats it is to maximise budgets and 
power, and for politicians it is to maximise votes.22 When these actors’ interests conflict with the 
interests of citizens (generally or a specific subset of citizens), there is the uncertainty that the 
elected branches’ decisions will be made in a way which furthers these actors’ interests rather 
than those of citizens.23 Second, even if we assume good faith on the part of bureaucrats and 
politicians, these actors may nonetheless discount or disregard a citizen’s interests because of 
simple neglect.24  Owing to a lack of experience or to just basic ignorance on their part, 
bureaucrats and politicians may not be aware of or fully understand the plight of the citizen (or 
the group to which she belongs) and thus, fail to protect her interests – albeit unintentionally. 
Of note, the threat of a citizen’s interests being discounted or disregarded by the elected 
branches is pronounced especially for low-income citizens. This is so because their interests are 
not likely to align with either bureaucrats or politicians. Bureaucrats’ interests in maximising 
budgets and power are likely to run contrary to the interests of low-income citizens in 
maximising social welfare entitlements; the less money spent on social welfare, the more money 
that remains in the budget (and which may be used elsewhere). Politicians’ interests in 
maximising votes means that they will cater to the interests of those who have political influence 
and can re-elect them into power. Unfortunately, this politically powerful cohort of citizens is 
not likely to include those with low income. Several social rights scholars, including Sandra 
Fredman, Jeff King, Paul O’Connell and Kim Lane Scheppele have forcefully argued (supported 
by a body of empirical studies) that low-income citizens do not exert much political influence 
and thus, are a marginalised group.25 This marginalisation of low-income citizens follows a 
circular pattern. To start off, it is a well-recognised point that governmental policy-making is 
heavily influenced by the wealthy through lobbying and interest groups.26 As Colm O’Cinneide 
has suggested, the reality of the situation is ‘that those in most need of state support are often 
those least able to access the political system and press for change’.27 Following in large part 
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from the wealthy’s disproportionate political influence, those with low income tend to feel 
excluded from the political and democratic process and so, tend not to participate in it: they 
seldom register as voters and, when they do register, they are not organised voters generally.28 
Accordingly, political parties rarely target low-income voters and so, low-income citizens lack 
representation which would give them a political voice to influence governmental policy-
making.29 As a result, the interests of low-income citizens – on top of being discounted or 
disregarded intentionally in the pursuit of political ambition – are also likely to be neglected 
unintentionally due to a lack of representation.30 Hence, and bringing us full circle, the wealthy 
(and middle class) are given even more political clout, leading low-income citizens to feel even 
more excluded and to their further marginalisation. On those rare occasions where a political 
party does target those with low income, it is often met with countervailing political forces from 
the wealthy lobbying and interest groups which prevent it from delivering on social programmes 
it may have promised.31  As King has pointed out, a strong welfare state – which entails 
regulation of commerce and redistributive tax spending – is ‘diametrically opposed to the interests of 
the wealthy’ and thus ‘precisely the target of the well-resourced lobbying interests’.32 
To make matters worse, in newer democracies such as those in the Global South and the 
former-Soviet Union, these various forms of uncertainty are exacerbated. On this point, David 
Landau has convincingly argued that such democracies frequently suffer from a lack of political 
party institutionalisation.33 Whereas more developed democracies benefit from institutionalised 
party systems (with political parties having clear and enduring ideological platforms), newer 
democracies do not: their parties are plagued by confused platforms which change frequently. 
Because of this lack of political party institutionalisation, voters in newer democracies are less 
able to use party identification to assess the views of prospective politicians – and in turn, less 
able to predict how they will exercise control over social goods and services. As Landau has 
made clear, ‘the party label is a necessary shortcut for voters: without it, they will often be unable 
to make an informed choice. And where the ideological meaning of a party label is malleable, 
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voters will not get what they think they are getting even if they do try to rely on the party label’.34 
Hence, in newer democracies, an already uncertain process is rendered all-the-more uncertain. 
We may thus fairly conclude that the citizen-government relationship satisfies the second 
element of a trust relationship: in social democracies, both the legislature and the executive hold 
discretion in exercising their control over those social goods and services which citizens need, 
and correspondingly, citizens are left uncertain of how said control will ultimately be exercised. 
 
(iii) Citizens are Vulnerable to the Elected Branches 
Lastly, in the citizen-government relationship, citizens are vulnerable to the elected branches (at 
least to some extent). Extrapolating from what I said in Chapter 1, citizens’ vulnerability follows 
from the combined effect of two features of the citizen-government relationship: first, the 
control and discretion which the elected branches have over social goods and services (ie the 
first two elements of a trust relationship) and second, citizens’ need for those social goods and 
services. Because citizens need the social goods and services, their provision to citizens 
contributes to citizens’ well-being; and because the elected branches have control and discretion 
over those goods and services, the elected branches hold power over citizens. The elected 
branches, in exercising their control, may or may not choose to provide the social goods and 
services to citizens; and as a result, citizens may not be able to obtain those goods and services – 
at least not from the state. Accordingly, citizens are vulnerable to the elected branches. 
Granted, citizens are not equally vulnerable to the elected branches. Just how vulnerable a 
specific citizen is to the elected branches depends on the two factors which I set out in Chapter 
1. In the citizen-government relationship, the first factor (the availability of the good or service 
from an alternative source) usually, and predictably, translates into whether the social good or 
service is available from a provider on the private market. As I said earlier, in contemporary 
social democracies, it is rare for the elected branches to maintain exclusive control over social 
goods and services: there is often available to citizens (at least those who can afford it) a private 
market for those goods and services – ie the elected branches maintain partial control. Where a 
citizen can access a social good or service through the private market, her vulnerability to the 
elected branches is less. Second, a citizen’s vulnerability depends on the personal attributes and 
life circumstances which I identified in Chapter 1: these include her health, her age, her talents 
and, of particular importance here, her socio-economic status. For example, a citizen in poor 
health is in greater need of public health care than one who is in good health and so, is more 
vulnerable to the elected branches. Similarly, a citizen with children has greater need for public 
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education than one without children and so, once again, is more vulnerable. But also recall that 
this second factor may interact with the first. In the citizen-government relationship, this 
interaction is an especially significant one. Of particular note, citizens’ socio-economic status 
interacts with the availability of social goods and services from private sources to generate an 
inequality of vulnerability across citizens. To repeat, where a citizen can access a social good or 
service through the private market, her vulnerability to the elected branches is less. In other 
words, the relevant providers on the private market mitigate citizens’ vulnerability. However, 
only those citizens who have the financial means to turn to the private market (ie the wealthy 
and potentially the middle class) may benefit from this opportunity for mitigated vulnerability. 
Their money makes the private market a practical alternative should their government refuse to 
provide, or place restrictions on the provision of, social goods and services in the public system. 
In other words, the latter category of citizens is not wholly dependent on their government for 
the social goods and services which they need. For low-income citizens, however, the public 
system is likely their only means of access. They do not have the financial resources necessary to 
make the private market a practical alternative. Instead, low-income citizens are most likely at the 
mercy of politicians and bureaucrats for the social goods and services which they need.35 
I leave aside for the moment the inequality of vulnerability which follows from these two 
factors and their interaction. While I fully acknowledge that this inequality can and does exist, 
the fact remains that all citizens are vulnerable to the elected branches, at least to some extent. If 
the social goods and services at issue are, generally speaking and on the whole, things which 
citizens need, and the elected branches have control and discretion over those goods and 
services, citizens are inevitably vulnerable. Regardless of whether there is a private market for a 
specific social good or service as well as whether a citizen has the financial means to take 
advantage of that market, the elected branches nonetheless maintain control over a social good 
or service which that citizen needs. The elected branches – whether the only source or one of 
many sources of that social good or service – still remains a source thereof. And therefore, the 
citizen is exposed to some degree of vulnerability to the elected branches. Accordingly, the 
citizen-government relationship also satisfies the third and final element of a trust relationship. 
 
Defining Trust in the Citizen-Government Relationship 
Given the foregoing analysis, it is hopefully apparent that the citizen-government relationship 
may be accurately characterised as what I have called a trust relationship. As such, based on my 
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discussion in Chapter 1, the citizen-government relationship is a relationship in which it is 
possible for trust to arise. If we accept this as true, it brings me to my next question: what 
precisely is trust in the citizen-government relationship? In other words, what does it mean to 
say that citizens “trust” their elected branches of government with respect to social rights? 
Employing the ‘workable notion’ of trust which I developed in Chapter 1 and applying it here, I 
define trust in the citizen-government relationship as follows: it is a set of positive expectations held by 
citizens regarding the manner in which the elected branches will exercise the control they maintain over the social 
goods and services which citizens need. And applying the three expectations set out in Chapter 1 to the 
citizen-government relationship, the expectations comprising this specific trust are the following: 
(i) that the elected branches will exercise good will toward citizens; (ii) that the elected branches 
will fulfil their fiduciary responsibility to citizens; and (iii) that the elected branches have the 
requisite competence to exercise the control they maintain over those goods and services. 
 Before getting into these three expectations, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to 
one point. As will become apparent very shortly, the definition of trust which I develop in this 
chapter (as arising in the citizen-government relationship) brings together a number of broad 
ideas in which legal scholars and political scientists have long been interested. Each of these 
ideas is the subject of a large and rich body of academic scholarship. Accordingly, it would be 
impossible in this thesis for me to offer any in-depth consideration of these ideas and their 
corresponding bodies of scholarship. However, I would like to stress that in developing this 
definition of trust, my objective is not to do so. Rather, my objective is a significantly more 
modest one: I seek simply to demonstrate how these ideas relate to the three expectations which 
comprise trust and through the concept of trust, to connect these ideas with one another. 
 
(i) The Expectation of Good Will 
The first constituent expectation of trust in the citizen-government relationship is good will: for 
citizens to trust their elected branches means that they expect the elected branches to show good 
will toward them in their exercise of control over social goods and services. To be more specific, 
I suggest that this expectation of good will translates into two inter-related sub-expectations. 
The first sub-expectation is that those actors who staff the elected branches will exhibit 
good intentions toward citizens in exercising said control. To quote the apt words of John Dunn, 
trust in the political context necessarily includes an ‘expectation of benign intentions’ from 
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political actors.36 To elaborate a bit upon what this means in the social rights context, I think that 
it is helpful to consider a typology of reasons outlined by Kent Roach and Geoff Budlender as to 
why governments fail to comply with constitutional standards vis-à-vis social rights matters.37 
Roach and Budlender (relying on a typology which was originally developed by Chris Hansen in 
another context) have set out three such reasons: inattentiveness, incompetence and 
intransigence on the part of government. Inattentiveness refers to those circumstances in which 
government actors make unintentional oversights or, as is more commonly the case, they fail to 
appreciate the nature of their constitutional obligations to citizens.38 Incompetence captures 
those cases of government non-compliance which are due to incapacity or, in the words of 
Roach and Budlender, the product of ‘decades of neglect, inadequate budgets and inadequate 
training of public officials’.39 I will address the issue of competence a bit later in the chapter. And 
finally, intransigence covers those situations in which government actors understand their 
constitutional obligations to citizens and have the capacity to meet them, yet they refuse to do 
so.40 In my view, the first sub-expectation of good will (the expectation of good intentions) may 
be properly recharacterised as an expectation that the elected branches will not act – to use 
Roach and Budlender’s/Hansen’s term – ‘intransigently’ in exercising their control over social 
goods and services. Where the elected branches (or more accurately their staff) understand their 
obligations to citizens and are able to meet those obligations – however, they choose not to (as 
intransigence suggests) – the elected branches fail to exhibit good intentions toward citizens.41 
The second sub-expectation which I suggest is encompassed by good will is that the 
elected branches, in exercising their control over social goods and services, will employ fair 
procedures. This sub-expectation follows from the first. As Joel Brockner has said, ‘The fairness 
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of procedures says a lot about whether the party’s [ie the trustee’s] “heart is in the right place.” 
Fair procedures signify that the party “means well,” that is, the party appears to want to live up 
to its commitments’.42 Thus, by implementing and following a set of fair procedures, the actors 
who staff the elected branches convey their good intentions toward citizens. Now, fair 
procedures is one of the broad ideas to which I referred earlier. And it is well beyond the scope 
of this chapter or this thesis to offer an exhaustive definition of “fair procedures” in social rights 
matters. Scholars across various disciplines have long debated the parameters of procedural 
fairness. That said, I do, however, wish to provide at least some elaboration of the notion here. 
In particular, I would like to make two points of elaboration: one is relatively simple and 
the other is much more involved. First, because I have defined trust in the citizen-government 
relationship as a set of expectations held by citizens (and the expectation of good will is an 
expectation held by citizens), it seems amply reasonable that the “fairness” of said procedures 
would also be judged from the perspective of citizens. In other words, fairness is defined by 
what citizens would reasonably be expected to consider fair. Second, scholars, in debating the 
parameters of procedural fairness, have identified a lengthy list of elements which they say (often 
supported by empirical studies) contribute to people’s assessments of procedural fairness.43 
Undoubtedly, these elements carry different weight depending on context.44 Therefore, while it is 
beyond this thesis’s scope to exhaustively define fair procedures in the social rights context (and 
thus, to consider every element of procedural fairness therein), in what follows I do wish to 
outline three such elements which I regard as carrying particular weight in this specific context. 
The first such element is transparency: for citizens to perceive the process by which the 
elected branches exercise their control over social goods and services as fair, it must be 
transparent.45  A transparent process enables citizens to see how the elected branches are 
exercising their control over social goods and services and to know whether, in that process, the 
actors who staff those branches are indeed exercising good will (not to mention acting in 
accordance with the other two constituent expectations of trust). Linking transparency directly to 
citizen trust, Karen Cook, Russell Hardin and Margaret Levi have noted that because ‘[p]ower is 
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often correlated with lack of transparency and secrecy’, those in political power are more likely to 
be perceived as trustworthy if they employ ‘a decisionmaking process that is transparent enough 
to those dependent on them to reveal that their actions are in the best interest of those over 
whom they have power’.46 In the social rights context, such transparency is especially important 
because, as it has often been said, the ‘welfare state presents itself to the public as an 
extraordinar[ily] complex, diversified and unintelligible institutional arrangement’.47 A transparent 
process signals to citizens that the elected branches have nothing to hide in this complex 
arrangement. In essence, transparency offers citizens good reason to expect good will to be 
exercised by the elected branches (as well as, once again, the other two expectations of trust). 
This is because if the elected branches fail to meet citizens’ expectations in this regard, their 
failure will be on display for everyone to see.48 Moreover, and relatedly, if a citizen wishes to 
challenge a governmental decision in this regard, a transparent process equips that citizen with 
the information she needs to do so and, in turn, to hold the elected branches accountable.49 
The second element of procedural fairness which is of considerable importance in the 
social rights context is participation: for citizens to judge the elected branches’ process for 
exercising their control over social goods and services as fair, it must be participatory.50 To use 
the concise words of Margaret Levi: ‘If a group perceives that its voice is systematically ignored, 
it will not accept the policy-making process as fair’. 51  The relevance of participation to 
procedural fairness is owed, in large part, to the fact that participation renders the process more 
representative. Gerald Leventhal, in his influential work on procedural fairness in allocative 
procedures (which most processes of concern in social rights matters indeed are), has identified 
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“representativeness” as a key criterion which such procedures must satisfy to be perceived as 
fair.52 As Leventhal has explained, for a perceiver to judge an allocative process as fair, ‘all phases 
of the allocative process must reflect the basic concerns, values, and outlook of important 
subgroups in the population of individuals affected by the allocative process’.53 This criterion of 
representativeness intertwines with the element of participation where the perceiver (the person 
determining the fairness of the procedure in question) is one of the individuals who are affected 
by the allocative process: in Leventhal’s words, his participation in that process makes it ‘fairer 
because it gives greater representation to a very important individual, namely, himself’.54 In the 
social rights context, participation is especially important since, for the reasons I outlined earlier, 
it is highly questionable whether low-income citizens and their interests are truly represented via 
the political/democratic processes. Their participation makes such representation more likely. 
The significance of participation to perceptions of procedural fairness is well-supported 
by empirical studies. For example, based on an extensive body of studies conducted by him as 
well as others, Tom Tyler has concluded that people feel more fairly treated if they are given 
opportunities ‘to participate in the resolution of their problems or conflicts by presenting their 
suggestions about what should be done’.55 He has referred to such opportunities for participation 
as “process control or voice”. However, and of particular note, Tyler has found that such 
participation in the process need not amount to control over its outcome. Although people’s 
assessments of fairness are indeed enhanced when what they say shapes the outcome of a 
dispute, such control over outcome is not essential for a process to be judged as fair. People 
value the simple opportunity to share their views with decision-makers even if those views have 
little to no influence on the ultimate decisions made.56 In fact, when it comes to political 
disputes, Tyler has found that not only do people not need control over outcomes, they do not 
want it: people expect political authorities to make those decisions for them.57 But with that said, 
people do need to feel that their views were sincerely considered by decision-makers in making 
their decisions – ie that their “voice” was indeed heard by the relevant decision-makers.58 To 
quote Tyler, for participation to lead to ‘the evaluation of procedures as fairer’, people ‘must 
trust that the authority sincerely considered their argument, even if they were then rejected’.59 
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Accordingly, based on the foregoing research, I suggest that for citizens to perceive the 
process by which the elected branches exercise their control over social goods and services as 
fair, citizens must be able to participate in that process. If a governmental decision has particular 
impact on a specific group of citizens, procedural fairness requires that said group be able to 
express its views to the relevant government authority and that the latter, in turn, sincerely 
consider those views in the process of making its decision. The government authority need not 
allow those views to dictate its ultimate decision; however, it must sincerely consider them. 
The final element of procedural fairness which I will point to as especially important in 
the social rights context is respect for citizens’ rights: for citizens to perceive the process by which 
the elected branches exercise their control over social goods and services as fair, their rights must 
be respected in that process.60 For Tyler, this element falls under a larger fairness element which 
he has called ‘treatment with dignity and respect’. 61  Tyler has found that people judge a 
procedure as fairer when they are treated with dignity and respect in that procedure – and such 
treatment includes both ‘common respect and courtesy’ as well as ‘respect for peoples’ rights’.62 
In Tyler’s words, ‘People value having respect shown for their rights and for their status within 
society. They are very concerned that, in the process of dealing with authorities, their dignity as 
people and as members of society is recogni[s]ed and acknowledged’.63 
Now, as Tyler has pointed out in his work, respect for citizens’ rights encompasses both 
human rights as well as legal process rights (eg standing to bring a legal case).64 And therefore, 
procedural fairness requires that the elected branches respect all of these rights in exercising their 
control over social goods and services. That said, I would like to stress one particular right here: 
citizens’ (human) right to equality.65 Why? As many scholars have emphasised, the right to 
equality is closely related to social rights.66 And following from this relationship, we should – in 
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addressing the appropriate approach to enforcing social rights – also consider equality. 
Accordingly, this brings me to a question: if procedural fairness in the social rights context 
requires that the elected branches respect citizens’ rights – including, importantly, their right to 
equality – what does it mean for the elected branches to respect citizens’ right to equality? 
Under a formal approach to equality, it means that the elected branches will, in exercising 
their control over social goods and services, treat all citizens alike. However, the equality 
literature makes very clear that the formal approach to equality suffers from several problems, 
including, of particular note, its failure to address deeply entrenched patterns of social 
disadvantage and its perverse capability of disallowing governmental measures aimed at actually 
promoting equality.67 For that reason, I submit that respect for citizens’ right to equality cannot 
reasonably connote the protection of formal equality. Rather, in line with what is the 
overwhelmingly dominant view in the equality literature (as well as the position adopted by some 
national courts), I submit that equality in this regard denotes substantive equality.68 And hence, 
for the elected branches to respect citizens’ right to equality in their exercise of control over 
social goods and services, they must exercise said control in furtherance of substantive equality. 
Unlike formal equality (which focuses on differential treatment in law, seeking to 
eliminate such differential treatment), substantive equality’s focus is on ‘patterns of group-based 
disadvantage’ which give rise to structural inequality.69 It recognises that ‘equality cannot be 
achieved by adopting a merely negative or “hands-off” approach’; and hence, it acknowledges 
the need for positive governmental measures which address that group’s disadvantaged 
position.70 In view of that, substantive equality is said to ‘transcend[] formal equality at the point 
where it demands differential legal treatment in order to ameliorate and overcome inequalities’.71 
While there is much agreement in the equality literature in favour of a substantive (rather than 
formal) approach to equality, there is disagreement as to the overarching objectives of such an 
approach: that is, they agree that equality demands positive governmental measures but disagree 
over what is to be equalised in introducing such positive measures.72 Sandra Fredman, in her 
influential work in the area, has argued that substantive equality ‘resists capture by a single 
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principle’.73 According to her, substantive equality is, rather, a multi-dimensional concept.74 And 
drawing on the strengths of various principles in the substantive equality discourse, Fredman has 
identified four objectives for the concept: (i) to promote respect for the equal dignity and worth 
of all (including to redress stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence); (ii) to accommodate, 
affirm and celebrate identity within a community; (iii) to break the cycle of disadvantage which is 
associated with out-group membership; and (iv) to facilitate full participation in society. For 
Fredman, these objectives – or dimensions – interact and have synergies with one another; and 
so, we can, and should, consider how the dimensions might be used to buttress one another. 
I agree with Fredman’s conceptualisation. It recognises the complexity of inequality, 
locating the right to equality, as Fredman has noted, in its ‘social context, responsive to those 
who are disadvantaged, demeaned, excluded, or ignored’.75 So, adopting this multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation for the purpose of conceptualising trust in the citizen-government relationship, 
I contend that for the elected branches to exercise their control over social goods and services in 
furtherance of substantive equality, they must strive to implement measures which achieve the 
four above-outlined objectives.76 And given the procedural fairness requirement that citizens’ 
rights (including the right to equality) be respected, the elected branches must so strive for the 
process by which they exercise their control over such goods and services to be judged as fair.77 
To sum up, I have suggested that in the citizen-government relationship, the first 
expectation of trust – that of good will – translates into two inter-related sub-expectations: one 
being that those who staff the elected branches will exhibit good intentions toward citizens, and 
the other being that the elected branches will employ fair procedures in exercising their control 
over social goods and services (including those which are transparent, participative and 
respectful of citizens’ rights (including the right to equality). Accordingly, to say that citizens 
“trust” the elected branches with respect to social rights means, at least in part, that they expect 
such intentions and procedures from the elected branches. 
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(ii) The Expectation of Fiduciary Responsibility 
In the citizen-government relationship, the expectation of fiduciary responsibility is closely 
connected with the expectation of good will. For this reason, I will consider it next. However, 
before I get into the substance of this expectation in the citizen-government relationship, I shall 
first elaborate upon why I think that this expectation applies to this particular relationship. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the expectation of fiduciary responsibility only 
applies to relationships of a fiduciary nature. In my view, the citizen-government relationship 
may be accurately characterised as such. In making this claim, I rely in part upon an important 
body of work developed by public law scholars in the last 10 years which has emphasised the 
fiduciary foundations of public authority – a body described as “fiduciary political theory”.78 
Scholars in this camp have argued that various relationships in the political realm (including 
those between political representatives and the people, judges and the people, and administrative 
agencies and the people) are fairly characterised as fiduciary in nature. Here, I make a similar 
suggestion in the social rights context with respect to the citizen-government relationship.79 
To support my suggestion, I will employ Evan Fox-Decent’s conceptualisation of a 
fiduciary relationship (developed to advance his claim that the state-subject relationship is 
fiduciary in nature).80  For Fox-Decent, three conditions are necessary and sufficient for a 
fiduciary relationship to arise: (i) the fiduciary must have “administrative”, discretionary power 
over some set of the beneficiary’s interests; (ii) the beneficiary must be ‘incapable of controlling 
the fiduciary’s exercise of power’; and (iii) the beneficiary’s relevant interests must be ‘capable of 
forming the subject matter of a fiduciary obligation’.81 I will now consider each condition. 
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Fox-Decent’s first condition has two sub-conditions: (a) the fiduciary must exercise 
discretionary power over a set of the beneficiary’s interests; and (b) that power must be 
“administrative” in nature – ie it must be “institutional” (the exercise of power takes place in an 
institution which has its own substantive values and internal practices), “purpose-laden” (the 
power is exercised for some purpose) and “other-regarding” (that purpose involves a party other 
than the fiduciary).82 Both sub-conditions are satisfied in the citizen-government relationship. As 
for (a), it will be recalled that the social goods and services at issue in social rights are things 
which citizens need; and as such, citizens have an interest in obtaining them. Also recall that the 
elected branches exercise control over those social goods and services through the legislative and 
administrative steps which I outlined earlier in this chapter (ie the preparation, development and 
promulgation of primary legislation, the preparation and approval of the budget, and subsequent 
administrative action). Because in each of those steps, the elected branches exercise significant 
discretion, it is fair to say that the elected branches exercise discretionary power over a set of 
citizens’ interests (ie citizens’ interests vis-à-vis those social goods and services). 
With respect to (b), I submit that the elected branches’ discretionary power in this regard 
is “administrative” in nature. Its institutional character is obvious. As for its being purpose-laden 
and other-regarding, it satisfies these elements for two reasons. The first is the overarching fact 
of sovereignty (which Fox-Decent has used to argue that the state’s power over its subjects is 
purpose-laden and other-regarding).83  According to Fox-Decent, because the state assumes 
sovereign powers (which it exercises through its institutions), subjects have no choice but to 
‘entrust the specification, administration, adjudication, and vindication of their rights to the 
state’.84 And for that reason, Fox-Decent has argued, the state exercises its powers for the 
purpose of benefiting its subjects. Included in those rights are social rights whose administration 
and specification citizens have no choice but to entrust to the state (and by extension, the elected 
branches which exercise its powers). Consequently, I think that Fox-Decent’s argument may be 
fairly extended to the citizen-government relationship. Second, as will be recalled from earlier in 
this chapter, there is a good argument that citizens, via their payment of taxes, specifically entrust 
social goods and services to the state (and again by extension, to the elected branches). Both of 
the above points – the fact of sovereignty and citizens’ specific entrustment of social goods and 
services to the elected branches via their payment of taxes – support the same conclusion: that 
the elected branches’ discretionary power over citizens’ interests vis-à-vis the relevant social 
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goods and services is exercised for the purpose of benefiting citizens. And owing to that 
conclusion, their power may be fairly characterised as both purpose-laden and other-regarding. 
The second condition of a fiduciary relationship is that the beneficiary is incapable of 
controlling the fiduciary’s exercise of power – and following from that fact, the beneficiary is 
vulnerable to abuses of the fiduciary’s power.85 This condition is also satisfied in the citizen-
government relationship. As Fox-Decent has argued for the state-subject relationship, ‘[p]rivate 
parties have no authority to … exercise the powers necessary to determine’ their rights: ‘they do 
not get to make laws that apply to others’ and so, ‘are juridically incapable of exercising public 
authority’.86 This argument applies no less to the citizen-government relationship. Aside from 
their limited voting power, citizens are incapable of controlling the elected branches’ power over 
their interests vis-à-vis social goods and services. They do not dictate the content of social 
welfare legislation, they do not decide what is and is not included in the budget, and they do not 
control the administrative action through which the legislation is implemented. As a result, 
citizens are vulnerable to abuses of the elected branches’ power. 
Finally, the beneficiary’s interests must be ‘capable of forming the subject matter of a 
fiduciary obligation’.87  The fiduciary relationship has trust at its core. As Fox-Decent has 
explained, the fiduciary concept was ‘born of a rich and complex legal history animated by a 
concern to protect the integrity of relations of trust’.88 But for Fox-Decent, in contrast to how 
the social science literature has conceptualised it, trust is a presumptive concept: that is, the 
fiduciary exercises his power ‘on the basis of the beneficiary’s trust’ regardless of whether the 
beneficiary does anything to repose trust in him.89 Thus, Fox-Decent has argued that in the state-
subject relationship, trust is both the basis for the state’s authority over its subjects and its duty 
to them. As he has summarised, the law, via the fiduciary principle, ‘entrusts the state to establish 
legal order on behalf of the people’; and the state, in turn, ‘exercises power on the basis of the 
people’s trust … precisely because the fiduciary principle has entrusted the state with public 
powers on their behalf’. 90  The same reasoning may be applied to the citizen-government 
relationship. Regardless of citizens’ actual trust in the elected branches with respect to social 
rights, the fiduciary principle entrusts them with the above power on citizens’ behalf; and the 
elected branches exercise their power on the basis of citizens’ trust. The citizen-government 
relationship accordingly satisfies the fiduciary relationship’s third and final condition. 
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Now, in characterising the citizen-government relationship as a fiduciary relationship, I 
recognise that fiduciary political theory has its critics.91 That said, for the reasons which scholars 
in this camp have put forward, I think that fiduciary political theory holds significant promise; 
and following thereon, I suggest that it can be applied to the citizen-government relationship.92 
My suggestion that the citizen-government relationship is a fiduciary relationship also 
finds support in the work of Bernard Barber (from which, in large part, I derived the expectation 
of fiduciary responsibility in the first place).93 As will be recalled from Chapter 1, Barber roots 
the expectation of fiduciary responsibility in the fact that in certain relationships, the trustee 
possesses special knowledge and skills which make his technically competent performance 
difficult to monitor by the truster. For him, ‘Trust of this kind [fiduciary responsibility] … is a 
social mechanism that makes possible the effective and just use of power that knowledge and 
position give and forestalls abuses of that power’.94 The citizen-government relationship seems 
to satisfy Barber’s description. In exercising their control over social goods and services, the 
elected branches possess (or at least are expected to possess) special knowledge and skills which 
would make it difficult for citizens, as trusters, to monitor their technical competence. I will 
elaborate upon such competence in the next section. Further, Barber specifically recognises the 
application of this expectation to the relationship between ‘The Public and Its Leaders’.95 
Therefore, there is good reason to believe that Barber himself would have concluded that the 
expectation of fiduciary responsibility applies to the citizen-government relationship. 
If we accept that the expectation of fiduciary responsibility indeed does apply to the 
citizen-government relationship (as I have just sought to make out), this raises my next question: 
what precisely does the expectation involve? I noted earlier that this expectation is closely related 
to that of good will. Both involve, broadly speaking, an expectation that the elected branches will 
act in citizens’ interests; however, the fiduciary responsibility expectation takes it a step further. 
At its core, it is an expectation that the elected branches, in exercising their discretion over social 
goods and services, will not allow their staff’s interests to impact their decisions (thereby unfairly 
discounting or disregarding citizens’ or a subset of citizens’ interests). Fiduciary relationships (a 
category in which we are now including the citizen-government relationship) are said to give rise 
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to a number of duties or obligations on the part of the fiduciary: these may include loyalty, care, 
and in the public law context, fairness and reasonableness.96  The expectation of fiduciary 
responsibility is an expectation that these duties will be fulfilled. Again, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to offer an exhaustive analysis of each of these duties and to define precisely what 
they entail. However, as Fox-Decent has convincingly explained, ‘the most fundamental and 
general fiduciary duty’ (by which many of these duties are encompassed) is what he has described 
as ‘fidelity to the other-regarding purposes for which fiduciary power is held’.97 As I elucidated 
earlier, on the basis of the beneficiary’s trust in him, the fiduciary is granted the power to act on 
the beneficiary’s behalf: ie to pursue her interests. The fiduciary’s duty (or “responsibility”, if you 
will, as per the language of the expectation herein) is to exercise said power exclusively for that 
purpose: he must pursue only the beneficiary’s interests. 
In applying this duty to the citizen-government relationship, there are two issues which a 
reader may reasonably raise. The first relates to the identity of the beneficiary. In a political 
relationship, like the citizen-government relationship, the fiduciary has multiple beneficiaries (ie 
all citizens) whose interests are bound to conflict with one another (at least in some cases).98 
Thus, the fiduciary does not have one beneficiary whose singular set of interests he may pursue; 
accordingly, in fulfilling his duty, he is obliged to pursue multiple, competing interests which he 
must necessarily balance. That said, the core fiduciary duty – fidelity to the other-regarding 
purposes of the fiduciary’s power – demands that while the fiduciary pursues these multiple, 
competing interests, he does not allow his own interests to interfere therewith.99 This brings me to 
the second issue: do the elected branches, as fiduciaries of citizens, have “interests”? Not per se; 
but those actors who staff the elected branches do, which may conflict with citizens’ (or a subset 
of citizens’) interests and which may be furthered at their expense. These actors’ core fiduciary 
duty, as staff of the elected branches, is to ensure that the latter does not happen. As Fox-Decent 
and Evan Criddle have well-described, the fiduciary principle ‘requires the state and its 
institutions to act for the good of the people rather than for the good of its officials or rulers’.100 
 For these reasons, I suggest that in the citizen-government relationship, the expectation 
of fiduciary responsibility both rightfully applies and that it amounts to an expectation that the 
elected branches, in exercising their control over social goods and services, will fulfil the duties 
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of a fiduciary. At its core, it is an expectation that the elected branches will exercise said control 
exclusively for, to use Fox-Decent’s words, ‘other-regarding purposes’ – that is to say, the elected 
branches, in exercising their control, will pursue only the interests of citizens and not the 
interests of their staff. Therefore, to say that citizens “trust” the elected branches with respect to 
social rights further means, again in part, that the elected branches will act in this manner. 
 
(iii) The Expectation of Competence 
Last but certainly not least, trust in the citizen-government relationship entails an expectation of 
competence. In fact, according to John Dunn, in political relationships, like the citizen-
government relationship, the expectation of competence is probably the most important. Dunn 
has argued that ‘modern political theory … gives inadequate weight to the human importance of 
practical skill in politics’ and has claimed that while both ‘trust in the good intentions’ of political 
actors and ‘trust in their practical capacities’ are vital to modern democracies, if we must choose 
between them ‘it is wiser in most circumstances … to opt for trust in practical capacity’.101 
 In the citizen-government relationship, the expectation of competence may be described, 
broadly speaking, as an expectation that the elected branches have the requisite competence to 
exercise their control over social goods and services and so, in turn, that they will exercise said 
control in a competent manner. But what does that mean? What defines “competence” from the 
elected branches? How do they exercise their discretion over social goods and services in a 
“competent” manner? I suggest that in the citizen-government relationship, competence engages 
yet another broad idea in which legal scholars and political scientists have long been interested: 
evidence-based policy-making (EBPM). In brief, it is my suggestion that the expectation of 
competence in this relationship translates into an expectation that the elected branches will 
exercise their control over social goods and services in accordance with the principles of EBPM. 
 EBPM is a model aimed at the development and implementation of the most effective 
public policies and programmes. It may be said to revolve around three forms of knowledge.102 
The first, and perhaps the most commonly associated with EBPM, is knowledge derived from 
scientific research. Under EBPM, policy-makers use the best available research from the natural 
and social sciences to better understand and improve public policies and programmes. However, 
as many scholars have emphasised, under EBPM, scientific research is not, or at least should not 
be, determinative: in JA Muir Gray’s telling words, with EBPM, ‘decisions are based on evidence 
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and not made by evidence’.103 Thus, EBPM necessitates a synthesis of knowledge from scientific 
research with other forms of knowledge.104 Brian Head has usefully categorised these other 
forms of knowledge into what he has called “political knowledge”, on one hand, and “practical 
implementation knowledge”, on the other. “Political knowledge” – a form of knowledge which 
comes into play during the development stage for public policies and programmes – refers to the 
‘know-how, analysis and judgment of political actors’. 105  It is a vast and varied form of 
knowledge indeed, including everything from persuasion/advocacy skills and the ability to build 
coalitions of support, to the capacity to negotiate trade-offs and compromises. “Practical 
implementation knowledge” – which comes into play during the policy and programme 
implementation stage – is knowledge relating to the management of social programmes. It 
encapsulates what one needs to know in order to ‘wrestle with everyday problems of 
program[me] implementation and client service’.106 Stemming from ‘the “practical wisdom” of 
professionals in their “communities of practice”’, this form of knowledge assumes the form of 
government adopting a “best practice”.107 
 I suggest that these three forms of knowledge which define EBPM are what citizens 
would reasonably expect from “competent” government in its exercise of control over social 
goods and services. With respect to political actors (ie members of the legislature, Cabinet 
members), it seems reasonable that what Head has called “political knowledge” would be 
expected of such actors in carrying out their responsibilities vis-à-vis social goods and services (ie 
preparing, developing and promulgating primary legislation, as well as preparing and approving 
the budget) to be deemed competent. And by the same token, “practical implementation 
knowledge” would be expected of competent administrative decision-makers in carrying out 
their responsibilities in implementing social programmes. If not these two forms of knowledge, I 
cannot imagine what would amount to competence from the elected branches of government. 
Moreover, it also seems reasonable that a competent government would be expected to 
possess the kind of knowledge from scientific research which EBPM demands. In exercising 
their control over social goods and services, the elected branches make decisions – including 
which social goods and services to fund/deliver, how much money to invest in a social 
programme, and who will/will not be covered by that programme – in order to serve certain 
policy ends. Scientific research, by offering insights into which policy initiatives are the most 
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effective to achieve those ends, is thus of critical value. Accordingly, I do not think it too 
outlandish to suggest that competent decisions in this regard would be made on the basis of the 
best research which is available. Further, this suggestion follows from my discussion of 
competence from Chapter 1. As I explained there, a trustee’s competence may come from a 
number of sources, including expert knowledge.108 Now, granted, the elected branches’ staff 
cannot be experts in all fields and sub-fields of social welfare. But surely it is reasonable that 
where a trustee, like the elected branches, does not possess the requisite knowledge and skills 
himself (as the elected branches may not), competence would demand that he make good faith 
efforts to seek out those who do. In such cases, the source of the trustee’s competence is, rather 
than his own knowledge and skills, those of another actor (and the research that actor produces); 
and so, whether the trustee satisfies the competence criterion will depend on the competence of 
the actor upon whom he relies. Thus, to be truly competent, the trustee must make good faith 
efforts to seek out the most competent actor and so, the best available evidence from research. 
 Hence, the last expectation which comprises trust in the citizen-government relationship 
– the expectation of competence – is an expectation that the elected branches will exercise their 
control over social goods and services in a competent manner. I suggest that this expectation 
translates into an expectation that the elected branches will exercise said control in accordance 
with the principles of EBPM: that is, they (or more accurately their staff) will exhibit what Head 
has called “political knowledge” and “practical implementation knowledge” and they will base 
their decisions on the best available evidence from scientific research. And so, the final part to 
saying that citizens “trust” the elected branches with respect to social rights is that they expect 
the elected branches to use EBPM in exercising their control over social goods and services. 
 
Chapter Summary 
From this chapter, we arrive at the conclusion that the citizen-government relationship may be 
accurately characterised as a trust relationship. It satisfies all three elements thereof (control, 
discretion/uncertainty and vulnerability) and thus, it is a relationship in which trust may arise. 
Trust in that relationship may be defined as a set of positive expectations held by citizens 
regarding the manner in which the elected branches will exercise the control they have over 
social goods and services which citizens need. Those expectations, I suggest, are that the elected 
branches will exercise good will toward citizens (their staff will exhibit good intentions and will 
follow fair procedures), will fulfil their fiduciary responsibility to citizens (they will pursue only 
the interests of citizens and not those of their staff) and have the requisite competence (they will 
                                               
108 Barber (n 93) 9. 
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exercise their control in accordance with EBPM principles). In the next chapter, I outline yet 
another consequence of characterising the citizen-government relationship as a trust relationship: 
it is subject to what I call “the network conception of trust”. And as we will see in Chapter 4, 
this consequence is pivotal to political trust offering a tool for social rights enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Network Conception of Trust 
Owing to the citizen-government relationship’s characterisation in Chapter 2 as a trust 
relationship (ie as a relationship in which the three elements of control, discretion/uncertainty 
and vulnerability are present), we know that it is possible for trust to arise therein. In this 
chapter, I suggest that a further – and in my view, quite significant – consequence follows from 
that characterisation. It renders the citizen-government relationship subject to a notion from the 
social science scholarship on trust which I will call the “network conception of trust”. In brief, 
the network conception of trust posits that in contemporary societies, a trust relationship (like 
the citizen-government relationship) is embedded in a rich social context – or as part of a 
complex network of social relationships – upon which trust in that trust relationship also 
depends. Applying this network conception of trust to the social rights context, I suggest in this 
chapter that in contemporary social democracies, the citizen-government relationship is 
embedded in a complex network of trust relationships which exist between citizens, the elected 
branches, and other state and non-state actors (including, importantly, the courts), and that trust 
in the citizen-government relationship depends on the relationships in that network (including 
the relationship between citizens and the courts which arises out of social rights adjudication). 
 
The “Network Conception of Trust” 
What I am calling the “network conception of trust” does not belong to a single author or to a 
single discipline.1 Rather, it is a broad idea which has been expressed by numerous writers on 
trust across a range of social science disciplines, including (but not limited to) sociology,2 
economics,3 philosophy,4 political theory,5 and management.6 Based on my reading, these writers’ 
                                               
1 The expression “network conception of trust” is drawn from a piece written by Karen S Cook and Russell Hardin, 
‘Norms of Cooperativeness and Networks of Trust’ in Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp (eds), Social Norms 
(Russell Sage Foundation 2001). 
2 James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Harvard University Press 1994); Karen S Cook and Alexandra Gerbasi, 
‘Trust’ in Peter Hedstrom and Peter S Bearman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology (OUP 2009); ibid; 
Mark S Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ (1973) 78 American Journal of Sociology 1360; Jocelyn Pixley, 
‘Impersonal Trust in Global Mediating Organizations’ (1999) 42 Sociological Perspectives 647; Susan P Shapiro, 
‘The Social Control of Impersonal Trust’ (1987) 93 American Journal of Sociology 623; Susan Shapiro, ‘The 
Grammar of Trust’ in Jocelyn Pixley (ed), New Perspectives on Emotions in Finance: The Sociology of Confidence, Fear and 
Betrayal (Routledge 2012); Lynne Zucker, ‘Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840 to 
1920’ (1986) 8 Research in Organizational Behavior 53. 
3 Partha Dasgupta, ‘Trust as a Commodity’ in Diego Gambetta (ed), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations 
(Basil Blackwell 1988); Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’ 
(1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481. 
4 Annette C Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Harvard University Press 1995). 
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arguments (though obviously dissimilar in some respects) do ultimately share two fundamental 
features which I will use to define this network conception of trust. First, these scholars agree 
that in contemporary societies, relationships in which trust may arise are embedded in a rich 
social context. That social context is comprised of complex structures or “networks” of social 
relationships.7 Second, they agree that trust in such a relationship ultimately depends on the 
other relationships which constitute the network in which the former relationship is embedded. 
We can see this network conception of trust most clearly in the work of Karen Cook and 
Russell Hardin.8 Cook and Hardin have sought to build on, and apply to the concept of trust, the 
scholarship of sociologist Richard Emerson on the concept of power.9 For Emerson, a key flaw 
in the sociological power research up to the point in time in which he was working (ie the 1960s) 
was ‘the implicit treatment of power as though it were an attribute of a person or a group (“X is 
an influential person,” “Y is a powerful group,” etc.)’.10 Breaking with this orthodoxy in the 
power literature, he argued that power is better seen as ‘a property of the social relation’, thereby 
shifting the focus of analysis on power from the individual to the relationship.11 Following on 
from his relational understanding of power, Emerson, in his subsequent work (alone as well as 
collaboratively with colleagues who include Cook), theorised that so-called power-dependence 
relationships (or what they more broadly called “exchange relations”) “connect” with one 
another to form an “exchange network”.12 By “connect”, Emerson and Cook meant that two 
exchange relations were contingent on one another or interdependent. They explained, ‘Two 
exchange relations between actors A-B and actors A-C are connected to form the minimal 
network B-A-C to the degree that exchange in one relation is contingent on exchange (or nonexchange) in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
5 Karen S Cook, Russell Hardin and Margaret Levi, Cooperation without Trust? (Russell Sage Foundation 2005); Roger 
Cotterrell, ‘Trusting in Law: Legal and Moral Concepts of Trust’ (1993) 46 Current Legal Problems 75; Henry 
Farrell, ‘Institutions and Midlevel Explanations of Trust’ in Karen S Cook, Margaret Levi and Russell Hardin (eds), 
Whom Can We Trust? How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible (Russell Sage Foundation 2009); 
Margaret Levi, ‘A State of Trust’ in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds), Trust and Governance (Russell Sage 
Foundation 1998); Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
6 Jörg Sydow, ‘Understanding the Constitution of Interorganizational Trust’ in Christel Lane and Reinhard 
Bachmann (eds), Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications (OUP 1998). 
7 Some writers, rather than using the term “network” as I have, have opted for alternative terms, including “system” 
or “mosaic”: see Coleman (n 2) for the former and Dasgupta (n 3) for the latter. However, the vast majority of 
writers have adopted the “network” terminology and accordingly, I have done so as well. 
8 Cook and Hardin (n 1). See also Cook, Hardin and Levi (n 5). 
9 Richard M Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’ (1962) 27 American Sociological Review 31; Richard M 
Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations: Two Experiments’ (1964) 27 Sociometry 282; Karen S Cook and Richard 
M Emerson, ‘Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks’ (1978) 43 American Sociological Review 721; 
Karen S Cook et al, ‘The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results’ (1983) 
89 American Journal of Sociology 275. 
10 Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’ (n 9) 31. 
11 ibid 32. 
12 For a summary, see Karen S Cook et al, ‘Social Exchange Theory’ in John DeLamater and Amanda Ward (eds), 
Handbook of Social Psychology (Springer 2013), 64. 
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other relation’.13 Cook and Hardin have proposed that Emerson’s work on power provides an 
appropriate model for a theory of trust. As they have explained it, Emerson’s work ‘does for the 
concept, power, what can be done for the concept, trust. It shifts the framework surrounding the 
study of power from that of an attribute of an individual … to that of a property of a social 
relation’.14 Following Emerson’s lead, Cook and Hardin have adopted a relational understanding 
of trust.15 They have defined trust, similar to the way I have in this thesis, as a three-part 
relationship involving a truster (A), a trustee (B) and some relatively defined matter (x), with the 
relationship taking the form of ‘A trusts B to do x’.16 Accordingly, they have suggested that trust 
necessarily depends on relational considerations, including the nature of the truster’s interests, 
the trustee’s interests, their knowledge of one another and other attributes such as gender, age or 
education level. But at the same time – and the key point here – Cook and Hardin have 
suggested that the ‘commonplace discussion of trust between two individuals as though they 
were abstracted from their social context misses too much of what is at stake to make sense of 
social relations’.17 Instead, they have argued that trust is best conceived of as ‘embedded in a 
network of relations’, and so, it also depends ‘on the larger context of our social relations and the 
broader network of relations that surrounds us’.18 Put simply, and in their words, trust is ‘a 
function of iterated or ongoing interactions’ in which the truster and the trustee are involved.19 
James Coleman, in his highly influential book Foundations of Social Theory, has similarly 
developed what may be considered a network conception of trust. Like Cook and Hardin, 
Coleman has conceived of trust as arising in a relationship (or “relation” in his words) between a 
“trustor” and a trustee.20 Coleman has argued that such trust relations exist in structures which 
he has called “systems of trust”. For Coleman, these “systems” encompass groups of two- or 
three-party relations. 21  Specifically, he has identified three such systems (mutual trust, 
intermediaries in trust and third-party trust) and has suggested that within each system, trust in a 
trust relation depends on another trust relation; or to put it in slightly different, more active 
language, one trust relation impacts trust in another. A mutual trust system, according to 
Coleman, involves two actors being in two trust relations with one other (each actor occupying 
                                               
13 Karen S Cook et al, ‘The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results’ (1983) 
89 American Journal of Sociology 275, 277 (emphasis added). 
14 Cook and Hardin (n 1) 331. 
15 ibid 332. See also Cook, Hardin and Levi (n 5) 2. 
16 Cook and Hardin (n 1) 331. 
17 ibid 330. 
18 ibid 330-31 
19 ibid 330-31. 
20 Coleman (n 2) 96. 
21 ibid 177. 
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the role of trustor in one of those relations). He has suggested that the mutual trust system 
fosters trust in a trust relation by increasing the likelihood that the trustee in that relation will 
keep the trust (out of fear that if he does not, the trustor (who is the trustee in the second trust 
relation) will not keep her trust). In an intermediary in trust system, an actor outside the 
immediate trust relation serves as both the trustee for one party to the trust relation and as 
trustor for the other party, thereby acting as an intermediary between the two parties. Coleman 
has identified three kinds of intermediaries (advisors, guarantors and entrepreneurs). I shall 
briefly elaborate upon one intermediary – “the advisor” – as it is relevant to my later analysis. 
The advisor is an actor outside the immediate trust relation who essentially advises the trustor to 
trust the trustee. As Coleman has explained, the trustor’s relationship with the advisor fosters her 
trust in the trustee because the trustor ‘trusts the advisor’s judgment, leading him to place trust in 
the ability and integrity of the trustee … It is the trustor’s trust in an advisor’s judgment that 
leads to placement of trust in the performance capability of the ultimate trustee’.22 And lastly, a 
third-party system involves a situation where a trustor accepts a promise from a third party to aid 
in her transaction with the trustee. According to Coleman, the trustor’s relation with the third 
party impacts her trust in the trustee because it allows her to transact with the trustee where she 
would not otherwise. Additionally, and beyond these three systems of trust, Coleman has 
recognised that trust arises in larger systems (ie involving more than two or three parties). Such 
larger systems would likely be the kinds of “networks” which Cook and Hardin have in mind. In 
such larger systems, Coleman has argued that the smaller systems of mutual trust, intermediaries 
in trust and third-party trust act as “building blocks” which construct the larger system.23 
One final example of a network conception of trust which I find helpful to the analysis 
in this thesis is that of Susan Shapiro.24 Like the above scholars, Shapiro has conceived of trust as 
arising in a relationship (specifically an agency relationship ‘in which principals … invest 
resources, authority, or responsibility in another [an agent] to act on their behalf for some 
uncertain future return’).25 However, Shapiro’s network argument is much more targeted in 
scope than that of either Cook and Hardin or Coleman. She is focused on a specific type of 
network or system – the embedding of a trust relationship in a network of relationships between 
the truster and a defined set of third parties who impose a variety of social control measures on 
the trustee in his relationship with the truster (eg professional associations, regulatory watchdogs 
                                               
22 ibid 181. 
23 ibid 188. 
24 Shapiro, ‘The Social Control’ (n 2). See also Shapiro, ‘The Grammar of Trust’ (n 2). 
25 Shapiro, ‘The Social Control’ (n 2) 626. As I noted in Chapter 1, I do not agree with this characterisation of a trust 
relationship as it necessitates that the trustee’s control over the good or service result from the truster entrusting. 
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and certified public accountants). Shapiro has called these third parties “guardians of trust”. She 
has claimed that through such social control measures, a guardian of trust (and more precisely, 
his relationship with the truster) fosters trust between the truster and the trustee, with the 
resulting trust being “impersonal trust” (a term which should be recalled from my discussion of 
trust in Chapter 1).26 Moreover, Shapiro, like Coleman and his smaller systems of trust, has 
recognised that such truster-guardian relationships rarely exist in isolation; as she has explained, 
they usually form part of ‘a complicated matrix of social-control strategies – that intervene at 
different points in the delivery of trust and scrutini[s]e different roles, records, or organi[s]ational 
routines from different perspectives, for different purposes’.27 So, in Shapiro’s theory (in parallel 
to Coleman and Cook and Hardin), trust in a trust relationship depends on the network of 
relationships (here, truster-guardian relationships) in which that relationship is embedded. 
 
The Network Conception Follows From a Relational View of Trust 
As Cook and Hardin have made clear, the network conception follows from a relational view of 
trust.28 I mentioned briefly in Chapter 1 that the relational view of trust is to be distinguished 
from a competing view which considers trust a trait or a disposition of an individual actor.29 In 
that view, the unit of analysis is the individual – that is, the truster. Focusing on the individual, 
that view envisages trust as depending on a single factor which is internal to the truster: whether 
she has a specific trait or a disposition towards trusting others. If the truster has this trait or 
disposition, we may say that she is a “trusting” person and accordingly, that trust exists.30 Trust, 
in that view, does not depend on the party whom the truster is “trusting” (ie the trustee) or the 
circumstances surrounding that trust. In other words, trust is a psychological phenomenon.31 In the 
relational view, in contrast, trust is treated as a property of a social relationship.32 The unit of 
analysis is the relationship rather than the individual truster, and so, trust depends on that 
relationship.33 In other words, trust, in the relational view, is a social phenomenon. Now, of 
course, trust depends on things which are internal to the relationship, including the nature of the 
good or service at issue in the relationship and the truster’s knowledge of or familiarity with the 
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29 Russell Hardin, ‘Conceptions and Explanations of Trust’ in Karen S Cook (ed), Trust in Society (Russell Sage 
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Organizational Relationships’ (2011) 32 Organization Studies 281, 282. 
32 Cook and Hardin (n 1) 330-31. See also Cook and Gerbasi (n 2) 220; Cook, Hardin and Levi (n 5) 2; Levi (n 5) 78. 
33 Cook and Gerbasi (n 2) 220; Cook and Hardin (n 1) 331. 
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trustee.34 For example, I made the point in Chapter 1 that where the good or service at issue in 
the relationship (ie X) changes, the truster’s expectation of the trustee’s competence may change 
and accordingly, the extent to which she trusts the trustee may also change. However, at the 
same time, and as the above writers on trust have stressed, social relationships in contemporary 
societies are embedded in a rich social context. And because of such embeddedness, to use the 
apt words of sociologist Mark Granovetter, ‘to construe them as independent is a grievous 
misunderstanding’.35 It is from this latter point which the network conception of trust stems. 
Trust (as a property of a social relationship) depends not only on factors which are internal to 
that relationship, but also on external factors – that is, on the network in which it is embedded. 
As should be clear by this point, in this thesis, following the lead of many prominent 
writers on the concept, I have adopted such a relational view of trust. Like Cook and Hardin, I 
have conceived of trust as arising in a three-part relationship between a truster, a trustee and 
some good or service (X). And that relationship is built on the three elements of control, 
discretion/uncertainty and vulnerability. Moreover, it will be recalled that in Chapter 2, I 
characterised the citizen-government relationship as such a trust relationship. From these two 
points, coupled with the foregoing discussion of the network conception of trust as following 
from a relational view, I suggest that it follows, in turn, that the network conception of trust is 
appropriately applied to the citizen-government relationship. And applying the network 
conception of trust to the citizen-government relationship, I make two principal claims. First, I 
claim that in contemporary social democracies, the citizen-government relationship is embedded 
in a network of trust relationships which exist between citizens, the elected branches of 
government, and other state and non-state actors. As I will explain in more detail in the next 
part, these actors include (but are not limited to) private providers of social goods and services, 
the media and – most importantly for the purpose of this thesis – courts. Second, I claim that 
trust in the citizen-government relationship ultimately depends on this network of relationships. 
Therefore, trust in that relationship depends on the other relationships in the network. And this 
includes – once again importantly for this thesis – citizens’ relationship with courts which arises 
from constitutional social rights adjudication. I now proceed with making out these two claims. 
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The Social Rights Network 
Defining the Boundaries of the Social Rights Network 
Let us begin with my first claim: that the citizen-government relationship is embedded in a 
network of trust relationships between citizens, state and non-state actors. To make out this 
claim, I will try to show how the citizen-government relationship interconnects with a number of 
different parties and relationships to form a network configuration. Thus, I will essentially walk 
the reader through the construction of the network (what I will call the “social rights network”).  
But before I do, I shall start by defining the boundaries of the social rights network. In 
contemporary social democracies, the protection of social rights involves an ever-larger cast of 
characters and array of relationships. Because of increasing globalisation, privatisation and public 
interest litigation, courts and other decision-makers, extra-governmental parties such as private 
industry, lawyers, legal aid bodies, non-governmental and international organisations, as well as 
foreign governments, have come to play a role in the overall process. In my view, all of these 
parties and the relationships which exist between them, citizens and the elected branches would 
constitute the rich social context in which the citizen-government relationship is embedded and 
accordingly, the full network of relationships for social rights (ie the full social rights network). 
It would be impossible to analyse all of these parties and the relationships between them 
in the limited space of this chapter. Fortunately, my aim is not to do so. Instead it is merely to 
introduce the network conception of trust to social rights law for the specific purpose of my 
analysis in Chapter 4 on the proper role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. Given 
this specific objective, I will limit my consideration of the social rights network to a subset of 
three parties in the network and the relationships between them. They are: private providers of 
social goods and services; the media; and courts.36 I have chosen these three parties for several 
reasons. First, they provide good illustrations by which I may introduce and apply the network 
conception to social rights law. Second, as I will explain shortly, they play pivotal roles in social 
rights matters and thus, it makes sense to include them in any thoughtful analysis of this field. 
And lastly, and obviously, I have chosen courts because they are the central focus of this thesis. 
Before turning to the first party (private providers of social goods and services), I would 
like to make one point of clarification. In my view, like the citizen-government relationship, the 
relationships which exist between these parties, citizens and the elected branches may be 
accurately characterised as trust relationships. In fact, I anticipate that most, if not all, of the 
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significantly more complicated than I can accommodate in this chapter. 
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relationships in the social rights network may be characterised as such. This is relevant because, 
as trust relationships, the extent to which a truster’s trust in a trustee depends on another 
relationship of which she is part is likely to depend, in turn, on the extent to which she trusts the 
trustee in that second relationship. Coleman makes this point in his discussion of “the advisor” 
as an intermediary in trust. He explains that the truster’s relationship with the advisor impacts his 
trust relationship with the trustee because she trusts the advisor. Presumably, if the truster does 
not trust the advisor, her relationship with the advisor will not impact her trust in the trustee. 
For this reason, in my analysis of the parties and relationships which follow, I also briefly outline 
how each relationship would be expected to satisfy the three elements of a trust relationship. 
However, with that said, I see no reason why, nor find any conclusion in the trust literature that, 
trust in a trust relationship only depends on the trust relationships in its social context or 
network. Accordingly, it is conceivable that some of the relationships in the “social rights 
network” would not satisfy the three elements of a trust relationship. And their failure to so 
satisfy would not necessarily detract from their capacity to impact trust in a trust relationship. 
 
Constructing the Social Rights Network 
(i) Private Providers of Social Goods and Services 
The first party which I will describe here as forming part of the social rights network is private 
providers of social goods and services. In contemporary social democracies, the provision of 
social goods and services by the state is entirely dependent on those who directly provide those 
goods and services. For example, public health care depends on, among many others, physicians, 
nurses and medical technicians. Governments may either employ such providers or, as is more 
commonly the case in recent years, outsource to them.37 At the same time, as I mentioned briefly 
in Chapter 2 with respect to the direct/indirect control distinction, these providers rarely find 
themselves confined to a single, public system. In the vast majority of cases, they, as an overall 
group, have the opportunity to offer their goods and services privately. A given provider may 
have the option of offering her services concurrently in the public system and privately, or she 
may be compelled to choose one. In either case, there is likely to exist a cohort of providers who 
offer their goods and services privately. This cohort of providers is the focus of this section. 
 The existence of this cohort of providers has an important ramification for citizens on 
the receiving end. It means the availability of a private market, the effect of which is that citizens 
(technically speaking) are not wholly dependent on the elected branches for the social goods and 
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services which they need; they may have the option of obtaining them from sources alternative 
to the elected branches (ie private providers) who, like the elected branches, maintain control 
over the social goods and services. In Chapter 2, I referred to this state of affairs as the elected 
branches maintaining partial control. To make clear the ramification this state of affairs has for 
citizens, I will refer to private providers from here forward as “alternative sources”. Where a 
private market is available, in addition to the citizen-government relationship, citizens may also 
be said to have a relationship with the alternative source. By this I do not mean that citizens have 
opted for (or are even in a financial position to opt for) the alternative source over the elected 
branches (a point which will become relevant in the next part); I mean simply that the alternative 
source is available to citizens, making it part of the rich social context in which the citizen-
government relationship is embedded. Expanding upon the three-part form which I developed 
in Chapters 1 and 2 (where the elected branches are the trustee (A), citizens are the truster (B), 
and X is the social good or service at issue), I will call the alternative source of X, C. 
Consistent with what I suggested earlier, the relationship between citizens (B) and the 
alternative source (C) (what I call the “alternative source relationship”) may be characterised as a 
trust relationship. C, like the elected branches, maintains control over X, a social good or service 
which citizens need. This is what makes C an “alternative source” in the first place. Further, in 
the vast majority of cases, C also holds some discretion in exercising said control vis-à-vis 
citizens.38 Thus, citizens cannot be certain about their interaction with the alternative source. And 
lastly, given the alternative source’s control and discretion over X, coupled with citizens’ need 
for X, citizens are vulnerable to the alternative source. Diagram 1 below reflects pictorially the 
citizen-government and alternative source relationships. The lines are the trust relationships and 
the arrows indicate the direction in which trust flows in the relationship from truster to trustee. 
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Diagram 1: Citizen-Government and Alternative Source Relationships 
 
To provide some level of concreteness to the scenario depicted in Diagram 1, let us 
make X a defined good or service: primary education. Consistent with what I said earlier about 
the common concurrence of public systems and private markets, in most contemporary social 
democracies, primary education is available both publicly (through a public education system) as 
well as privately. The latter may be delivered by private educational institutions (such as 
institutions which are religiously-affiliated or based on a particular theory of teaching) or by 
private tutors. In this example, C in Diagram 1 represents one of these private institutions or 
private tutors and citizens may have the option of sending their children to a public institution 
(as part of the public education system) (A) or to the private institution or tutor (C). 
Moreover, in contemporary social democracies, assuming a competitive market, it is 
unlikely that citizens would only have access to one alternative source of X. In our primary 
education example, we can expect citizens to have a range of alternative sources, including both 
multiple private institutions as well as private tutors. This means that citizens may not only have 
the option of turning to a source of X alternative to the elected branches, but additionally, in 
exercising this option, they have a choice of alternative sources. For the purpose of illustration, 
let us say that citizens have a choice of three alternative sources: C1, C2 and C3. Assuming the 
same circumstances as before (satisfying the elements of control, discretion/uncertainty and 
vulnerability), the relationships between citizens and each of C1, C2 and C3 may be characterised 
as trust relationships. This choice of alternative sources is depicted in Diagram 2 below. 
   
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
B
A Alternative Source 
Elected 
Branches 
(Trustee) 
Citizens (Truster) 
 
79 
Diagram 2: Choice of Alternative Source Relationships 
 
Now, the foregoing analysis has captured one category of relationships in social welfare: 
the relationships between consumers of social goods and services (citizens) and their providers 
(the elected branches and the alternative sources). For the purpose of this thesis, this category of 
relationships is the most important. However, I would be remiss (in developing the network and 
in the interest of comprehensiveness) if I did not point out that these parties are involved in 
another category of relationships. In contemporary social democracies, the elected branches 
occupy dual roles: as a source of social goods and services to citizens (hence, the relationships I 
just described) and as a representative of citizens via the democratic process.39 In their role as 
citizens’ representative, the elected branches are also responsible for regulating the relationship 
between citizens and the alternative sources: this may include licensing and setting standards of 
practice, overseeing the liberty of these alternative sources to set fees or select to whom they 
deliver their services, restricting the power of these alternative sources’ professional associations 
to sanction their members, and imposing criminal liability on these alternative sources.40 Given 
this role and its responsibilities, I think that it is fair to say that the elected branches, in addition 
to being in relationships with citizens, are also in relationships with the alternative sources. 
Like the citizen-government and alternative source relationships, I also think that it is fair 
to characterise such relationships as trust relationships. For example, we may conceive of the 
relationship between the elected branches and an alternative source as a trust relationship in 
which the elected branches are truster and the alternative source is trustee. This conception makes 
                                               
39 Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks, ‘Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the Triangular Shape of 
Social and Economic Rights’ in Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of 
Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press 2010), 10-11. 
40 ibid 10. 
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sense if we recognise, as Bernard Barber has suggested, that the truster in a trust relationship 
does not necessarily need to be the direct recipient of the good or service which is at issue in the 
relationship.41 For instance, a parent may be in a trust relationship with a third party for a good 
or service which his or her child will ultimately receive. This would be the case in our primary 
education example from earlier. So, how are the three elements of a trust relationship satisfied in 
this relationship? The alternative source continues to maintain control and discretion in exercising 
that control over X (a good or service which citizens need). However, in this relationship it is the 
elected branches (rather than citizens) who are uncertain: they are uncertain about the alternative 
source’s interaction with citizens. And because the elected branches represent citizens (who are 
vulnerable to the alternative source as I described earlier), the elected branches too are vulnerable 
to the alternative source: unfavourable behaviour by the alternative source toward citizens opens 
the elected branches up to negative repercussions at the hand of citizens, including the possibility 
of being voted out of power. This specific group of trust relationships between the elected 
branches and each of the alternative sources (C1, C2 and C3) is depicted below in Diagram 3. 
Diagram 3: Relationships Between Elected Branches and Alternative Sources 
  
 
(ii) The Media 
I turn next to a somewhat undervalued party in the social rights literature – the media. Scholars 
of both political science and media studies have recognised that in contemporary democracies, 
the media plays a fundamental role in the relationship between citizens and their governments.42 
                                               
41 Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (Rutgers University Press 1983), 17. 
42 Kees Aarts, Audun Fladmoe and Jesper Stromback, ‘Media, Political Trust, and Political Knowledge’ in Toril 
Aalberg and James Curran (eds), How Media Inform Democracy: A Comparative Approach (Routledge 2012), 98-99; Kelly 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to comprehensively consider this role, but I do wish to offer 
some elaboration to aid in applying the network conception. The media provides a critical, if not 
the primary, source of information for citizens about politics and current affairs.43 As such, social 
scientists have theorised and experimentally shown that the media can and does have a 
tremendous impact on citizens’ knowledge of and attitudes toward political actors and policies.44 
The relationship between citizens and the media may too be accurately characterised as a 
trust relationship. The media controls a good or service which citizens need and/or want: political 
information. This control stems, in significant part, from its investigatory capabilities and its 
priority access to sources. However, the media is not simply a channel through which 
information flows; it has discretion in what information it conveys and how it conveys that 
information to the public. Owing to this discretion, it has been said (and empirically shown) that 
the media has both priming effects (based on how much attention it chooses to pay to a 
particular issue) as well as framing effects (based on the style in which it chooses to cover that 
issue) on citizens.45 In fact, on the latter point, modern media coverage of political stories is 
more often journalists’ opinions of political events as opposed to the substance of the events 
themselves. 46  For this reason, the media is said to occupy a new “interpretive” role in 
contemporary democracies, making it ‘an unaccountable part of the political process’.47 At the 
same time, the media has self-serving interests: it may be partisan to a particular political party or 
a particular ideology and, like any commercial industry which strives for self-preservation and 
profit, it has an interest in increasing the size of its overall audience. Given these self-serving 
interests, coupled with the media’s control and discretion, citizens cannot be certain of their 
interaction with the media (ie what political information it will convey and how it will convey it). 
Finally, citizens’ need and/or want for political information (and more importantly, the impact 
                                                                                                                                                  
Blidook, ‘Media, Public Opinion and Health Care in Canada: How the Media Affect “The Way Things Are”’ (2008) 
41 Canadian Journal of Political Science 355; Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille, ‘Falling or Fluctuating Trust Levels? 
The Case of the Netherlands’ in Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe (eds), Political Trust: Why Context Matters (ECPR 
Press 2011), 59; Jan Müller, Mechanisms of Trust: News Media in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes (Campus 2013), 17; 
Patricia Moy and Muzammil M Hussain, ‘Media Influences on Political Trust and Engagement’ in George C 
Edwards III, Lawrence R Jacobs and Robert Y Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the 
Media (OUP 2011), 222-23; Joseph S Nye, Jr, ‘Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government’ in Joseph S 
Nye, Jr, Philip D Zelikow and David C King (eds), Why People Don’t Trust Government (Harvard University Press 
1997), 15-17; Joseph S Nye, Jr and Philip D Zelikow, ‘Conclusion: Reflections, Conjectures and Puzzles’ in Joseph S 
Nye Jr, Philip D Zelikow and David C King (eds), Why People Don’t Trust Government (Harvard University Press 
1997), 261-75; Orlando Patterson, ‘Liberty Against the Democratic State: On the Historical and Contemporary 
Sources of American Trust’ in Mark E Warren (ed), Democracy and Trust (Cambridge University Press 1999), 191. 
43 Aarts, Fladmoe and Stromback (n 42) 98-99, 103-04; Patterson (n 42) 191; Nye, Jr and Zelikow (n 42) 261. 
44 Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press 2000), 16-20; Nye, Jr and Zelikow (n 42) 274. 
45 Blidook (n 42) 356-58 (who cites a number of studies in support of these claims). 
46 Nye, Jr and Zelikow (n 42) 274. 
47 Nye, Jr (n 42) 17. 
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the information has on their knowledge and attitudes), renders citizens vulnerable to the media. 
Expanding once again upon the three-part form, I will call the media, D. And consistently 
assuming a competitive market as I did with private providers of social goods and services, it is 
inaccurate to conceive of the media as a single entity. As citizens have a choice of alternative 
sources, they too have a choice of media sources: they may choose between different types of 
media (print, television, radio) and between different companies of the same type. For the 
purpose of illustration, let us say that citizens have a choice between two sources: D1 and D2. 
Now, a reader may rightfully ask: what about the elected branches? Are they not also in a 
trust relationship with the media? After all, they (and their policies) are the very subject of the 
political information which the media conveys; and most often, the media controls that 
information because the elected branches have provided it to them (thereby entrusting them 
with that political information). Accordingly, I think that the reader would be correct in this 
regard: the elected branches and the media are in a trust relationship. The good or service over 
which the media has control is again political information; but what the elected branches need 
and/or want is for the media to convey that information to citizens in a way which casts them in 
a positive light. Otherwise, they may again suffer negative repercussions from citizens. However, 
as I just explained, the media has discretion both as to substance and style: thus, the elected 
branches cannot be certain of what information it will convey to the public or how it will convey 
that information. For instance, the media may distort the story, omit positive aspects, take words 
uttered out of context or, as we see with recent allegations of so-called “fake news”, offer a story 
with no factual foundation. And because the information conveyed by the media has significant 
impact on citizens’ political knowledge and attitudes, the elected branches are also vulnerable to 
the media. Diagram 4 below provides a pictorial representation incorporating the media. 
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Diagram 4: Trust Relationships with the Media 
 
 
(iii) Courts 
Last, but certainly not least in this thesis, I come to the courts. Based on the thesis up to this 
point, we already know that the role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights is 
contested. That is the reason why it is the central focus of this thesis in the first place. However, 
for the present purpose, I think that I may confidently draw a few, relatively uncontroversial 
conclusions which will enable me to establish courts as forming part of the social rights network. 
 The justiciability of social rights was once the subject of an intense debate among 
scholars, jurists and politicians across the globe. This debate reached its height when the new 
democracies of the Global South and the former-Soviet Union were trying to decide whether to 
include express (and justiciable) social rights provisions in their constitutions. Those who argued 
that social rights were not justiciable (and thus, had no place in a constitution) necessarily argued 
that courts had no role to play in this area. However, in the last few decades, scholars, jurists and 
politicians have (for the most part) come to accept that courts have at least some role to play. 
Such acceptance perhaps was inevitable given that an increasing number of constitutions now 
include express and justiciable social rights provisions, several courts have accepted their 
justiciability and, in many jurisdictions without express constitutional provisions, courts have 
recognised implicit constitutional protection for social rights.48 Thus, as Anashri Pillay has 
summarised, ‘The weight of academic, judicial and political opinion in this area has moved away 
                                               
48 Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou, ‘Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global Economic 
Crisis and Constitutional Litigation’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 660, 673. 
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from justiciability to a consideration of the most effective judicial approaches to’ social rights.49 
David Landau has concurred in this point, noting, ‘For all practical purposes, the debate about 
whether to include social rights in constitutions is over … Most of the more recent work in the 
field has focused on the specific question of how social rights should be enforced rather than the 
older question of whether they should be included in constitutional texts in the first place’.50 
Accordingly, in my view, we should accept (as it appears most scholars, jurists and politicians 
have) that social rights are justiciable and that courts have at least some role to play in the social 
rights arena. And if we do accept that point, we should also accept that courts form at least some 
part of the rich social context within which the citizen-government relationship is embedded. 
But even if we do not accept such a role for courts – that is, we do not agree that social 
rights are justiciable and that courts should be intervening in social rights matters – I think that 
this conclusion (that courts form part of the citizen-government relationship’s social context) 
ultimately follows. Regardless of what we may think the courts should be doing, it is undeniable 
that over the last few decades, courts have played a role in this area: with increasing frequency, 
litigants have brought social rights matters before courts, and courts have decided their cases. In 
fact, scholars have described these past few decades as witnessing an “explosion” of social rights 
litigation.51 For example, in 2009, Malcolm Langford made the point that ‘[i]f we were to 
speculate on the total number of decisions that have invoked constitutional and international 
[social] rights, a figure of at least one to two hundred thousand might be in order’.52 In my view, 
this proliferation of litigation means that courts do form part of the social rights network. In the 
blunt but apt words of Daniel Brinks and Varun Gauri, ‘for good or ill – or, more accurately, for 
good and ill … – the language of rights, the mechanism of courts, the intervention of lawyers, 
and the cumbersome tools of the law have become a permanent and prominent part of the 
                                               
49 Anashri Pillay, ‘Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Developing Principles of Judicial Restraint in South 
Africa and the United Kingdom’ [2013] Public Law 599, 599. 
50 David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 189, 190, 
196. See also Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: 
An Updated Appraisal’ (Human Rights Consortium, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2007) 
<http://socialrightscura.ca/documents/publications/BP-justiciability-belfast.pdf> accessed 13 July 2017, 35: ‘Both 
our appraisal of common arguments against making social and economic rights justiciable and our analysis of 
jurisprudence in this area suggest that concerns about the justiciability of social and economic rights are generally ill-
conceived and run contrary to experience’. For a similar position, see also Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The Problematic of 
Social Rights – Uniformity and Diversity in the Development of Social Rights Review’ in Liora Lazarus, Christopher 
McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Hart Publishing 2014). 
51 Daniel M Brinks and Varun Gauri, ‘The Law’s Majestic Equality? The Distributive Impact of Judicializing Social 
and Economic Rights’ (2014) 12 Perspectives on Politics 375, 376; Malcolm Langford, César Rodriguez-Garavito 
and Julieta Rossi (eds), Social Rights Judgments and the Politics of Compliance: Making it Stick (Cambridge University Press 
2017). 
52 Malcolm Langford, ‘Domestic Adjudication and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Socio-Legal Review’ 
(2009) 6 International Journal on Human Rights 91, 91. 
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policy-making landscape’.53 And it is for this reason that I say that there is indeed a relationship 
between citizens and the courts which arises out of constitutional social rights adjudication. 
Given the nature of such social rights matters – which involve the courts reviewing 
governmental decisions on social welfare – I think that it is accurate to say that, at a minimum, 
courts occupy a position in the social rights network between citizens and the elected branches 
of government. Such matters usually involve citizens, either acting alone or relying upon 
representatives (eg lawyers, non-governmental organisations, special interest groups), turning to 
the courts when they are dissatisfied with either the process or the results of governmental 
decision-making. In cases to date, citizens have challenged, among other things, governmental 
decisions not to fund or deliver whole categories of social programmes; where funded or 
delivered, the eligibility criteria for those programmes; and finally, their implementation. 
Like the other relationships which I have considered up to this point in the chapter, the 
relationship between citizens and courts may be accurately characterised as a trust relationship. 
The courts have control over something which citizens need: a ruling in their favour vis-à-vis the 
social goods and services which they need. Put simply, that ruling brings them closer to those 
social goods and services. The courts also have discretion in delivering their rulings.54 As Ronald 
Dworkin put it years ago, ‘the general proposition, that the exercise of judicial choice or 
discretion within areas circumscribed more or less tightly by rules is not an occasional misfiring 
but a characteristic feature of the legal process, is today almost a law school cliché’.55 This 
discretion relates not only to the court’s interpretation of social rights but also to its granting of 
remedies for rights violations. Because of this discretion, citizens cannot be certain of how the 
courts will rule; and given their need for a favourable ruling, citizens are vulnerable to the courts. 
Further, when citizens choose to litigate their claims, the courts become a truster in their 
own respect – that is, in their relationship with the elected branches. This trust relationship arises 
out of the fact that, in contemporary constitutional democracies, the courts must rely on the 
elected branches to enforce their constitutional decisions.56 As I established in Chapter 2, in 
contemporary social democracies, the elected branches have control and discretion over social 
goods and services which citizens need. And although the courts’ rulings may seek to impact the 
                                               
53 Daniel M Brinks and Varun Gauri, ‘A New Policy Landscape: Legalizing Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developing World’ in Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press 2010), 303. 
54 On judicial discretion generally, see Ronald Dworkin, ‘Judicial Discretion’ (1963) 60 The Journal of Philosophy 
624; Ronald M Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 The University of Chicago Law Review 14; Ronald M 
Dworkin, ‘Social Rules and Legal Theory’ (1972) 81 The Yale Law Journal 855; Kent Greenawalt, ‘Discretion and 
Judicial Discretion: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges’ (1975) 75 Columbia Law Review 359. 
55 Dworkin, ‘Judicial Discretion’ (n 54) 624. 
56 Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A Joseph, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and 
Changing Agendas (Wadsworth 2012), 337. 
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elected branches’ exercise of control and discretion, the ultimate decision nonetheless remains 
that of the elected branches. For instance, a court may rule that a citizen (or a certain group of 
citizens) is entitled to a particular social good or service and order the elected branches to fund 
and/or deliver that good or service; but without the elected branches’ ensuing decision to 
actually fund/deliver, the court’s ruling is largely meaningless. For this reason, I think that we 
may fairly say that courts cannot be certain of how the elected branches will respond to their 
rulings. And finally, courts are vulnerable to the elected branches. That vulnerability chiefly 
assumes the form of institutional credibility: if the courts’ rulings are not followed by the elected 
branches, it diminishes their credibility in the eyes of the elected branches and the public.57 And 
to make matters worse, owing to such rulings, the judiciary may suffer repercussions from the 
elected branches, including a lack of cooperation in the future, a reduction in resources, or worse 
still, impeachment.58 To quote Frank Cross, the courts ‘are politically vulnerable institutions that 
have powerful reasons to be cautious in imposing restrictions on the other branches’.59 
Further expanding upon the three-part form of the citizen-government trust relationship, 
and rounding out our social rights network in this chapter, I will refer to the courts as E. 
Diagram 5 below incorporates the courts into the social rights network, situating them, as I just 
described, between citizens and the elected branches of government. 
Diagram 5: Trust Relationships with Courts 
 
 
                                               
57 Katharine Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (OUP 2012), 161. 
58 Frank B Cross, ‘The Error of Positive Rights’ (2001) UCLA Law Review 857, 887-89. 
59 ibid 887-88. 
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Before moving on from the construction of the social rights network (as part of my first 
claim) to my second claim, I would like to stress once again, in the interest of greater clarity, a 
point which I made earlier. The social rights network undoubtedly consists of relationships 
beyond those which I have identified and analysed in the above sections. Such relationships 
include not only relationships with new parties (ie other than the five parties which I analysed in 
the above sections) but also new configurations of these five parties beyond those which I have 
expressly identified. For instance, with respect to the relationship between the elected branches 
and alternative sources, we may conceive of a trust relationship operating in the reverse direction 
to that which I described in that section, wherein the alternative source is truster and the elected 
branches are trustee. Or in the case of courts, we may speak of a trust relationship operating 
between courts and the media. But as my aim herein is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of 
the social rights network, I will not venture further to consider these parties or relationships. 
 
Trust in the Citizen-Government Relationship Depends on the Social Rights Network 
This brings me to my second claim: that trust in the citizen-government relationship depends on 
the network of relationships in which it is embedded. This claim follows from a straightforward 
application of the second fundamental feature of the network conception of trust (as I have 
referred to it) to the citizen-government relationship. If trust in a trust relationship depends on 
the network of relationships in which that relationship is embedded (as this feature posits), 
applying it to the citizen-government relationship means that trust in that relationship (as a trust 
relationship) depends on the network of relationships in which it is embedded. Additionally, if 
we accept, based on the foregoing constructive analysis, that the network in which the citizen-
government relationship is embedded is that which I have called the social rights network, then 
that means that trust in the citizen-government relationship depends on the social rights network. Put 
simply, citizens’ trust in the elected branches with respect to social rights depends on the 
relationships which constitute that social rights network. Or, to rephrase this claim using more 
active language: we can expect the relationships in the social rights network to be able to impact 
(and in the right circumstances, to foster) trust in the citizen-government relationship. 
At this time, I think that two points of clarification are warranted. First, the claim that I 
am making here is a theoretical one. It draws from the work of the many writers on trust who I 
identified at this chapter’s outset as advocating a network conception of trust and it applies that 
work to the citizen-government relationship. In my view, these writers’ work – taken together to 
form what I have called the network conception of trust – supports the claim which I have 
made. However, to be fair, if we wanted to say with greater certainty that a specific relationship 
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in the social rights network does indeed impact trust in the citizen-government relationship, we 
should conduct an empirical investigation. In other words, we should measure trust in the 
citizen-government relationship as a variable of that other relationship. And as I pointed out in 
the Introduction, such an investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Granted, significant 
challenges would be in store for such an investigation, including difficulties with accurately 
measuring trust (as conceptualised) and controlling for the impact of a single relationship; 
however, I would be remiss if I did not draw attention to this important fact. Second, it is also 
beyond the scope of this thesis to go further than the claim which I have made by offering an 
analysis of how we can expect each trust relationship in the social rights network to be able to 
impact trust in the citizen-government relationship. Based on my reading of the above writers on 
trust, it is likely that different trust relationships would be expected to impact trust in the citizen-
government relationship via different paths. Thus, just as it would be impossible to analyse all of 
the parties and the relationships which constitute the social rights network, it would be equally 
impossible to analyse all of these paths. Fortunately, again, my aim is not to do so. To repeat, my 
aim is to introduce the network conception of trust to social rights law for the specific purpose 
of my analysis in Chapter 4 on the proper role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. 
Therefore, I will limit my analysis in this thesis to those paths which are pertinent to this aim. 
To illustrate the above two points, consider, for example, the interaction between the 
citizen-government relationship and the relationship between citizens and the media with respect 
to social rights (which we can call the “citizen-media relationship”). An application of the claim 
made in this section to these relationships suggests that we can expect the citizen-media 
relationship to be able to impact trust in the citizen-government relationship. After all, as I 
established earlier, the citizen-media relationship forms part of the social rights network in which 
the citizen-government relationship is embedded. Now, to say with greater certainty that the 
citizen-media relationship does impact trust in the citizen-government relationship would require 
empirical evidence which I have not collected. That said, there have been a wealth of empirical 
studies in support of this claim at a more general level (ie not in the specific context of social 
rights).60 These studies have established that the media (through its relationship with citizens) can 
impact public trust in government. If we accept the foregoing conclusion, this raises the question 
of how: how can the citizen-media relationship be expected to impact trust in the citizen-
government relationship? Here, I think that Coleman’s description of “the advisor” as an 
intermediary in trust is fitting. As I explained earlier, Coleman has argued that where a truster has 
                                               
60 As a representative sample, see (and the studies referenced therein) Aarts, Fladmoe and Stromback (n 42) 98-99; 
Bovens and Wille (n 42) 59; Moy and Hussain (n 42) 222-23. 
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a relationship with a third party (“the advisor”) who advises her to trust a trustee, to the extent 
that the truster trusts the advisor’s judgment, that relationship fosters trust between her and the 
trustee. In fact, Coleman has specifically identified the media as such an advisor in contemporary 
societies (at least as of 1990 when he wrote Foundations of Social Theory), explaining that the media 
increasingly constitutes ‘the intermediary in whose judgment persons place trust’.61 Applying 
Coleman’s idea to the social rights context, where the media, through its conveyance of political 
information vis-à-vis social rights to citizens, portrays the elected branches in a positive light, I 
think that it is fair to say that the media advises citizens to trust the elected branches with respect 
to social rights. And assuming that citizens trust the media (which is obviously not a given, 
especially today, but I will assume it to be true for now), based on Coleman’s argument, the 
media’s advice to trust the elected branches (and in turn, citizens’ relationship with the media) 
can be expected to foster citizens’ trust in the elected branches with respect to social rights. 
 
Synthesis and Chapter Summary 
I end this chapter by returning to the party lying at the centre of this thesis – courts. Given my 
analysis in this chapter, it is fair to conclude that we can expect constitutional social rights 
adjudication by courts to be able to impact (and in the right circumstances, to foster) public trust 
in government. Why? From this chapter, we know that there is a relationship between citizens 
and courts which arises out of constitutional social rights adjudication. Given the recent 
proliferation of social rights adjudication, this relationship exists regardless of which position we 
adopt regarding the justiciability of social rights. Further, we know that the relationship between 
citizens and courts forms part of the rich social context (or social rights network) in which the 
citizen-government relationship is embedded. And lastly, in light of the immediately foregoing 
analysis, because the relationship between citizens and courts forms part of the social rights 
network, we can expect it to be able to impact trust in the citizen-government relationship. 
Accordingly, my conclusion follows: we can expect constitutional social rights adjudication by 
courts to be able to impact (and in the right circumstances, to foster) trust in the citizen-
government relationship. In the next chapter, I employ this conclusion, along with the 
conceptual groundwork which I laid in Chapters 1 and 2, to advance the central argument of this 
thesis: that political trust has normative potential for social rights enforcement by courts. 
                                               
61 Coleman (n 2) 194. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Courts as Mediators of Government Trustworthiness 
In this chapter, we arrive at what I consider to be the heart of the thesis. This is so for two 
reasons. First, this chapter represents a culmination of the last three chapters. In Chapters 1-3, I 
sought, at least chiefly, to develop the prerequisite theoretical building blocks for the argument 
which I now advance in this chapter – the central argument of the thesis. That argument is, put 
simply, that the concept of political trust has normative potential for defining the proper role of 
courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. To be more precise, I argue that courts can, and 
(for a host of reasons which I will outline shortly) should, use the concept of political trust as an 
adjudicative tool in their enforcement of constitutional social rights. In the process of doing so, I 
carve out a role for courts in this particular area as what I call “mediators of government 
trustworthiness”. Second, the illustrations which I offer in the next two chapters of the thesis 
(using concrete examples from South Africa and Canada) are principally aimed at illustrating the 
argument in this chapter. Accordingly, this chapter, in essence, prepares the reader for those two 
illustrations. In advancing this chapter’s argument, I organise my discussion around three simple 
but, to my mind, critical questions: (i) Why courts? (that is, why do courts warrant a special role in 
the social rights network?); (ii) How trust? (that is, how can courts use the concept of political 
trust as a so-called adjudicative tool in social rights enforcement?); and finally, (iii) Why trust? 
(that is, why should courts centre social rights enforcement on the concept of political trust?). 
 
Why Courts?: Justifying a Special Role for Courts in the Social Rights Network 
A reader may question why, after developing the social rights network in Chapter 3, I am now 
choosing to single out the courts and grant them a special role in that network. Accordingly, 
before elaborating upon my proposed role for courts as “mediators of government 
trustworthiness”, I will take a brief moment to justify granting a special role to courts. From 
Chapter 3 we know that courts form part of (or are embedded in) the social rights network in 
which the citizen-government relationship is embedded. That embeddedness, however, does not, 
by itself, warrant any special role for courts in the network: in this respect, courts are no different 
than any other party in the social rights network (including the media or private providers of 
social goods and services). Like those parties, courts are interconnected with various network 
actors via trust relationships such that trust between them and other actors in the social rights 
network ultimately depends on the array of relationships of which the network is comprised. 
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Instead, courts occupy a special role in the social rights network because of why they are 
embedded in the social rights network. In Chapter 3, I suggested, as a primary reason at least, 
that courts are embedded in the network because of the justiciability of constitutional social 
rights. If social rights are indeed justiciable, then courts, as constitutional guardians, must have 
some role to play in enforcing those rights. And that enforcement role justifies a special role for 
courts in the social rights network: unlike any other party in the social rights network, courts are 
under a constitutional obligation to oversee the citizen-government relationship. 
My conclusion that social rights are justiciable merits further discussion than my analysis 
in Chapter 3 could afford. I shall elaborate upon it now. As I said there, social rights’ justiciability 
was once intensely debated by scholars, jurists and politicians across the globe. That debate 
reached its peak during the late 1980s-early 1990s when the new democracies of the Global 
South and the former-Soviet Union sought to decide whether to include express (and justiciable) 
social rights provisions in their national constitutions. While the justiciability debate’s lengthy 
timespan as well as incredible depth prevent me from offering anywhere near a comprehensive 
literature review in this chapter, I will do my best to summarise its central points in what follows. 
The arguments against social rights’ justiciability fell into two principal categories: 
institutional legitimacy and institutional capacity.1 The argument from legitimacy follows on from 
the well-known criticism made against the institution of judicial review more generally. This 
criticism, most-frequently associated with Jeremy Waldron, challenges judicial review as anti-
democratic and therefore as illegitimate.2 Judicial review is argued to be such because it enables 
judges – who are unelected – to overrule the decisions and actions of democratically elected 
officials, thereby undermining the will of the majority. Alexander Bickel famously called this 
problem with judicial review the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”.3 Building upon this criticism, 
the argument from legitimacy posits that the counter-majoritarian difficulty is all-the-more 
damning to judicial review where the decisions and actions being reviewed by the courts pertain 
to social rights. Why is that the case? First, social rights have significant budgetary consequences. 
If courts are allowed to adjudicate social rights matters, they would be interfering with the 
drawing of the budget and, in turn, would be encroaching upon one of the legislature’s principal 
prerogatives.4 Second, because resources are scarce, social rights are likely to conflict with one 
                                               
1 See Lorne Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada (Carswell 1999), 233. 
2 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 The Yale Law Journal 1346. 
3 Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd ed, Yale University Press 
1986), 16. 
4 For a summary of this argument (although not in support of it), see Cécile Fabre, ‘Constitutionalising Social 
Rights’ (1998) 6 The Journal of Political Philosophy 263, 280; Roberto Gargarella, ‘Deliberative Democracy, 
 
92 
another, necessitating the making of difficult choices which shape what society looks like.5 For 
these reasons, it has been argued, the matters raised by social rights are best left to the elected 
and politically accountable branches of government; courts, being unelected bodies, lack 
legitimacy so as to interfere with or second-guess those branches’ decisions or actions. 
The argument from capacity arises, in large part, out of the idea of polycentricity which 
was developed by Lon Fuller. 6  According to Fuller, certain problems – which he called 
“polycentric” – are not suitable for adjudication. Polycentric problems are those characterised by 
the interconnection of several issues and which affect a large number of individuals, yielding a 
complex web of interdependent relationships. 7  The issues are interconnected (and the 
relationships, interdependent) in the sense that when an action is taken to address one issue, that 
action reverberates through the web, producing a series of unpredictable consequences vis-à-vis 
the other issues. Fuller argued that polycentric problems do not lend themselves well to 
adjudication because of certain defining characteristics of the adjudicative process, namely: 
adjudication is binary in nature, with the two parties having diametrically-opposed interests; the 
court can only satisfy one party’s interests; and despite being affected by judicial rulings, third 
parties have limited influence over the outcome of a case. Relying on Fuller, the argument from 
capacity suggests that social rights raise polycentric problems.8 For example, a governmental 
decision about whether to fund a health care treatment is said to be a polycentric problem 
because it has budgetary implications for a range of social goods and services and because it 
affects all the people who depend on those goods and services. To be concise, because 
governmental budgets are finite, a decision to fund one treatment means less funds available for 
other treatments as well as other social goods and services. Moreover, and relatedly, the 
argument from capacity posits that courts lack the expertise as well as the resources necessary to 
make social rights decisions. It has been said that judges are not competent to tell the 
government how to allocate resources because they have neither the training nor the 
information-gathering tools required to assess the suitability of a resource allocation decision.9
 The arguments from legitimacy and capacity have been forcefully countered by several 
                                                                                                                                                  
Dialogic Justice and the Promise of Social and Economic Rights’ in Helena Alviar Garcia, Karl Klare and Lucy A 
Williams (eds), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries (Routledge 2015), 107. 
5 For a summary of this argument (although again not in support of it), see Fabre (n 4) 281. 
6 Lon Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978-1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 353.  For a good 
summary of Fuller’s argument, see Jeff King, ‘The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity’ [2008] Public Law 101. 
7 Mark Elliot and Robert Thomas, Public Law ( 2nd ed, OUP 2014), 551. 
8 For a summary, see King (n 6) 107-08, citing Trevor RS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law 
(OUP 2001), 188-92; David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd ed, OUP 2002), 229-
30; Stanley de Smith, Harry Woolf and Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1995), 311-12. 
9 For a summary (although again not in support of it), see Fabre (n 4) 281. 
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scholars. For the most part, these counter-arguments highlight the questionable assumptions 
upon which the arguments from legitimacy and capacity are based. A full consideration of these 
counter-arguments is well beyond the scope of this chapter and this thesis. However, I will 
briefly outline a few of them. First, the argument from legitimacy assumes that members of the 
legislature (and the executive, by extension under a parliamentary system), due to their having 
been elected, are representatives of the people and are accountable to them through the 
democratic process. This representativeness and accountability, so the argument from legitimacy 
goes, renders the elected branches more legitimate than courts. Many scholars have challenged 
this assumption, especially as it pertains to low-income citizens. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, 
these scholars emphasise that those with low income (arguably those whom social rights are 
most intended to protect) do not exert much political influence.10 Governmental policy-making 
is heavily influenced by the wealthy through lobbying and interest groups. Low-income citizens – 
who often feel excluded from the political and democratic process due to the wealthy’s heavy 
influence – tend not to participate in it, thereby generating a negative feedback loop. 
Constitutional social rights adjudication, it is said, offers low-income citizens an alternative 
forum in which their interests may be better protected and it introduces into the system another 
type of accountability from which low-income citizens may benefit: legal accountability.11 
Second, the argument from capacity is built on an assumption that the judiciary’s 
competence vis-à-vis social rights matters is fixed, such that it cannot acquire the skills or the 
expertise necessary to competently decide such matters. Cécile Fabre, Virginia Mantouvalou and 
David Wiseman (among others) have questioned this assumption.12 For them, the argument 
from capacity underestimates the courts’ ability to develop competence in this area. In Fabre’s 
words, ‘there is no reason why specialised judges could not be trained to acquire those skills, or 
could not seek advice from independent experts, as they actually already do’.13 Wiseman has 
called the acquisition of such skills and knowledge by the judiciary “competence-building”.14 
                                               
10 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008), 34; Jeff King, Judging Social 
Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012), 157-69; Paul O’Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International 
Standards and Comparative Experiences (Routledge 2013), 5; Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘A Realpolitik Defense of Social 
Rights’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1921, 1926-27. 
11 Martha Jackman, ‘Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada’ (2010) 18 Health Law 
Journal 1, 2; King, Judging Social Rights (n 10) 60; Gargarella (n 4) 107-08; Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Legal Accountability 
and Social Justice’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (OUP 
2013), 406-07; Margot Young, ‘Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice’ (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 669, 670-71. 
12 Fabre (n 4) 281-82; Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘In Support of Legalisation’ in Conor Gearty and Virginia 
Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Hart Publishing 2010), 117; David Wiseman, ‘Competence Concerns in Charter 
Adjudication: Countering the Anti-Poverty Incompetence Argument’ (2006) 51 McGill Law Journal 503. 
13 Fabre (n 4) 282. 
14 Wiseman (n 12) 516. 
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Accordingly, as Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford have explained, quite 
appropriately I would think, if ‘states have concerns about the competence of courts … to 
intervene in this area, they might want to investigate how courts … can enhance their capacity, 
or how they can be assisted by other institutional actors in performing their necessary role, rather 
than suggesting that rights claimants should be left without any hearing or remedy at all’.15 
Finally, both arguments assume that judicial review will take on a “strong form” with the 
effect that courts, in enforcing social rights, will overrule the decisions and actions of the elected 
branches. This assumption leads to a further assumption which is all-too-familiar in the social 
rights literature: that constitutional social rights enforcement requires courts to make the 
“hapless choice” between what Katharine Young has termed the “two wrongs of enforcement” 
– judicial usurpation and abdication: by assuming strong-form judicial review, the arguments 
from legitimacy and capacity assume that courts face a binary choice between usurping the 
policy-making role of the government and abdicating their judicial role as protector and enforcer 
of rights.16 However, as with the other two counter-arguments, these assumptions have proved 
to not be well-founded. There is an ever-growing trend among social rights scholars to advocate 
weaker forms of judicial review built on principles of inter-institutional dialogue and deliberative 
democracy.17 In essence, these scholars have suggested that courts can work with the elected 
branches, rather than be pitted against them, in their development of social policy. These weaker 
forms of judicial review make it no longer necessary for courts to choose between usurpation 
and abdication; instead they may opt for a middle ground between them. As Matthias Klatt has 
said, ‘usurpation and abdication do not represent a strict antagonism. Rather, they are a matter of 
degree. Both represent the two ends of the spectrum of different forms of judicial review’.18 
These counter-arguments are not to say that the arguments from legitimacy and capacity 
are without merit. There is good reason for us to be concerned about giving the courts too much 
power vis-à-vis social rights so as to “usurp” government’s policy-making role. To use Colm 
O’Cinneide’s words, ‘it would be foolish to rely on legal controls to give effect to a “total” vision 
of social justice, i.e. a comprehensive system of resource distribution that satisfies a particular 
                                               
15 Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated 
Appraisal’ (Human Rights Consortium, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2007) 
<http://socialrightscura.ca/documents/publications/BP-justiciability-belfast.pdf> accessed 13 July 2017, 6. 
16 Katharine Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (OUP 2012), 34. See also Frank I Michelman, ‘The 
Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
13, 16. 
17 Rosalind Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial 
Review Revisited’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 391; Alana Klein, ‘Judging as Nudging’ 
(2008) 39 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 351; O’Connell (n 10) 194-96; Scheppele (n 10) 1935; Young (n 16) 
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18 Matthias Klatt, ‘Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance’ (2015) 13 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 354, 361. See also King, Judging Social Rights (n 10) 8. 
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philosophical ideal of group justice’.19 However, the arguments from legitimacy and capacity do 
not warrant the conclusion that social rights are/should be non-justiciable. They suggest, rather, 
that ‘caution is warranted’ in our determination of how courts should enforce social rights.20 
And in recent years, it appears that scholars, jurists and politicians (for the most part) 
have accepted that conclusion. Following the height of the justiciability debate in the 1980s-
1990s, most new democracies opted for the inclusion of express and justiciable constitutional 
social rights provisions.21 The classic example here is the constitution of South Africa (the topic 
of Chapter 5). In fact, more than 90 percent of constitutions globally contain at least one express 
and justiciable social (or economic) rights provision.22 Moreover, in many more established 
democracies whose constitutions do not include express provisions, courts have recognised 
implicit constitutional protection for social rights. This is the case in countries like India, 
Germany and Israel. 23  So, as O’Cinneide has summarised the current climate around the 
justiciability of social rights, ‘it is clear that key constitutional actors in many states (including 
legislators, judges and academic commentators) are becoming more accepting of the possibility 
that judicial protection of social rights may be a worthwhile addition to the repertoire of modern 
constitutionalism’.24 And accordingly, as commentators like David Landau and Anashri Pillay 
have highlighted, recent years have witnessed a shift in the foregoing debate from the issue of 
justiciability to that of judicial approaches for enforcing social rights.25 In other words, the focus 
of the debate has gone from whether courts should enforce social rights to how they should do so. 
                                               
19 O’Cinneide (n 11) 401. 
20 ibid 401. See also King, Judging Social Rights (n 10) 8. 
21 For more information, see the Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights dataset which is available at 
<http://www.tiesr.org/data.html>. 
22 Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl and Evan Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions’ (2014) 
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23 Hartz IV, BVerfG, Case No 1 BvL, 1/09, 125 BVerfGE 175; Hassan v National Insurance Institute [2012] HCJ 
10662/04; Olga Tellis & Ors v Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] 2 Supp SCR 51. 
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Journal 189, 196; Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory’ in Malcolm 
Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2008), 29; Christopher P Manfredi, ‘Déjà Vu All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of Judicial Policymaking’ 
in Colleen M Flood, Kent Roach and Lorne Sossin (eds), Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private 
Health Insurance in Canada (University of Toronto Press 2005), 147; Nolan, Porter and Langford (n 15) 35; Marius 
Pieterse, ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 383, 404-05; Anashri Pillay, ‘Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Developing Principles of 
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For these reasons, I think that it may be fairly concluded that social rights (at least as a 
broad category) are justiciable. Of course, there will be readers who will disagree with my 
conclusion in this regard; and for those readers, I can do no more than refer to the vast body of 
literature which I have already cited above. However, in recognition of the apparent shift in the 
social rights enforcement debate, and in an effort to continue moving the debate forward, I start 
my argument here from the position that social rights are justiciable. Thus, it is not my intention 
to contribute to the justiciability debate (at least not directly); instead, I seek to contribute to the 
social rights enforcement debate in its new form (or “second wave”) – that is, the question of 
how courts should enforce social rights.26 And since my argument assumes that social rights are 
justiciable (with courts thereby having some role to play in enforcing those rights), it follows, for 
the reasons I described earlier, that courts must occupy a special role in the social rights network. 
 
How Trust?: Transforming Political Trust into a Social Rights Enforcement Tool 
The role which I propose for courts in their enforcement of citizens’ social rights is what I call 
“mediators of government trustworthiness”. To outline this judicial role, I will start by explaining 
the concept of trustworthiness and its relationship to trust. Then, I will move onto what I mean 
by the term “mediators” and how I conceive of courts “mediating” government trustworthiness 
when enforcing constitutional social rights. However, before fully delving into the details of this 
judicial role, I would like to make one point clear. This thesis does not suggest that the courts are 
the ideal branch of government to realise citizens’ constitutional social rights. For the reasons 
already outlined (ie legitimacy and capacity), the executive and legislative branches of 
government are better-positioned than the courts to realise citizens’ social rights. Moreover, 
there may be other good (and some may even argue better) means for citizens to vindicate their 
social rights than adjudication by courts (eg administrative tribunals, ombudsmen). That said, 
where social rights are constitutionalised, courts have a constitutional obligation to enforce them 
against the other branches of government. Courts as “mediators of government trustworthiness” 
is proposed in this chapter (and this thesis) as a defensible role with these circumstances in mind. 
 
What is Government Trustworthiness? 
The concept of trustworthiness follows on directly from the concept of trust. As the term itself 
suggests, trustworthiness implies that a trustee in a trust relationship is worthy of the truster’s trust 
                                               
26 Richard Stacey, ‘Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement 
of Economic and Social Rights’ (2017) 31 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 85, 85-86. 
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in him. As such, it represents the likelihood that the trustee will fulfil the truster’s trust.27 So, if 
trust is (as I argued in Chapter 1) a set of expectations held by the truster regarding whether the 
trustee will act with good will, competence and in fulfilment of his fiduciary responsibility to the 
truster, trustworthiness indicates that the trustee is likely to act in accordance with those 
expectations. A trustee is “trustworthy” if he is likely to act in accordance with the truster’s 
expectations of trust. Hence, applying this idea to the citizen-government relationship – where 
trust means that citizens hold the expectations outlined in Chapter 2 (ie that the elected branches 
will exercise good will toward citizens, will fulfil their fiduciary responsibility to them and have 
the requisite competence to exercise control over social goods and services) – trustworthiness 
denotes that the elected branches are likely to act in accordance with those expectations. 
A trustee’s trustworthiness may stem from one of two sources.28 First, a trustee may be 
trustworthy owing to his person or character. Put simply, his person or character make it such 
that acting with good will, competence and in fulfilment of his fiduciary responsibility is likely. If 
the truster trusts the trustee in these circumstances, the resultant trust is described, it will be 
recalled, as “personal trust” or “primary trust”. Second, and important for my purpose, a trustee 
may be trustworthy owing to external constraints which have been imposed upon him so as to 
restrict the discretion which he exercises over the good or service. Here, rather than the trustee’s 
person or character, it is the external constraints upon him which make it likely that the trustee 
will act with good will, competence and in fulfilment of his fiduciary responsibility. If the truster 
trusts the trustee in these circumstances, the resultant trust is “impersonal trust” or “secondary 
trust”. Applying these two sources of trustworthiness to the citizen-government relationship, the 
elected branches’ trustworthiness may therefore stem from either the person or character of the 
personnel who staff those branches, or, alternatively, from external constraints which have been 
imposed upon them in their decision-making on behalf of those institutions. As Philip Pettit has 
summed up these two sources of government trustworthiness, ‘We may trust our politicians or 
bureaucrats … to behave appropriately on the grounds that they are effectively bound to do so 
by the disciplines of office. Or we may trust them to behave appropriately on the grounds that 
                                               
27 For this reason, some writers have even defined trust (rather than in terms of the expectations I have of good will, 
competence and fiduciary responsibility) in a circular manner in terms of the truster’s expectations about the trustee’s 
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‘Trust as Noncognitive Security About Motives’ (1996) 107 Ethics 43, 44. 
28 Orlando Patterson, ‘Liberty Against the Democratic State: On the Historical and Contemporary Sources of 
American Trust’ in Mark E Warren (ed), Democracy and Trust (Cambridge University Press 1999); Philip Pettit, 
‘Republican Theory and Political Trust’ in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds), Trust and Governance (Russell 
Sage Foundation 1998); Jocelyn Pixley, ‘Impersonal Trust in Global Mediating Organizations’ (1999) 42 Sociological 
Perspectives 647; Susan P Shapiro, ‘The Social Control of Impersonal Trust’ (1987) 93 American Journal of 
Sociology 623; Susan Shapiro, ‘The Grammar of Trust’ in Jocelyn Pixley (ed), New Perspectives on Emotions in Finance: 
The Sociology of Confidence, Fear and Betrayal (Routledge 2012). 
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they are cooperatively responsive to the reliance of individual people, or of the people as a 
whole, to their decisions. Or of course we may trust them at once on both sorts of grounds’.29 
 
The Promotion of Government Trustworthiness Through Judicial Constraints 
When I say that courts should act as “mediators” of government trustworthiness, I mean that 
they should promote the elected branches’ trustworthiness vis-à-vis social rights by offering 
citizens a means of impersonal trust. To explain this point, I shall refer the reader back to 
Chapter 3 and specifically to Susan Shapiro’s work on trust (which, it will be recalled, focused on 
impersonal trust).30 To recap from Chapter 3: Shapiro has argued that actors who she has called 
“guardians of trust” (actors including professional associations, regulatory watchdogs and 
certified public accountants) – through the imposition of various social control measures (or 
social constraints) on a trustee in his relationship with a truster – can foster trust (specifically 
impersonal trust) between the truster and the trustee. In essence, it is Shapiro’s argument that via 
the imposition of such constraints, guardians of trust can promote a trustee’s trustworthiness.31 
They can increase the likelihood that the trustee will fulfil the truster’s trust. And it is this 
promotion of the trustee’s trustworthiness which fosters the truster’s trust in the trustee. 
I suggest that like Shapiro’s guardians of trust, courts – in enforcing constitutional social 
rights – can impose trustworthiness-promoting constraints on the elected branches vis-à-vis their 
exercise of discretion over social goods and services. By doing so, courts act as a sort of guardian 
of trust (to use Shapiro’s term). I also suggest that through the imposition of such constraints, 
courts may be said to “mediate” the elected branches’ trustworthiness. To be clear, I use the 
term “mediate” not in its traditional legal sense but more in its sociological sense. From Chapter 
3, we know that in the social rights network, courts occupy a position between citizens and the 
elected branches. Courts are an intermediary in the citizen-government relationship. If the courts 
constrain the elected branches’ discretion so as to promote their trustworthiness, I think that it is 
fair to say that courts are “mediating” that relationship – and they do so via trustworthiness. 
Accordingly, I label this proposed role for courts as “mediators of government trustworthiness”. 
 
Defining Trustworthiness-Promoting Constraints 
This naturally leads me to my next question: what kinds of judicial constraint in social rights 
adjudication are “trustworthiness-promoting”? Based on the conceptual groundwork which I 
                                               
29 Pettit (n 28) 299. 
30 Shapiro, ‘The Social Control’ (n 28). 
31 For a similar view, see Pettit (n 28). 
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laid in Chapters 1 and 2, I contend here that trustworthiness-promoting constraints are 
characterised by two general features. First, contrary to what Cass Sunstein has called “judicial 
minimalism”, courts must decide social rights cases broadly.32 They must set ‘broad rules for the 
future’ so as to prospectively constrain the elected branches’ discretion over social goods and 
services.33 Why? As trust is a set of expectations (as I defined it in Chapter 1), and expectations 
are by definition beliefs about future events, trust is necessarily prospective. In the simplest of 
terms, trust relates to the trustee’s exercise of control over the good or service in the future. So, if 
trust in the citizen-government relationship is a set of expectations held by citizens regarding 
how the elected branches will (in the future) exercise their control over social goods and services 
(as I defined it in Chapter 2), for a judicial constraint to promote government trustworthiness 
(and so, increase the likelihood of the elected branches fulfilling citizens’ trust), it must constrain 
the elected branches’ future conduct. And a broad judicial ruling does just that (at least usually). 
Second, given trust’s focus on procedure, courts’ broad rulings must not be directed at the 
specific social goods and services to which citizens are entitled (ie the outcome of the 
government’s decision-making), but rather, the process by which the elected branches exercise 
their discretion.34 Succinctly, it is the government’s procedure vis-à-vis the provision of social 
goods and services – rather than the outcome thereof – which must be the focus of constraint by 
the courts. Specifically, the judgments of courts must target what I have identified in this thesis 
as the constituent expectations of trust (good will, fiduciary responsibility and competence) so as 
to make their fulfilment by the elected branches more likely. And by making these expectations’ 
fulfilment more likely, such judgments, in effect, render the elected branches more trustworthy.35 
 The scope of this thesis does not permit me to set out a detailed account of what 
precisely trustworthiness-promoting judicial constraints would entail and how exactly courts can 
impose them (so as to mediate government trustworthiness). For this reason, I leave that line of 
inquiry for future research. However, I would like to outline, in very brief form, what such an 
approach to social rights enforcement would, generally speaking, look like. Generally speaking, it 
would have courts holding the elected branches to a standard of trustworthiness. Such a standard 
would consist of two inter-related forms of judicial intervention in social rights cases. First, 
                                               
32 Cass R Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard University Press 1999), 10. 
33 ibid 9-10. However, as will become apparent shortly, I use the language of “standards” rather than “rules”. 
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likely to be responsive’: Sunstein (n 32) 57. In my view, trustworthiness is such a precondition for democracy and 
the trustworthiness standard proposed herein imposes the sort of good incentives which Sunstein describes. 
 
100 
courts would use the constituent expectations of trust to expressly define the elected branches’ 
obligations to citizens in exercising their control over social goods and services. Those 
obligations are, in the broadest terms: (i) in line with the expectation of good will, to not behave 
intransigently and to employ fair procedures, including those which are transparent, participatory 
and respectful of citizens’ rights (including equality); (ii) consistent with the expectation of 
fiduciary responsibility, to ensure that their staff’s interests do not sway their decisions, so as to 
unfairly discount or disregard citizens’ or a subset of citizens’ interests; and (iii) corresponding to 
the expectation of competence, to develop (and implement) their social policies and programmes 
in accordance with the principles of EBPM. Courts would explicitly set out these obligations in 
their judgments (generally and as they play out in particular areas of social welfare) so that the 
elected branches and citizens know what their obligations and entitlements, respectively, are. 
Second, courts would hold the elected branches accountable where they fail to meet this 
trustworthiness standard. To explain what such accountability would entail, again only generally 
speaking, I will rely on the useful definition of the term offered by Barbara Cameron in her work 
on social welfare in Canada. Cameron has defined accountability as ‘a relationship between 
parties whereby one party is answerable to the other for the performance of commitments or 
obligations that are evaluated against criteria or standards known to the parties, and sanctions are 
applied for failure to meet the commitments’.36 Adapting Cameron’s definition of accountability 
for the present purpose, the elected branches would be answerable to the courts (and to citizens 
through the courts) for their constitutional social rights obligations. In this regard, the courts 
would be responsible for reviewing the elected branches’ social welfare legislation and executive 
action vis-à-vis welfare. The ‘criteria or standards’ against which that legislation and executive 
action are evaluated would be derived from the constituent expectations of trust (as I outlined 
earlier). In other words, courts would, in enforcing constitutional social rights, in turn, enforce the 
elected branches’ trustworthiness.37 And where the elected branches have failed to comply with 
the trustworthiness standard (as outlined), they would be censured and sanctioned by the courts. 
From a government trustworthiness-promoting perspective, it is absolutely imperative 
that both forms of judicial intervention be present – that is, it is not enough that courts review 
social welfare legislation and executive action vis-à-vis welfare without expressly defining the 
elected branches’ obligations to citizens in advance. This is so for two inter-related reasons. For 
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one thing, as Piotr Sztompka has pointed out, accountability (like that which I described above) 
‘enhances trustworthiness because it changes the truster’s calculation of interests; it adds an extra 
incentive to be trustworthy, namely to avoid censure and punishment’.38 Hence, we should 
expect judicial accountability to render the elected branches more trustworthy because they have 
an incentive to act trustworthily (ie to avoid the courts’ censure/punishment). However, if the 
elected branches are not made aware of what is expected of them in advance – and therefore, 
that for which they will be censured and/or punished by the courts – they are not likely to 
change their behaviour accordingly. For another, an express judicial definition of the elected 
branches’ obligations provides citizens (and those who represent citizens such as special interest 
groups and non-governmental organisations) with the tools they need to hold the elected 
branches accountable via non-judicial means. Since litigation is time-consuming and expensive, 
to truly promote government trustworthiness (ie increase the likelihood that the elected branches 
will act with good will, in fulfilment of their fiduciary responsibility and with the requisite 
competence) accountability (with its censures/punishments) cannot be limited to the courts. 
 
Why Trust?: Justifying Political Trust as a Tool for Social Rights Enforcement 
If we accept, based on the foregoing, that the concept of political trust can be transformed into 
an adjudicative tool for social rights enforcement, it still does not justify why. Why should 
political trust be at the centre of social rights enforcement, operating as such a tool for courts in 
their enforcement role? Surely, the concept of political trust has some intuitive appeal when it 
comes to social rights enforcement: it seems correct on an intuitive level that courts, in fulfilling 
their role as enforcers of social rights, should be concerned with citizens’ trust in government. 
After all, should citizens not be entitled to trust their government vis-à-vis the social goods and 
services which they need; and so, should courts, in overseeing the citizen-government 
relationship, not be concerned with such? But with that said, I will now present four principled 
reasons (that is, beyond intuitive appeal) why I think that courts should use political trust as an 
adjudicative tool in their enforcement of social rights. The first follows from the fiduciary nature 
of the citizen-government relationship. Specifically, if we accept that the citizen-government 
relationship is a fiduciary relationship (as I presented in Chapter 2), then there is a good 
argument, based on the work of fiduciary law scholars, that trust should be at the centre of social 
rights enforcement. The second relates back to the Introduction and the instrumental value of 
public trust in government. I contend that by holding the elected branches to a standard of 
trustworthiness, courts should be able to foster citizens’ trust in the elected branches and, in 
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turn, generate the valuable ends which follow from public trust in government. Third, I argue 
that the concept of political trust fits particularly well with social rights adjudication. By this I 
mean that political trust responds well to many of the difficulties which social rights enforcement 
is said to raise. And the final justification in this regard is connected with a standard defence for 
constitutional review: that is, constitutional review’s potential to support or enhance democracy. 
I suggest that, consistent with this defence, the trustworthiness standard outlined herein can be 
said to support democracy. In the rest of this part, I will address each principled reason in turn. 
 
(i) The Relevance of Trust Follows from the Fiduciary Nature of the Citizen-Government Relationship 
The first reason I present in favour of courts using political trust as an adjudicative tool for social 
rights enforcement stems from the fiduciary nature of the citizen-government relationship. In 
Chapter 2, I built an argument, drawing on the work of public law scholars like Evan Fox-
Decent and Evan Criddle as well as sociologist Bernard Barber, why the citizen-government 
relationship should be characterised as such: that is, it is a fiduciary relationship wherein the 
elected branches are a fiduciary to citizens. It was this characterisation which yielded the 
expectation of fiduciary responsibility as a constituent expectation of trust in that relationship. 
 If we accept the foregoing characterisation, there is a good argument which follows 
therefrom that the objective of social rights enforcement should be trust. In the private law 
context, fiduciary law scholars have argued, perhaps not surprisingly, that the law regulating the 
relationship between fiduciaries and their principals should centre on the concept of trust.39 
Seeing as fiduciary relationships have trust at their core, fiduciary law, in essence, ‘regulates 
relationships that are based on reasonable trust’.40 And thus, so the argument goes, it makes 
sense that fiduciary law should revolve around trust as a concept. In the most recent and, in my 
view, clearest example of this argument, Matthew Harding has claimed that given the centrality 
of trust to the fiduciary relationship, fiduciary law ought to be aimed at facilitating trusting 
relationships between fiduciaries and principals. In his words, ‘a main purpose of fiduciary law 
[ought to be] to enable such relationships to form, persist and deepen in ways that generate the 
instrumental and intrinsic value’ which such relationships have.41 For Harding, fiduciary law can 
achieve this purpose by providing principals with ‘guarantees that the conduct of the fiduciaries 
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will be consistent with the requirements of trustworthiness’.42 In other words, owing to fiduciary 
law, a principal in a fiduciary relationship is able to expect the fiduciary to act trustworthily and 
so, can trust him with respect to the property or power which is at issue in their relationship. 
 If we apply the foregoing reasoning to the citizen-government relationship, it follows 
that social rights enforcement should centre on the concept of political trust. Why? Given that 
social rights enforcement is the means by which courts oversee the citizen-government 
relationship, its governing law (social rights law) regulates that relationship. And based on the 
above reasoning – that the law regulating a fiduciary relationship should centre on trust – it 
follows that social rights law – as law regulating a fiduciary relationship (the citizen-government 
relationship) – should centre on political trust. Social rights law should be aimed at facilitating 
trust between citizens and the elected branches with respect to social rights so as to ‘generate the 
instrumental and intrinsic value’ of citizen trust in the citizen-government relationship. 
Granted, I recognise the dangers of extending private law principles to a public law 
context (given their differences both in purpose and application).43 But I should point out that in 
characterising the citizen-government relationship as a fiduciary relationship, I do not adopt a 
“literalist” approach to public fiduciary theorising.44 That is, I am not suggesting that the elected 
branches’ duties to citizens are literally identical to those of a trustee in the private law context. 
And in arguing that social rights enforcement should centre on political trust, I am not 
advocating transplantation of private law doctrine to public law. I am suggesting, rather, as Fox-
Decent has phrased it, that ‘the principles relevant to acting on behalf of another in private law 
might help illuminate’ this public law context.45 Thus, to be sure, we need to exercise ‘caution 
when considering the application of fiduciary concepts to public law’ (and fiduciary duties in a 
public law context will assume a different form).46 That said, I do think that the above broad 
reasoning can be justifiably extended to the social rights context in light of the fact that the 
fiduciary political theory literature has, like the private law literature, recognised trust’s centrality 
to fiduciary relationships. For example, recall that for Fox-Decent, trust is the basis for the 
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state’s authority over its subjects and its duty to them: their trust authorises the state to act on 
their behalf and, in turn, the state must act on the basis of that trust. So, given the public law 
literature’s recognition of the key role played by trust in fiduciary relationships, I do not think 
that the above reasoning is misplaced in the social rights context. 
Further, my suggestion in this regard finds support in an argument which Paul Finn has 
made. Finn – who may be included in the camp of fiduciary political theory scholars – has 
argued that we may fairly characterise government as a trust (and so, characterise government 
actors as trustees for the people).47 In support of his argument, he has advanced three specific 
propositions: (i) that sovereign power resides in the people; (ii) that where the public’s power is 
entrusted to others for the purposes of civil governance, the relevant actors are trustees for the 
people; and (iii) that those ‘entrusted with public power are accountable to the public for the 
exercise of their trust’.48 As part of his argument, and importantly for the present purpose, Finn 
has contended that the people – in virtue of their sovereignty – are entitled to have certain 
expectations about the manner of their governing. And such expectations may ground 
corresponding duties on government actors. One key expectation is what Finn has called the 
“integrity principle”. It necessitates that ‘government is structured and practised in ways that 
invite and retain public trust in government itself’.49 In other words, the people are entitled to 
expect that government actors – as trustees for the people – will exercise public power in a 
trustworthy manner; and government actors may have a corresponding duty to the people to 
exercise the power which has been entrusted to them trustworthily.50 Therefore, in light of Finn’s 
work in this regard, there is some precedent in the public law literature for the idea that political 
trust can and should be used as the basis for a government’s obligations to its citizens. 
 
(ii) Promoting Government Trustworthiness Should Generate the Valuable Ends of Public Trust in Government 
Additionally, the instrumental value of trust in the citizen-government relationship is itself a 
reason why the concept should be at the centre of social rights enforcement. As I documented in 
the Introduction, social scientists have long recognised the value of public trust in government 
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to well-functioning democracies. It has been argued and experimentally demonstrated that such 
trust encourages public cooperation, affecting the public’s willingness to accept authority 
decisions, its feelings of obligation to obey laws and its performance evaluations of authority 
figures. Accordingly, public trust in government has been tied to such valuable ends as social 
stability, economic welfare and effective governance.51 Moreover, social scientists have noted 
trust’s especial importance vis-à-vis social policy. I will not retrace that literature here. 
Based on the application of the network conception of trust to the citizen-government 
relationship, we can expect constitutional social rights adjudication to be able to impact (and in 
the right circumstances, to foster) citizens’ trust in the elected branches with respect to social 
rights. If we accept that conclusion, the promotion of government trustworthiness offers a 
suitable path by which such fostering of citizens’ trust can occur. By imposing trustworthiness-
promoting constraints on the elected branches (in the way I described earlier), courts should be 
able (via constitutional social rights adjudication) to foster citizens’ trust in the elected branches 
with respect to social rights; and accordingly, they should be able to generate the foregoing 
valuable ends. There is a considerable body of theoretical literature to support this conclusion.52 
That literature makes clear that institutions ‘can be made to support trust between persons by 
making them trustworthy’.53 As Russell Hardin has recognised, ‘The best device for creating trust 
is to establish and support trustworthiness’.54 Hardin has explained this relationship between 
trust and trustworthiness as follows: a truster’s learning to trust a trustee depends on the success of 
her trusting – that is, she will learn to trust the trustee if her trust therein proves to be well-
placed. And the success of her trusting depends, in turn, on the trustee’s trustworthiness: if the 
trustee is trustworthy, the truster’s trust in him will likely prove to be well-placed. Therefore,  as 
Hardin has quite reasonably concluded, ‘we can imagine that enhancing trustworthiness in 
general will increase levels of trust’.55 For this reason, writers on trust (including Shapiro as will 
be recalled from Chapter 3 and earlier) have argued that institutions may foster trust by imposing 
social control measures on the trustee, thereby promoting his trustworthiness.56 Applying this 
theory to constitutional social rights adjudication, we may conclude that courts, by imposing 
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trustworthiness-promoting constraints, should be able to foster citizens’ trust in the elected 
branches with respect to social rights; and in turn from this, they should be able to generate the 
valuable ends which have been said and demonstrated to come with public trust in government. 
 Alternatively, even if we do not accept the foregoing (ie that by promoting the elected 
branches’ trustworthiness we should be able to foster citizens’ trust in them), there is a good 
argument that the promotion of trustworthiness in and of itself will generate the valuable ends of 
public trust in government. To repeat: the value of such trust stems from its effect on the 
public’s willingness to accept authority decisions, feelings of obligation to obey laws and 
performance evaluations of authority figures. It is these effects which are said to generate the 
valuable ends of social stability, economic welfare and effective governance. But the research of 
Tom Tyler has established that, in actuality, it is not people’s trust in authorities per se which is 
linked with these effects, but, more precisely, people’s attributions of authority trustworthiness.57 If 
people consider organisational authorities to be trustworthy (even though they may not trust 
them for whatever reason), then they are more likely to accept their decisions, obey their laws 
and positively evaluate them. So, regardless of whether trustworthiness has value as either a path 
to trust or in itself, it is reasonable to expect that courts’ promotion of the elected branches’ 
trustworthiness in constitutional social rights adjudication will generate the valuable ends noted. 
 
(iii) The Concept of Trust Fits Particularly Well with Constitutional Social Rights Adjudication 
Third, I suggest that political trust has normative potential for social rights enforcement because 
trust (as theorised in earlier chapters) fits particularly well with social rights adjudication and the 
difficulties which it is said to raise. Here, I advance three arguments: (a) because a constituent 
element of a trust relationship is discretion/uncertainty, trust responds to an aspect of social 
rights which has proven problematic for social rights adjudication – their prospectivity; (b) unlike 
much of the debate to date, centring social rights enforcement on trust rightfully brings the 
beneficiaries of social goods and services – that is, citizens – to the centre of social rights matters 
by shifting the emphasis of such adjudication from the bilateral relationship between courts and 
the elected branches, to the triangular relationship between courts, the elected branches and 
citizens; and (c) the trustworthiness standard which I propose offers a good middle ground 
between the “two wrongs of enforcement” – judicial usurpation and judicial abdication. 
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(a) Trust Responds to the Prospectivity of Social Rights 
Abram Chayes noted decades ago that traditional adjudication has a “retrospective orientation”: 
it focuses on the past conduct of the parties, is concerned primarily with assessing the legal 
consequences of that past conduct, and the remedy granted by the court derives logically from 
that conduct.58 Chayes argued that this traditional idea of adjudication did not fit well with the 
then-emerging model of “public law litigation” in the United States. That model (exemplified by 
U.S. cases involving school desegregation like Brown v Board of Education II) is characterised by 
courts reviewing the application of regulatory policy and creating/managing ‘complex forms of 
ongoing relief’ in the form of injunctions, with the effect of reforming public institutions.59 
Chayes attributed the misfit between the public law litigation model and the traditional idea of 
adjudication, in large part, to the model’s prospectivity – ie its focus on the parties’ future conduct.  
Public law litigation, Chayes suggested, is prospective in three respects. First, in public 
law litigation the court’s liability determination ‘is not simply a pronouncement of the legal 
consequences of past events’ (as it is for the traditional idea of adjudication) ‘but to some extent 
a prediction of what is likely to be in the future’.60 Courts must make educated guesses about 
whether future actions ‘will materiali[s]e, in what circumstances, and with what consequences’.61 
Second, remediation in public law litigation is prospective in purpose. Whereas under the 
traditional idea of adjudication, relief seeks to ‘compensate for past wrong’, in public law 
litigation it ‘seeks to adjust future behavior[u]r’.62 Public law litigation achieves this purpose by 
making use of injunctive relief. Finally, according to Chayes, injunctive relief is itself prospective 
in character. Not only is it a significant constraint on the parties’ future conduct (being 
enforceable by contempt), but because it is continuing, the parties may return to the court at a 
future time to enforce the order or modify it should the surrounding circumstances change.63 
For the most part, constitutional social rights litigation fits within Chayes’s broader 
category of public law litigation. Consistent with his characterisation of public law litigation, 
social rights cases frequently involve the judicial review of policy and its application, regularly ask 
courts to create and manage complex injunctive relief (usually of an ongoing nature where courts 
choose to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction over their orders), and can result, if courts 
choose to intervene to such an extent, in the reform of public institutions. Therefore, as is true 
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for public law litigation more generally, social rights litigation can be said to be prospective in 
nature. That said, why is social rights litigation prospective? What is it about such litigation that 
makes it prospective in nature? In my view, the litigation is prospective because social rights 
themselves are prospective in nature. Social rights demand courts, in order to enforce them 
adequately, to adopt a prospective orientation. This prospectivity may be attributed, in significant 
part, to three characteristic features of social rights: (i) their positiveness; (ii) their internal 
limitation based on available resources; and (iii) the fact that they are not immediately realisable. 
These features require courts, in defining the substance of a social right and in granting a 
remedy, to consider – and to some extent predict – the elected branches’ likely future conduct. 
First, social rights are characteristically positive in nature.64  A positive right is defined as 
a claim to something such as a particular good or service.65 They are to be contrasted with 
negative rights which are rights ‘that something not be done, that some particular imposition be 
withheld’.66 Accordingly, there is, as Cécile Fabre has put it, a “duty distinction” between positive 
and negative rights: positive rights ground positive duties, requiring the state to do something, 
whereas negative rights ground negative duties of non-interference.67 As positive rights, the 
realisation of social rights requires state ‘action rather than inaction’.68 This feature has been 
highlighted by critics of constitutional social rights adjudication to contrast social rights with civil 
and political rights which are characteristically negative. The positiveness of social rights 
necessitates that courts adopt a prospective orientation in a few respects. As Etienne Mureinik 
has correctly pointed out, as positive rights, there is more than one appropriate way in which a 
government may realise a social right. If a civil or political right ‘is denied, the court knows, 
almost without thinking, that it must respond by quashing the denial. The right generates its own 
remedy, and the remedy is usually an annulment’.69 Social rights, in contrast, ‘can be delivered in 
many different ways, and it is always a matter of political and economic controversy which is the 
best’.70 For this reason (coupled with the arguments from legitimacy and capacity), critics of 
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constitutional social rights adjudication have correctly highlighted the importance of discretion 
for the elected branches to arrive at an appropriate decision. Even those in favour of social rights 
adjudication accept this important point. As Albie Sachs has vividly said, governments have the 
‘right … to be stupid’; we must be ‘cautious about constitutional principles that preempt any 
government forward planning, for they inhibit democratic governmental experimentation and 
public innovation’.71 So, unless courts wish to choose one means of realising a social right to the 
exclusion of all others, thereby inhibiting experimentation and innovation, they must leave the 
elected branches with some discretion. And the leaving of such discretion demands a prospective 
orientation. It requires courts to predict how the elected branches will likely exercise their 
discretion in the future and whether the courts should place restrictions on said discretion. 
Moreover, as positive rights, courts cannot directly enforce social rights; rather, courts 
are ultimately dependent on the elected branches to implement any directive they make.72 In this 
regard, Cass Sunstein has made the often-quoted observation: ‘Courts lack the tools of a 
bureaucracy. They cannot create government program[me]s. They do not have systematic 
overview of government policy’.73 In the absence of a decision on the part of government to 
implement it, a court’s ruling on social rights may be nothing more than ‘merely symbolic or 
supportive’.74 However, civil and political rights, as Mureinik has observed, are different in that 
they ‘are typically enforced by judicial review of government action, resulting, if the action is 
found to conflict with the right, in a court order striking it down’.75 Alternatively, where the 
conflict arises out of a legislative omission or underinclusion, a court may read into or read down 
legislation. In either case, the issue is resolved, and the remedy implemented, immediately. With 
social rights, on the other hand, owing to the courts’ reliance on the elected branches for 
implementation, the issue cannot be resolved, and the remedy cannot be implemented, 
immediately; instead their resolution and implementation are necessarily pushed into the future. 
Therefore, once again, the courts must predict the elected branches’ likely future conduct and, 
more specifically, the likelihood of them actually implementing any ruling they should make. 
Second, social rights are usually not absolute. The duty upon the state to realise social 
rights is frequently limited by available resources. As Fabre has pointed out, ‘Positive rights are 
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inevitably asserted to scarce goods, and consequently scarcity implies a limit to the claim’.76 Not 
to oversimplify the point, but the state cannot provide something that is beyond its physical and 
financial means. Given this limitation, social rights provisions frequently include qualifying 
language to this effect. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the “ICESCR”) (to which 71 States Parties are signatories) qualifies the 
obligation to achieve the rights recognised in the Covenant ‘to the maximum of [the State 
Party’s] available resources’. A similar qualification is found in the text of many national 
constitutions which recognise social rights. As Jeff King has suggested, such qualification can be 
made either explicitly (eg sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the South African Constitution (the rights 
to housing and health, food, water and social security, respectively) which qualify the obligation 
on the state to achieve these rights to that which is ‘within its available resources’) or implicitly 
made through the use of vague terms such as “fair” or “reasonable” to describe either the 
obligation which is imposed on the state or the social goods or services which are at issue.77 
This qualification on social rights also pushes courts towards a prospective orientation. 
This is so for two inter-related reasons. For one thing, “available resources” is an ambiguous 
concept.78 As Darrel Moellendorf has explained, available resources can be understood in two 
senses: one narrow and the other broad.79 In its narrow sense, available resources refers to those 
resources which a ministry or department has been allotted and which it has chosen to allocate 
to the protection of the right. In its broad sense, in contrast, available resources refers to any 
resources which the state can assemble and put towards the protection of the right.80 Scholars 
such as Moellendorf as well as David Bilchitz have advocated the broad interpretation, arguing 
that the narrow sense ‘would allow the government to avoid reali[s]ing conditional rights merely 
by virtue of its allocation of the budget’,81 and, as a result, would ‘ignore the special weight that 
should be attached to rights’.82 However, even if the broad interpretation is accepted, it, in turn, 
is open to multiple interpretations depending on where we decide the state must look to 
assemble resources. As Bilchitz has pointed out, available resources may refer to resources which 
are owned by the state, resources which may be obtained through increased taxes, and broader 
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still, resources from third parties like foreign loans.83 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has adopted the broadest interpretation, noting that it ‘refers to both the 
resources existing within a State as well as those available from the international community 
through international cooperation and assistance’.84 The ambiguity of the available resources 
concept militates in favour of a prospective orientation for a simple reason: the task of defining 
what resources are “available” is exactly the type of polycentric, budgetary decision which critics 
of social rights adjudication argue courts should not be making. For the courts to make such a 
decision would encroach ‘upon the jealously guarded “power of the purse”’,85 and under the 
broadest interpretation of the concept, interfere with the state’s foreign relations. Given this fact, 
courts are unlikely to resolve, at least explicitly and clearly, the ambiguity in the available 
resources qualification, preferring instead to leave it in the discretion of the elected branches. 
Thus, as with the multiple ways open to governments to realise social rights, this discretion 
demands that courts adopt a prospective orientation. To repeat, it requires courts to predict how 
the elected branches will exercise their discretion in the future and consider possible constraints. 
For another thing, “available resources” is a fluid concept. The availability of a resource 
depends on many factors, including whether it is physically available, the financial situation of 
the state, and under the broadest interpretation of available resources, the health of the state’s 
foreign relations. And all these factors are subject to change over time. For example, the fluidity 
of the available resources concept and its dependence on the state’s finances has become 
apparent following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. In the fitting words of Xenophon Contiades 
and Alkmene Fotiadou, ‘Dependent upon the economic contingencies and the inevitable 
fluctuations of economic growth, the content of social rights is by definition open-ended and 
ever-changing’.86 Thus, what is considered “available” today may not be tomorrow. In fact, on 
this point, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has said that in considering a 
claim that “resource constraints” explain a failure to make progress or the taking of retrogressive 
steps, the Committee would examine, among other things, changes to a State party’s financial 
circumstances. 87  Such circumstances include the ‘country’s current economic situation, in 
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particular whether the country was undergoing a period of economic recession’ and the 
‘existence of other serious claims on the State party’s limited resources; for example, resulting 
from a recent natural disaster or from recent internal or international armed conflict’.88 Given 
this fluidity, a court cannot provide fixed content to “available resources”; for it to do so would 
be artificial, leading to serious injustices should resources become more available in the future 
and, placing the elected branches in an impossible position should resources instead become less 
available (eg in an economic downturn or resource shortage). Thus, again, the elected branches 
require discretion thereby necessitating, for the same reasons above, a prospective orientation. 
Finally, characteristically speaking, social rights are not immediately realisable. Owing to 
resource constraints, it is generally understood that it would be unreasonable to expect the state 
to fully realise the social rights of all citizens immediately. As Cass Sunstein has said, ‘No one 
thinks that every individual has an enforceable right to full protection of the interests at stake’.89 
Thus, the obligation on the state (which corresponds to most social rights) is usually in the form 
of a duty to work towards the “progressive realisation” of that right. Under article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR, States Parties have an obligation to ‘take steps … with a view to achieving 
progressively the full reali[s]ation of the rights’ in the Covenant. Similar language is found in 
national constitutions. For example, sections 26(2), 27(2) and 29(1)(b) (the right to further 
education) of the South African Constitution place an obligation on the state to ‘take reasonable 
legislative and other measures … to achieve the progressive realisation’ of the right (and in the 
case of section 29(1)(b), to make ‘further education … through reasonable measures … 
progressively available and accessible’). This does not mean that the state does not have any 
immediate obligations. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has recognised 
two key obligations on States Parties which are of immediate effect: an obligation to ensure that 
the rights ‘will be exercised without discrimination’ and an obligation ‘to take steps’ towards 
achieving the realisation of the rights.90 On the latter point, the Committee has indicated that 
such steps must be ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations recogni[s]ed in the Covenant’.91 In a somewhat similar fashion, the South African 
Constitutional Court has recognised immediate obligations on the state under the above-
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mentioned provisions of their constitution: namely, an obligation to take reasonable measures to 
secure the rights and, relatedly, an obligation to meaningfully engage with the relevant parties.92 
Nevertheless, the “progressive realisation” idea presents a significant challenge for social 
rights adjudication. Despite immediate obligations imposed on the state such as those identified 
above, progressive realisation means that the full realisation of social rights need not be, and so 
most likely will not be, realised immediately.93 As Katharine Young has noted, the effect of 
progressive realisation is to grant governments ‘latitude to implement rights over time depending 
on the availability of necessary resources, rather than requiring them to guarantee rights 
immediately’.94 The result of such latitude is to push the obligation on the state to fully realise 
social rights (and in turn, their enforcement by the courts) into the future. In other words, the 
full realisation of social rights becomes a future obligation which the courts cannot – at least 
with traditional approaches to adjudication – enforce in the present. To do so would, as Mitra 
Ebadolahi has said, ‘involve extended judicial oversight, necessitate repeat court appearances, 
and require the courts to engage in nuanced factual analyses of governmental actions. The costs 
of such activities can be prohibitive’.95 Moreover, without a set timeframe within which social 
rights will be fully realised, this obligation on courts would become a permanent one. 
So, how does the trustworthiness standard which I have outlined in this chapter respond 
to the prospectivity of social rights? It is responsive to their prospectivity because the concept of 
trust – from which trustworthiness follows on directly – is itself prospective in nature. Not only 
does trust relate to future events (as I explained in an earlier part), but it necessitates that the 
trustee has discretion in exercising control over the good or service at issue, and, in turn, that the 
truster is uncertain (at least to some extent). It is for this reason that Luhmann has described 
trust as having a ‘problematic relationship with time’.96 Without discretion/uncertainty, we have 
neither trust nor trustworthiness – what we have is reliability. Now, because trustworthiness 
represents the likelihood that the trustee will fulfil the truster’s trust, a court – in applying the 
trustworthiness standard – must leave the elected branches with discretion in exercising their 
control over social goods and services. As I will explain shortly, if the court eliminated that 
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discretion, it would not be promoting government trustworthiness, but reliability. Thus, the 
trustworthiness standard, while it does impose constraints on the elected branches’ procedure 
vis-à-vis the provision of social goods and services, it nonetheless leaves them with discretion as 
to outcome. So, social rights’ prospectivity – which necessitates that the elected branches have 
discretion as to how to realise those rights – does not prove problematic for the trustworthiness 
standard. On the contrary, trust (and by extension, trustworthiness) indeed require discretion. 
 
(b) Trust Brings Citizens to the Centre of Social Rights Matters 
Many social rights scholars have taken issue with the over-emphasis which courts in social rights 
cases have placed on their relationship with the elected branches, and, relatively speaking, the 
little weight which they have given to citizens and their interests.97 Courts are overly concerned 
with institutional issues vis-à-vis social rights matters. This over-concern with institutional issues 
follows from the previously-noted arguments regarding the courts’ legitimacy and capacity. 
While the social rights debate’s focus has moved on from justiciability to judicial approaches, its 
underlying arguments, to a large extent, have not. Scholars and litigants who are opposed to 
judicial activism in social rights matters are now employing those arguments to advocate judicial 
restraint and deference to the elected branches. And so, not surprisingly, courts globally, in 
adjudicating social rights matters, continue to strongly emphasise these institutional issues.98 
Danie Brand has made a good argument in this regard. In particular, Brand has argued 
that South African courts, due to their over-emphasis on and concern with such institutional 
issues, have employed ‘the strategy of deference, in a binary institutional relations mode – that is, 
by deferring decisions to the other branches of government’.99 As he has explained, deference is 
not neutral for claimants in social rights cases; rather it constitutes a “loss” for them. In Brand’s 
words, ‘when courts employ deference in socio-economic rights cases to deal with problems of 
institutional capacity, legitimacy, integrity, security or constitutional comity, they favour the point 
of view with respect to the issues in dispute of one of the parties to that dispute (the state) over 
another (the claimants)’.100 Relying upon the theoretical work of Emilios Christodoulis, Brand 
has argued that instead of conceiving of social rights adjudication in such binary terms, ‘we 
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should recognise that it occurs within a more complex triangular relationship’ – between courts, 
the elected branches and citizens.101 On this point, Brand has suggested that ‘courts should move 
away from regarding the institutional problems they face in deciding socio-economic rights cases 
in binary, institutional relations terms’ and instead ‘should recognise that … they stand in 
relationship not only to the representative branches of government’, but also to citizens.102 In 
other words, citizens (and their interests) must be brought to the centre of social rights matters. 
Based on this argument, Brand has proposed that South African courts operationalise this ‘shift 
of perspective’ into ‘their doctrine, techniques and reasoning’ in social rights cases.103 
Responding to such scholarly criticism, the trustworthiness standard brings citizens and 
their interests to the centre of social rights matters. First, owing to its roots in the network 
conception of trust, the trustworthiness standard necessarily conceptualises social rights 
adjudication as a triangular relationship between courts, the elected branches and citizens. 
Recognising that courts are in a relationship with citizens as well as the elected branches, it 
envisages courts as using those two relationships to mediate the relationship which the two 
parties have with one another (much in accordance with what Brand has suggested). Further, by 
focusing on the elected branches’ trustworthiness, and, in turn, on citizens’ trust in the elected 
branches, citizens are a paramount consideration in this standard. While the relationship between 
courts and the elected branches is relevant (including the issues of legitimacy and capacity such 
that courts should not usurp the elected branches’ policy-making role), that relationship (and 
these institutional issues) do not, under this standard, overshadow the interests of citizens. 
 
(c) Trustworthiness Offers a Good Middle Ground for the “Two Wrongs of Enforcement” 
As I noted earlier, in enforcing social rights, there are two errors or “wrongs” which a court can 
make.104 The first is judicial usurpation which ‘occurs when the judiciary interprets and applies 
[social] rights in such a manner that it assumes control of the political system … crowding out 
… the democratically elected branches’.105 In essence, the courts usurp the policy-making role of 
the elected branches. The second wrong, judicial abdication, ‘occurs when the judiciary declines 
to protect constitutional rights’, thereby abdicating its own role as protector and enforcer of 
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constitutional rights.106 For example, a court may be said to be abdicating its role where it shows 
too much deference to the elected branches of government.107 However, as it will be recalled, 
usurpation and abdication ‘do not represent a strict antagonism’: ‘they are a matter of degree’ 
and, as such, courts can – and should – opt for a middle ground between these two extremes.108 
In my view, the trustworthiness standard which I have outlined in this chapter offers the 
courts such a middle ground. And it does so because of the procedural orientation of trust (that 
is, as conceptualised). Given this orientation, the trustworthiness standard would have courts 
reviewing (at least principally) the procedure by which the elected branches exercise their control 
over social goods and services (rather than the outcome thereof).109 In other words, given trust’s 
procedural orientation, the courts, in applying the trustworthiness standard, would not be 
defining the substance of social policy so as to usurp the elected branches’ policy-making role. 
However, the courts would be ensuring that the procedure followed by the elected branches in 
developing and implementing social policy evinces good will, competence and fulfilment of its 
fiduciary responsibility to citizens. And in so doing, they could still, I suggest, play a meaningful 
role in social rights protection so as to not abdicate their constitutional role as rights enforcer. 
In this regard, the trustworthiness standard finds parallels in other procedural approaches 
to social rights enforcement.110 Granted, procedural approaches to social rights enforcement 
have been the subject of much criticism. Such criticism has been, in large part, in response to the 
“reasonableness” approach adopted by the South African Constitutional Court in interpreting 
and applying its constitution’s social rights provisions (which scholars have interpreted as 
significantly procedural in nature).111 The principal concerns which have been raised by scholars 
in this camp are that procedural approaches (like reasonableness): (i) fail to set standards or lay 
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down principles which can guide future policy-making (as well as aid courts in future social rights 
cases); and (ii) they have limited practical effect in that they do little to protect vulnerable groups 
(and following from this, they may discourage litigation). These concerns are valid. However, I 
think that the trustworthiness standard for social rights enforcement which I am proposing 
herein, while principally procedural, would mitigate these two concerns to a significant degree. 
On the first concern, we know that the trustworthiness standard would have courts use 
trust’s three expectations to define the elected branches’ obligation to citizens. Consequently, 
unlike many procedural approaches (including reasonableness), the trustworthiness standard 
would set standards and lay down principles, both to guide future policy-making and to aid courts 
in future cases: those standards and principles stemming from the expectations of trust. 
Further, I submit that the trustworthiness standard would mitigate the concern of 
procedural approaches having limited practical effect. Why? By using trust’s three expectations 
to define the elected branches’ obligations, courts would promote what Brian Ray has termed the 
“institutionalisation” of procedural remedies. In his work, Ray has argued that engagement (a 
procedural remedy introduced by the Constitutional Court which obliges governments to engage 
meaningfully with affected communities on social welfare matters) ‘can give poor people and 
their advocates an important enforcement tool’.112 But to do so, it must be institutionalised. For 
Ray, institutionalisation requires governments to adopt measures which ‘ensure systematic 
implementation of engagement’ such that they ‘work to develop a more generalised capacity for 
engagement outside of specific projects’.113 In parallel to Ray’s argument vis-à-vis engagement, I 
suggest that the expectations of trust – if institutionalised in the elected branches’ exercise of 
control over social goods and services – could do a lot to protect vulnerable groups.114 That is, 
they would promote government good will, competence and fulfilment of fiduciary responsibility 
in the way I described in Chapter 2. And the trustworthiness standard would encourage the 
institutionalisation of these expectations because, again, courts would use the expectations to 
define the elected branches’ obligations. Put simply, the expectations would not only serve as an 
accountability measure (used by courts on an ad hoc basis to review decisions), but the elected 
branches would be expected to develop and implement social policy broadly in compliance with 
those expectations (with failure to comply giving rise to court intervention). The trustworthiness 
standard would therefore promote those expectations’ ‘systematic implementation’ in the elected 
branches’ overall exercise of control over the social goods and services at issue in social rights. 
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Now, it will be recalled that my conceptualisation of trust in the citizen-government 
relationship engages the notion of substantive equality (as part of the procedural fairness element 
of respect for citizens’ rights (including the right to equality)). Consequently, the trustworthiness 
standard cannot be fairly described as entirely procedural.115 But this more substantive element 
of the trustworthiness standard, I suggest, does not preclude it from nonetheless striking a good 
middle ground between the two wrongs of enforcement. On this point, a distinction can – and 
should – be drawn between, on one hand, what equality signifies and, on the other, how courts 
should enforce a constitutional right to equality.116 As I explained in the Introduction, human 
rights in contemporary democracies have several roles and functions beyond the courts. 
In light of the foregoing distinction, Sandra Fredman – despite advocating a substantive 
conception of equality – has said that courts, given their institutional limitations, should occupy a 
catalytic role. She has emphasised that ‘the existence of a right does not mean that the court 
needs to make primary decisions about the allocation of resources’.117 According to Fredman, 
courts – rather than detract from democracy (which would be the case if they made primary 
decisions about resource allocation) – can and should enhance democracy by requiring decision-
makers to justify, in light of the equality principle, their decisions vis-à-vis social welfare. They 
should require decision-makers to ‘show that their choice of eligibility criteria’ satisfies the four 
objectives (or dimensions) of substantive equality (which I outlined in Chapter 2) such that their 
choice ‘not only redresses disadvantage, but also promotes respect and dignity, accommodates 
diverse identities, and facilitates participation or counters social exclusion’. 118 For example, as she 
has noted, ‘Redistributive decisions should not be made on the basis of criteria which undermine 
status equality, such as stereotypical assumptions and unwarranted generali[s]ations’.119 
I agree substantially with Fredman’s view on the role of courts in enforcing the right to 
equality.120 It not only recognises the complexity of inequality (including its social context) but 
acknowledges the limited legitimacy and capacity of courts in making resource allocation 
decisions. Accordingly, it neither strips equality of substance (in a way that a formal conception 
of equality would) nor yields judicial usurpation of the elected branches’ policy-making role. And 
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so, incorporating Fredman’s approach to equality into the otherwise procedural trust-based 
approach to social rights enforcement would enable the resultant approach, though not entirely 
procedural, to nonetheless strike a good middle ground between the two enforcement wrongs. I 
thus suggest that her approach to equality can and should form part of this trust-based approach. 
The middle ground offered by the trustworthiness standard – and its appeal for social 
rights enforcement – is most apparent when we consider the well-recognised tension in the 
administrative state between technocracy and democracy.121 Given the increasing technological 
complexity of government-regulated areas (including the delivery of social goods and services), 
the administrative state has necessarily come to rely on experts. Contemporary administrative 
agencies are increasingly staffed by experts trained in everything from the medical sciences to 
urban planning. However, this administrative expertise has generated a tension. On one hand, 
expertise provides a strong – and, in fact, the central – rationale for courts affording deference to 
administrative agencies on matters of social policy. Owing to judges’ lack of training in the 
relevant areas, generally speaking, courts are in a comparatively disadvantaged position to resolve 
such matters.122 Hence, there is good reason to leave such matters to those with the expertise. 
On the other hand, there exists a valid fear of “regulation by experts”.123 As many have noted, 
experts suffer from a panoply of limitations which militate against deferring to them.124 Such 
limitations include not only the possibility that experts will not apply the expertise for which they 
are being relied upon, but that expertise is itself not as objective as some would suggest it is, 
experts being unduly influenced by the interests of well-organised businesses (so-called ‘agency 
capture’ or factionalism) or their own interests. Moreover, because the decisions made by experts 
are often value-laden (with technical and political decisions overlapping), expertise should not 
usurp democratic values such as participation and transparency.125 As Susan Rose-Ackerman has 
put it, ‘Analysis, however competent, cannot eliminate deep disagreements over values’.126 
The outlined trustworthiness standard is responsive to this tension. Through its 
constituent expectation of competence (which, it will be recalled, translates into an expectation 
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of EBPM), it accords expertise the prominent role which it deserves. Specifically, it necessitates 
that governmental decisions with respect to social goods and services be based on the relevant 
evidence from the natural and social sciences. However, it does not blindly defer to experts. 
First, the expectation of competence is defined by reference to the evidence upon which the 
decision is based and not the expertise of the decision-maker. Thus, it ensures that the expert 
applies the expertise for which she is relied upon. Second, because EBPM encapsulates more 
than merely knowledge from scientific research (but includes what Brian Head has called 
“political knowledge” and “practical implementation knowledge”), the trustworthiness standard 
necessarily adopts a more holistic approach to expertise. To repeat, with EBPM, ‘decisions are 
based on evidence and not made by evidence’.127 And lastly, under the trustworthiness standard, 
competence is in no way the end of the story. The other two expectations – good will and 
fiduciary responsibility – allow a court, in enforcing social rights, to consider the democratic 
values (including participation and transparency) with which expertise is frequently in tension. 
 
(iv) The Trustworthiness Standard Supports Democracy 
A final justification which I will put forward for centring social rights enforcement on political 
trust relates to a standard defence for constitutional review. Scholars of constitutional law have 
long suggested that while courts may be counter-majoritarian (as Waldron and others have 
forcefully argued), they are not (at least not necessarily) anti-democratic.128 Via constitutional 
review, courts can, rather, support or enhance democracy (as well as the values which underlie it).129 
In the social rights context, commentators have relied upon variations of this defence to 
carve out democratically defensible roles for courts in enforcing social rights.130 Rosalind Dixon, 
for example, has argued that courts can remedy “blockages” in the legislative process (which 
produce omissions and delays in that process) – what she has called “blind spots” and “burdens 
of inertia”.131 According to Dixon, because the resultant omissions and delays ‘are not driven by 
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resource constraints or supported by principled forms of justification’, they have ‘profound 
significance to the legitimacy of the constitutional system’; thus, by remedying the blockages, 
courts support democracy (specifically, they ‘enhance the overall inclusiveness and 
responsiveness of a constitutional democracy’).132 Sandra Fredman has similarly relied upon this 
defence (but has granted courts a larger role than Dixon has). Specifically, she has argued that 
the judicial enforcement of social rights is justified to the extent that it strengthens democracy.133 
As she has explained, ‘a major role of [social] rights duties is to strengthen democracy’; hence,  
‘justiciability [of such rights] may be appropriate to the extent that it can be harnessed to the 
achievement of these aims’.134 Fredman has identified three key values which, according to her, 
lie behind the democratic ideal: accountability, participation and equality. And so, she has argued 
that to the extent that social rights enforcement can support these three key values, it is justified. 
The trustworthiness standard, I submit, is compatible with this defence for constitutional 
review: that is, courts, by using the trustworthiness standard to enforce constitutional social 
rights (in the way I have proposed), can be said to support or “strengthen” democracy.135 Thus, I 
suggest, courts as mediators of government trustworthiness offers a democratically defensible 
role for courts in the enforcement of social rights. So, how exactly can the trustworthiness 
standard be said to support democracy? I suggest here at least two ways. First, it can be said to 
support democracy because political trust is itself supportive of – or “good for” – democracy 
(that is, under the rights circumstances). This conclusion follows from the previously-described 
link between political trust and cooperation. Owing to that link (which it will be recalled ties 
political trust to the valuable ends of social stability, economic welfare and effective governance), 
many writers have argued that political trust is supportive of democracy as a form of 
government.136 Put simply, political trust facilitates democracy. For example, Mark Warren has 
developed a particularly convincing argument in this respect (with which I agree). According to 
Warren, “democracy” may be defined as ‘the systems of institutions and associations that enable 
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People Don’t Trust Government (Harvard University Press 1997), 4-5; Mark Warren, ‘Trust and Democracy’ in Eric M 
Uslaner (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust (OUP 2018); Warren (n 135). 
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people to engage in collective self-government with respect to matters that affect their self-
determination’.137 When people trust, ‘they relinquish some control over their self-determination 
to the will of others’.138 However, given the previously-described link which exists between trust 
and cooperation, such relinquishment of control comes with a significant benefit: people ‘can 
dramatically increase their collective capabilities, since trust enables cooperative divisions of 
labour, and does so without the burdens of coercion or other costly means of organi[s]ation’.139 
It is this benefit which makes political trust supportive of or “good for” democracy: owing to its 
power to increase people’s collective capabilities in this manner, political trust ‘expands domains 
of collective self-rule’, thereby supporting the very idea of democracy (at least as defined).140 
To be sure, political trust is not always good for democracy. For one thing, since trust 
‘can be deferential, naïve or misplaced’, it can (and often does) support authoritarian politics. 141 
And such politics are, for obvious reasons, not good for democracy. Some writers have thus 
argued that rather than political trust, distrust or scepticism is valuable to democracy because it 
‘keeps constituents alert, and therefore public officials responsive’.142 As I have said, I do not 
dispute this argument. But its applicability, as I will explain shortly, is limited to certain kinds of 
trust. For another, trust can be problematic for democracy since it provides ‘the social glue for 
clans, ethnic and racial groups, and sectarian religious communities’; it holds ‘together criminal 
conspiracies and corrupt exchanges’; and it ‘is involved in “bad social capital”: relationships of 
mutual social investment that have broader divisive or corrosive social effects’ (eg organised 
crime).143 And all of these consequences, we can reasonably conclude, are bad for democracy. 
Therefore, according to Warren, political trust must satisfy two conditions to be good for 
democracy (or “democracy-supporting”). First, it must be “warranted”. Put simply, government 
actors must be worthy of citizens’ trust in them (ie trustworthy with respect to the relevant good 
or service at issue in their trust relationship). By being trustworthy, government actors grant 
citizens the knowledge (or in Warren’s terms, “the warrant”) which is necessary for them to 
make ‘a good trust judgment’.144 This condition, in my view, distinguishes those circumstances in 
which political trust is valuable to democracy from those where, rather, distrust or scepticism are 
valuable. Where a government has shown itself to be untrustworthy, of course citizens should 
                                               
137 Warren (n 136) 33. 
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not blindly trust their government; they should be sceptical.145 But distrust or scepticism of an 
unwarranted nature (ie where government has not shown itself to be untrustworthy) is not 
valuable to democracy.146 Second, to be good for democracy, we must be able to publicly justify 
the trust in question to those who are affected by the relevant trusting relationship. In other 
words, trust is only consistent with democracy if those who are affected by a trusting relationship 
find (or would find) the relationship acceptable. Corrupt relationships, crime organisations, and 
ethnic and religious factions, for instance, are built on trusting relationships (and the trust in 
them is usually warranted); however, the trust is not democracy-supporting since the relationship 
has a negative impact on others who, if they were aware of the reasons supporting the trusting 
relationship, would not approve of it. Consequently, a trusting relationship ‘is democratically 
legitimate just to the extent that it could be justified to those affected by its externalities’.147 
The trustworthiness standard outlined in this chapter promotes trust which satisfies both 
of Warren’s conditions. First, because the standard focuses on trustworthiness (as opposed to 
some other means of promoting citizens’ trust), the trust expected to result from its application 
may be fairly characterised as warranted. Citizens – via social rights adjudication – are given the 
knowledge or “the warrant” they need to make ‘a good trust judgment’ vis-à-vis the elected 
branches with respect to social rights.148 Further, the trustworthiness standard satisfies Warren’s 
second condition. As he has explained, the second condition maps roughly onto a distinction 
which has been drawn in the trust literature between “generalised” trust (ie trust in people 
generally) and “particularised” trust (ie trust between particular individuals); the condition is 
usually met where the relevant trust is of a more general nature (ie citizens’ trust in government 
generally) as opposed to a more particular nature (ie particular citizens’ trust in particular 
government actors).149 It is trust of the latter nature which supports the corrupt relationships, 
crime organisations, and ethnic and religious factions which are bad for democracy. In contrast 
to such cases, the trustworthiness standard promotes trust in the citizen-government relationship 
which is of a more general nature. Granted, some citizens are likely to be negatively impacted by 
                                               
145 As Onora O’Neill has put it, ‘it is foolish to assume that we should always, or indeed generally, seek to “restore 
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a trusting citizen-government relationship (since not all citizens will be satisfied with the 
outcome of governmental decision-making). But because the trustworthiness standard is rooted 
in criteria which are aimed at promoting a general form of citizens’ trust in the elected branches 
with respect to social rights (ie procedural fairness, competence and the fulfilment of fiduciary 
responsibility) – rather than that of a more particular nature – the trusting relationship cannot be 
reasonably considered unacceptable. We can thus publicly justify the trusting relationship to 
those citizens who are negatively affected by it. So, based on the foregoing, the trustworthiness 
standard, I submit, promotes the kind of trust which is good for democracy or “democracy-
supporting”; and following from this conclusion, the standard can be said to support democracy. 
Moreover, there is another reason, I contend, why the trustworthiness standard can be 
said to support democracy. And it relates to a more specific defence for constitutional review. It 
has been argued that one of the ways in which constitutional review supports or enhances 
democracy is by protecting the rights of minorities from the so-called “tyranny of the majority”. 
Courts, given their isolation from the electoral process as well as their independence from 
government interference, are said to be in a better position to protect minorities. Hence, 
constitutional review ‘is justified as a counter-weight to potentially myopic, prejudiced, careless 
and occasionally tyrannous majorities and the democratically elected politicians who feel obliged 
to respond to their demands’.150 The trustworthiness standard, in my view, is compatible with 
this more specific defence: that is, courts, by applying the trustworthiness standard in their 
enforcement of constitutional social rights, would be expected to protect the rights of minorities. 
This conclusion follows from the expectations by which I have conceptualised trust in 
the citizen-government relationship (and which courts would therefore enforce in applying the 
trustworthiness standard). First of all, those expectation elements of a more procedural nature 
would go a long way towards ensuring that the interests of minorities are represented in the 
process by which the elected branches exercise their control over social goods and services.151 
This is especially so, as I have noted, if the expectations are institutionalised. For example, the 
expectation of good will includes an expectation (under the element of participation) that the 
elected branches will sincerely consider the views of all those groups affected by the relevant 
exercise of control. And courts, in enforcing that expectation’s element, would require that the 
elected branches so consider those views (and hold them accountable should they fail to do so). 
Such a requirement for participation is an important means of protecting minorities’ rights. It 
would ensure that minorities (including low-income citizens who are poorly represented in the 
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democratic process) are given a voice in that process and that their voice is indeed heard therein 
(when it might not (and probably would not) otherwise be).152 Additionally, we know from the 
preceding section that the expectation of good will further includes a more substantive element: 
an expectation that the elected branches, in exercising control over social goods and services, will 
respect citizens’ right to equality (under the element of respect for citizens’ rights). Specifically, as 
I described in Chapter 2, this sub-element demands that the elected branches exercise said 
control in furtherance of substantive equality. And courts would enforce this sub-element by 
requiring that the elected branches justify their exercise of control, showing that their decisions 
in this regard satisfy Fredman’s four objectives (or dimensions) of substantive equality. Requiring 
this sort of justification from the elected branches offers another important means of protecting 
the rights of minorities. Not only does it reinforce the participation of minorities in the relevant 
decision-making process (since participation is one of Fredman’s four objectives or dimensions), 
but it also ensures, as Fredman has aptly highlighted, that the elected branches will not base their 
exercise of control on stereotypical assumptions – assumptions which have the ultimate effect of 
furthering the structural inequalities and assumptions which disadvantaged minorities face.153 
 
A Trust-Based Critique of Other Forms of Constraint in Social Rights Adjudication 
Before concluding this chapter and turning to the illustrations in Chapters 5 and 6, I will briefly 
consider two additional forms of judicial constraint which are common in constitutional social 
rights adjudication – that is, two additional ways in which courts can and do constrain the elected 
branches’ discretion over social goods and services other than via what I have called 
trustworthiness-promoting constraints. For reasons which will become apparent shortly, I label 
these two forms of constraint “vulnerability-mitigating” and “reliability-promoting”. I consider 
these additional constraints in this section for two inter-related purposes. First, I think that by 
contrasting these two forms of judicial constraint with trustworthiness-promoting constraints, I 
can provide greater clarity to what the latter category of judicial constraint entails. Second, these 
two forms of constraint have been criticised by legal scholars on several grounds, including their 
violating the separation of powers and their potential to worsen inequities between citizens. Like 
those scholars, I offer a critique of these two forms of constraint; but I do so on the basis of 
trust and trustworthiness. Specifically, I argue that neither constraint promotes government 
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trustworthiness; and if we accept based on the foregoing argument that government 
trustworthiness (and in turn, public trust in government) are valid concerns for social rights 
enforcement, it follows that these two forms of constraint’s failure to promote such 
trustworthiness militates against their adoption by courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. 
 
Vulnerability-Mitigating Constraints 
The first form of judicial constraint is what I will call “vulnerability-mitigating”. In imposing this 
form of constraint on the elected branches, courts – this time in line with judicial minimalism 
(unlike trustworthiness-promoting constraints) – decide social rights cases narrowly.154 They 
restrict their rulings to the specific issue or issues in the case before them and to the particular 
claimant or claimants who have brought that case to them. Thus, courts ‘try to decide cases 
rather than to set down broad rules’.155 Further, courts, in deciding those cases, overrule the 
elected branches and grant the claimants a social good or service which they have requested in 
the litigation. Therefore, and again unlike trustworthiness-promoting constraints, courts using 
this form of constraint focus on the outcome of governmental decision-making (rather than its 
process). Courts achieve this end by exercising their broad remedial powers, including mandatory 
orders which require the elected branches to provide the good or service, supervisory orders 
which require the elected branches to report to the courts (or to a third party) regarding their 
fulfilment of the courts’ mandatory orders, and coercive orders (eg contempt orders) where the 
elected branches fail to comply with the courts’ mandatory and/or supervisory orders. 
The vulnerability-mitigating form of constraint is best exemplified by Brazilian courts’ 
interpretation and application of the constitutional right to health. The “Brazilian model” for 
right-to-health litigation (to borrow Octavio Ferraz’s term) ‘is characteri[s]ed by a prevalence of 
individuali[s]ed claims demanding curative medical treatment (most often drugs) and by an 
extremely high success rate for the litigant’.156 As Ferraz has explained, this model has existed in 
Brazil since the late 1990s when the Supreme Federal Tribunal (Brazil’s highest court) 
interpreted the right to health as ‘an individual entitlement to the satisfaction of one’s health 
needs with the most advanced treatment available, irrespective of costs’.157 Since that time, 
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Brazilian courts have ordered their government to provide treatment for diabetes,  HIV/AIDS, 
Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, hepatitis C and multiple sclerosis (among others).158 
As I said earlier, this form of judicial constraint has been argued problematic on many 
grounds. First, there are significant concerns of equity. As Ferraz has contended in the context 
of Brazil, this form of constraint has the potential to (and most likely will) worsen existing 
inequities between citizens.159 Relying on empirical data on Brazil’s right-to-health litigation, 
Ferraz has convincingly shown that contrary to what one may expect, such litigation has not 
benefited low-income citizens in Brazil. On the contrary, and in his words, it has ‘by and large 
benefited a minority of individuals who are able to access lawyers and courts to force the state to 
provide expensive treatment that the public health system should not provide under any 
plausible interpretation of the constitutional right to health’.160 Therefore, owing to Brazil’s right-
to-health litigation (which, as I have already explained, is characterised by the vulnerability-
mitigating form of judicial constraint), this minority of citizens has been privileged over the rest 
of the population, including low-income citizens.161 Second, this form of judicial constraint raises 
considerable separation of powers issues. Since this form of constraint is a highly intrusive form 
of judicial intervention – with the courts demanding that the elected branches provide citizens 
with a good or service they had previously decided not to – it may reasonably be (and has been) 
suggested that courts, in imposing it, usurp the policy-making role of the elected branches.162 
 I raise here another problem with this form of judicial constraint: its inability to promote 
government trustworthiness. If government trustworthiness is the likelihood that the elected 
branches will fulfil citizens’ three expectations of trust, there is no reason (to my mind, at least) 
why this form of constraint should promote such trustworthiness. This form of constraint 
obliges the elected branches to provide litigants with the social good or service which they have 
requested. But why should the elected branches, as a result of such a specific and individualised 
obligation imposed upon them, be more likely – in their future interactions with citizens – to 
fulfil those three expectations of trust?163 I can see no reason for it. Unlike the trustworthiness-
promoting constraints described earlier, this constraint does very little to constrain the elected 
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branches’ future conduct (ie it does not set out any standard for the future, including for 
accountability purposes in future cases). It also does nothing to target the process by which the 
elected branches exercise their discretion over social goods and services (which, as we know, is 
the very focus of trust). So, if we accept the validity of government trustworthiness to the 
enforcement of constitutional social rights, this form of judicial constraint proves problematic. 
Based on the conceptual groundwork laid in Chapters 1 and 2, I contend that instead of 
promoting government trustworthiness, this form of judicial constraint mitigates the vulnerability of 
citizens to the elected branches. It will be recalled from those chapters that citizens’ vulnerability to the 
elected branches depends, in part, on the availability of the social good or service at issue from a 
source alternative to the elected branches. That alternative source is usually a provider on the 
private market; and so, where citizens have access (including financially) to that private market, 
such providers mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the elected branches. I suggest that much like 
private providers, courts also have the potential to mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the elected 
branches by serving as an alternative source of social goods and services. How so? Through the 
courts’ power of judicial review and their often-broad remedial powers, courts technically 
maintain control (albeit indirect control) over social goods and services.164 And owing to such 
control, courts can (at least technically speaking again) offer citizens another source of the social 
goods and services which they need. Now, where a court, in its prior cases (ie its precedent), 
shows itself willing to exert its technical control over social goods and services, it, in turn, 
establishes itself as an alternative source for citizens of those social goods and services. It 
indicates to citizens (as litigants in future social rights cases before that court) that, as was the 
case with private providers, if the elected branches do not provide them with the social goods 
and services which they need, those citizens may turn to the court to obtain them. And so, like 
private providers, that court can mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the elected branches. In my 
view, where a court imposes the present form of constraint on the elected branches (granting 
litigants in a case the social good or service which they have requested) a court does just this. It 
shows itself willing to exert its technical control over social goods and services, thereby 
establishing itself as an alternative source: and so, it mitigates citizens’ vulnerability to the elected 
branches. This is, in essence, what Brazilian courts have done with respect to the right to health. 
To be precise, and making matters worse for this form of judicial constraint, a court only 
mitigates citizens’ vulnerability to the elected branches to the extent that citizens can take 
advantage of the alternative access the court offers (again like a private provider). Hence, it is not 
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just that this form of judicial constraint does not promote government trustworthiness; but, 
given litigation’s time and expense which inevitably favour the financially advantaged, for low-
income citizens who do not have the meaningful option of litigating their social rights, courts 
(where they employ this form of constraint) do not even go so far as to mitigate those citizens’ 
vulnerability. And thus, in line with Ferraz’s argument, they worsen inequities between citizens.165 
 
Reliability-Promoting Constraints 
The second form of judicial constraint is what I will call “reliability-promoting”. In parallel to the 
trustworthiness-promoting category of constraint, this form of constraint involves courts making 
broad rulings which prospectively constrain the elected branches’ discretion over social goods 
and services. But instead of courts’ judgments targeting the process of the government’s 
decision-making, they target the specific social goods and services to which citizens are entitled 
(ie the outcome of that decision-making). Specifically, courts, in imposing this form of constraint 
on the elected branches, make broad rulings which interpret constitutional social rights as rights 
to defined social goods and services (or a specific quantity thereof), thereby imposing a 
constitutional obligation on the elected branches to provide those goods and services to the 
relevant rights-holders. For instance, a right to health may be interpreted as a right to a certain 
medical treatment, or a right to water as a right to a certain water litreage per person per month. 
The reliability-promoting form has definite similarities with its vulnerability-mitigating 
counterpart. In fact, the two forms of constraint frequently co-occur in social rights cases. In 
both forms, courts’ constraint on the elected branches’ discretion over social goods and services 
has the same broad consequence: citizens’ obtaining social goods and services. The difference 
between the two lies in the temporality of that constraint. And such temporality follows from the 
breadth of the judicial rulings in each. In the vulnerability-mitigating form, the constraint on the 
elected branches’ discretion is mainly retrospective.166 A court, in reviewing a past governmental 
action or decision, narrowly overrules that past action or decision and orders that the elected 
branches provide the social good or service to the litigants. By ruling that way, and exerting 
control over the social good or service, the court becomes an alternative source of social goods 
and services for citizens in the future. However, the constraint the court imposes on the elected 
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branches has little carry-forward value with respect to future interactions between citizens and 
the elected branches. It tells citizens who are not the litigants little about their future interactions 
with government. In the reliability-promoting form, in contrast, courts’ constraint on the elected 
branches’ discretion has much greater prospective function. By deciding cases broadly and 
interpreting a constitutional social right as a right to a defined social good or service, a court’s 
constraint has much greater impact on the future interactions between the elected branches and 
citizens generally. Granted, when a court constrains the elected branches’ discretion in this way, 
it frequently orders provision of the social good or service at issue to the litigants in the 
immediate case (thereby employing the vulnerability-mitigating form of constraint). However, 
and what distinguishes the two forms, they also restrict the elected branches’ discretion so as to 
limit the possible outcomes of future interactions between the elected branches and citizens. 
This form of constraint is generally preferred to its vulnerability-mitigating counterpart as 
it does not raise the same equity concerns: because the court’s ruling applies broadly, its benefit 
is not limited to those citizens who have the financial resources to litigate their social rights. That 
said, this form of constraint nonetheless remains problematic from a separation of powers 
standpoint. By interpreting a constitutional social right as a right to a defined good or service, the 
courts are, in essence, making social policy. By determining which social goods and services the 
state must provide, the courts are, given limited budgets, allocating resources away from state 
provision of other goods and services and, in turn, prioritising between them. Accordingly, in 
imposing this form of constraint, the courts may reasonably be said once again to be usurping 
the elected branches’ role.167 But in addition to such separation of powers issues, this form of 
constraint is also problematic because it fails to promote government trustworthiness. Granted, 
like trustworthiness-promoting constraints, this form of constraint does constrain the elected 
branches’ future conduct (via the court’s use of broad rulings). But since the court’s judgment 
targets the outcome of governmental decision-making vis-à-vis social goods and services rather 
than its process (and specifically the three expectations which constitute trust), there is again no 
reason (to my mind, at least) why this form of constraint should increase the likelihood of the 
elected branches fulfilling those expectations. Because the court’s judgment here does not target 
the three constituent expectations of trust, this form of judicial constraint, in contrast with the 
trustworthiness-promoting category of constraint, neither informs the elected branches to act in 
accordance with those expectations nor offers them any incentive to do so. So, why should they? 
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Hence, if we once more accept the validity of government trustworthiness to the enforcement of 
constitutional social rights, this form of judicial constraint similarly proves problematic. 
Based again on the conceptual groundwork from Chapters 1 and 2, I suggest that this 
form of judicial constraint – rather than promote the elected branches’ trustworthiness – promotes 
their reliability with respect to the specific social good or service at issue. Reliability, it will be recalled, covers 
those circumstances in which the outcome of the interaction between a truster and a trustee 
follows entirely from external constraints: that is, where external constraints imposed upon the 
trustee are so great that they eliminate his discretion and dictate the outcome of his interaction 
with the truster. In such circumstances, the truster is able to predict the outcome of her 
interaction with the trustee because of those constraints on outcome (thereby rendering the 
trustee reliable). In my view, the present form of judicial constraint serves this function. By 
making broad rulings which interpret constitutional social rights as a right to a defined social 
good or service, courts impose constraints on the elected branches which essentially eliminate 
their discretion over that good or service; and, in turn, they dictate the outcome of their future 
interactions with citizens vis-à-vis that specific good or service.168 For instance, if a court 
interprets a constitutional right to health as a right to a specific class of chemotherapy drugs, the 
elected branches are, owing to that decision, under a constitutional obligation to make such 
drugs available to the right’s holders. The court’s interpretation of the right to health in this 
manner essentially eliminates the elected branches’ discretion vis-à-vis chemotherapy drugs and, 
so, dictates whether citizens are able to obtain such drugs from the elected branches in the 
future. And following therefrom, since discretion/uncertainty is a constituent element of a trust 
relationship, where a court imposes this form of constraint on the elected branches, trust is no 
longer a possibility in the citizen-government relationship (at least with respect to that specific 
social good or service). Put concisely, via this form of judicial constraint the court effectively 
renders that specific case of the citizen-government relationship a “non-trust” relationship.  
 
Chapter Summary 
This brings me to the end of this chapter. In brief recap: I have argued that courts can, and (for 
the reasons provided herein) should, in their enforcement of constitutional social rights, use the 
concept of political trust as an adjudicative tool. They do so by holding the elected branches to a 
standard of trustworthiness (a standard which entails the imposition of trustworthiness-
promoting constraints on the elected branches’ discretion over social goods and services). In 
pursuing this end, courts serve as “mediators of government trustworthiness”. In the two 
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remaining chapters, I illustrate this argument (as well as its theoretical foundation from Chapters 
1-3) using two concrete examples from the social rights world. The first such illustration – the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in South Africa – is the focus of Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission of HIV in South Africa 
One has but to read several of the commentators on the South African controversies 
over AIDS – journalists, politicians, activists, scholars – to reali[s]e that the intellectual 
landscape of the AIDS epidemic has been reduced to simple terms: on one side, 
medicine and science, people of good will and good sense, efficacy and truth; on the 
other, a president and a few dissidents, corrupt politicians and quack scientists, 
incompetence and error. 
– Didier Fassin1 
 
This chapter illustrates the arguments made in this thesis (including, of particular importance, 
this thesis’s central argument about social rights enforcement) using the prevention of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT) in South Africa during the late 1990s and early 2000s. I 
have chosen this specific example for several reasons (which I outlined in the Introduction). 
Without repeating those reasons, I would, however, like to re-emphasise two of them. First, 
since the South African government’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic made international 
headlines, it has subsequently been researched and discussed by many commentators, ranging 
from lawyers and activists to anthropologists and media scholars. These commentators’ writings 
on the epidemic offer a wealth of material which I can use to illustrate these arguments. But note 
that in order to make the illustration in this chapter as authentic as it can be, I have sought to 
prioritise in my illustration, to the extent possible, the work of commentators in South Africa. 
Second, this example generated one of the most famous decisions made by the South African 
Constitutional Court – Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”) – wherein the Court 
faced a constitutional challenge to the South African government’s policy on PMTCT.2 Hence, it 
also offers a concrete social rights case to which I can apply this thesis’s central argument. 
 
Constitutional Background 
Social rights are expressly protected in the South African Constitution.3 The principal provisions 
which protect social rights are sections 26-29 of the Bill of Rights.4 Sections 26 and 27 use 
                                               
1 When Bodies Remember: Experiences and Politics of AIDS in South Africa (University of California Press 2007), 76. 
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(2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 159, 161-62. In the end, however, the argument for full inclusion won 
the day and social rights were expressly included in the South African Constitution. 
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parallel language to protect the right to housing, and the rights to health, food, water and social 
security, respectively. Sections 26(1) and 27(1) set out the basic rights. In principal part, they 
guarantee ‘everyone … the right to have access to’ ‘adequate housing’ (under section 26(1)) and 
‘health care services, including reproductive health care’, ‘sufficient food and water’ and ‘social 
security’ (under section 27(1)). Sections 26(2) and 27(2) place a corresponding positive obligation 
on the state. They require the state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of the rights in sections 26(1) and 
27(1).5 And third, sections 26(3) and 27(3) place negative obligations on the state: section 26(3) 
prohibits the state from making non-court-ordered or arbitrary evictions, and section 27(3) 
prohibits the state from refusing to provide emergency medical treatment. Next in the set comes 
section 28. It is a provision which applies specifically to children. Section 28(1) guarantees ‘every 
child’ a host of rights including under section 28(1)(c), ‘the right … to basic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care services and social services’. And finally, section 29 of the Constitution protects 
the right to education. In particular, section 29(1) provides that ‘everyone has the right’ to ‘a 
basic education, including adult basic education’ as well as ‘further education, which the state, 
through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible’.6 
The social rights in the Constitution are justiciable. This conclusion is supported not only 
by their express inclusion in the Constitution, but also by section 7(2) of the Constitution which 
requires the state ‘to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’, section 
8(1) which provides that the ‘Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’, and section 39(2) which requires ‘every court, 
tribunal, or forum’ to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ in every 
matter involving the interpretation of legislation and the development of the common law or 
customary law.7 The Constitutional Court has affirmed the justiciability of its social rights and, in 
                                                                                                                                                  
4 I say “principal” provisions for two reasons: (i) as I describe below, the South African Constitution establishes a 
framework for social rights protection and thus, there are other provisions which, in conjunction with sections 26-
29, protect social rights; and (ii) there are other provisions which are targeted at specific groups (eg section 35(2) is 
targeted at detained persons and confers the right ‘to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, 
including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading 
material and medical treatment’. Moreover, beyond the provisions described herein, the South African Constitution 
contains a panoply of other provisions which offer support to sections 26-29, including section 7(2) which places an 
overarching obligation on the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’. 
5 It should be noted that whether sections 26(2) and 27(2) qualify the rights in sections 26(1) and 27(1) or are 
standalone provisions is a source of contention among scholars. 
6 Additionally, section 29(2) guarantees ‘everyone … the right to receive education in the official language or 
languages of their choice in public educational institutions’ – but only where ‘reasonably practicable’. And section 
29(3) guarantees everyone a right to establish and maintain – at their own expense – independent educational 
institutions, provided they meet certain requirements set out therein. 
7 Jonathan Berger, ‘Litigating for Social Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education’ 
in Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developing World (Cambridge University Press 2008), 42. 
 
135 
fact, has relied upon the foregoing provisions (or the ultimate substance underlying them) to 
justify its affirmation. In its First Certification decision of 1996, the Court stated for the first time 
that ‘these rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable’.8 Dispelling the argument that the 
financial implications of social rights render them non-justiciable, the Court stated: ‘many of the 
civil and political rights entrenched … will give rise to similar budgetary implications without 
compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give 
rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability’.9 Hence, the Court 
decided, ‘At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from 
improper invasion’.10 Since that time, the Court has re-affirmed social rights’ justiciability in its 
jurisprudence, including in the leading case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
(“Grootboom”) (as well as in the TAC decision itself).11 In Grootboom, Yacoob J. (writing for a 
unanimous court) made clear that ‘the issue of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable at 
all has been put beyond question by the text of our Constitution as construed in the [First] 
Certification judgment … The question is therefore not whether socio-economic rights are 
justiciable under our Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case’.12 
 
Factual Background 
In the late 1990s, the prevalence of HIV in the South African population was escalating rapidly; 
and not before long it had reached unprecedented levels. By 2000, UNAIDS estimated that 
approximately 19.9 percent of adults in South Africa were living with HIV, up from 12.9 percent 
only two years earlier.13 This statistic gave South Africa the unenviable title of being the country 
with the largest number of people living with HIV and/or AIDS (PLHIV) (4.2 million in 2000). 
Particularly problematic was the steady and rapid rise in the percentage of pregnant 
women in South Africa who were living with HIV (PWLHIV). Whereas in 1990, only 0.8 
percent of pregnant women were living with HIV, by 2002, that number had jumped to 26 
                                               
8 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [1996] ZACC 26, 1996 (4) SA 744 [78]. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 [2000] ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46. 
12 ibid [20]. There continues to be some debate among scholars regarding justiciability. That said, I concur with the 
view expressed by Marius Pieterse, ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’ (2004) 
20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383, 404: ‘whether we like it or not, socio-economic rights are as 
justiciable as civil and political rights’ and, thus, ‘[p]ost-1996 South African courts are not only allowed, but 
constitutionally obliged to pronounce on the validity of legislation and policy in the socio-economic sphere’. 
13 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), ‘AIDS in a New Millennium: A Grim Picture with 
Glimmers of Hope’ (Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 2000) 
<http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2000/2000_gr_en.pdf> accessed 6 June 2017, 9. 
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percent.14 The numbers rose markedly during the period from 1995 to 2002, with the prevalence 
of HIV infection in pregnant women being estimated at 10.4 percent in 1995, 17 percent in 
1997, 22.4 percent in 1999 and 24.8 percent in 2001. This rise in HIV infection prevalence 
among pregnant women was particularly problematic because of the potential for intrapartum 
transmission of HIV from mothers to children during pregnancy. It is estimated that without any 
intervention, the risk of transmitting HIV from mother to child is between 20 and 45 percent.15 
As a result, by 1998, it was estimated that up to 70,000 children were born each year with HIV.16 
Fortunately, during the same period, significant advancements were made in treating 
HIV patients (including treatments for PMTCT purposes). In 1994, it was discovered that the 
use of the antiretroviral drug (ARV), AZT, could dramatically reduce the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV (MTCT).17 Additionally, contrary to popular belief that AZT had to be 
administered relatively early in pregnancy to be effective, a subsequent clinical trial in Thailand 
demonstrated that starting administration of AZT late in pregnancy – specifically, at 36 weeks – 
nonetheless yielded significant reductions in MTCT.18 Then, in July 1999, the results of a clinical 
trial conducted in Uganda (called HIVNET 012) were released, showing that an alternative ARV, 
nevirapine, could be used to reduce MTCT.19 The results showed that a single dose of nevirapine 
could cut MTCT by half when given to mothers immediately prior to labour and to infants 
shortly after birth (in the form of a syrup).20 The appeal of nevirapine was that it was equally 
effective to AZT, but could be administered using a less complex regimen and, accordingly, at a 
significantly reduced cost. By that point, nevirapine had already been approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration in the United States (FDA) for the treatment of people with HIV infection 
(which had happened in 1996).21 Moreover, in 1999, following the release of the HIVNET 012 
results, the World Health Organization listed nevirapine on its Model List of Essential Drugs.22 
                                               
14 Peter Barron et al, ‘Eliminating Mother-To-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa’ (Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, 2013) <www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/1/12-106807/en> accessed 1 November 2016, 
70-74. 
15 UNICEF, ‘Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT)’ (2017) 
<https://www.unicef.org/supply/index_42855.html> accessed 6 June 2017. 
16 Gilbert Marcus and Steven Budlender, ‘A Strategic Evaluation of Public Interest Litigation in South Africa’ (The 
Atlantic Philanthropies, 2008) 
<http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/app/uploads/2015/09/public_interest_litigation_sa.pdf> accessed 6 June 
2017, 69. 
17 ibid 69. 
18 ibid 69-70. 
19 ibid 74. 
20 Mandisa Mbali, South African AIDS Activism and Global Health Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 125, citing LA 
Guay et al, ‘Intrapartum and Neonatal Single-Dose Nevirapine Compared with Zidovudine for Prevention of 
Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV-1 in Kampala, Uganda: HIVNET 012 Randomised Trial’ [1999] Lancet 354. 
21 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID), ‘Nevirapine Approved by FDA: First Non-
Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor’ (1996) <https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/news/322/nevirapine-approved-by-
fda--first-non-nucleoside-reverse-transcriptase-inhibitor> accessed 6 June 2017. 
22 As revised December 1999, s 6.4.2. 
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However, ARVs were extremely expensive at that time in South Africa. For instance, 
Edwin Cameron (now a Justice of the Constitutional Court, then a judge of the South African 
High Court, who revealed in 1999 that he was living with HIV) noted in his address at the 
International AIDS Conference in 2000 that a monthly supply of ARVs (at that time) cost the 
South African rand equivalent of USD$400.23 Owing to this high cost, the South African 
government told the public that it could not afford to offer ARVs on its public health system.24 
Not before long, the South African government became the target of the Treatment 
Action Campaign (the “TAC”) and its mobilisation efforts. The TAC is a South African 
HIV/AIDS activist organisation which was launched in December 1998 ‘to campaign for access 
to AIDS treatment’.25 It was co-founded by its HIV-positive leader Zachie Achmat along with 
ten other activists. Given that the government had (at that point) defended its decision to not 
provide ARVs on affordability grounds, the TAC focused its efforts on bringing down the cost 
of ARVs in South Africa. It did so by mobilising support from international bodies (including 
Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam International and Health-Gap) who collectively put pressure 
on the pharmaceutical companies manufacturing ARVs to reduce their prices in developing 
countries.26 It also inserted itself into then-pending litigation. That litigation arose out of the 
South African National Department of Health’s decision in 1997 to pass the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act (the “Medicines Act”).27 Under the Medicines Act, the government 
could use two techniques which would enable it to access ARVs at a fraction of the cost it was 
paying: (i) the parallel importation of ARVs from other countries (where those ARVs were 
cheaper than what was being offered to the South African government by their manufacturers); 
and, (ii) compulsory licensing which enabled local manufacturers to produce generics of the 
brand-name drugs at a lower cost.28 Predictably, multinational drug companies as well as the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (the “PMA”) strongly opposed the Medicines Act and, 
in February 1998, challenged its constitutionality in the High Court.29 The TAC, in its attempt to 
bring down ARVs’ costs, put pressure on the PMA, demanding that it withdraw its challenge and 
bringing a motion to join the litigation as amicus curiae (which it was ultimately granted in March 
                                               
23 Edwin Cameron, ‘The Deafening Silence of AIDS’ (2000) 5 Health and Human Rights 7, 12. 
24 Pieter Fourie and Melissa Meyer, The Politics of AIDS Denialism: South Africa’s Failure to Respond (Ashgate 2010), 98. 
25 TAC webpage <http://www.tac.org.za/about_us> accessed 4 November 2016. 
26 Mark Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”: A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an Instrument for 
Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy and Development 133, 157; Mark Heywood, 
‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to Realize the Right to 
Health’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice 14, 24; Mbali (n 20) 164. 
27 Fourie and Meyer (n 24) 100. In fact, the Director General of the Health Department, in an affidavit deposed as 
part of the PMA case, stated repeatedly under oath that the sole barrier to the use of antiretroviral drugs in South 
Africa was affordability: Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”’ (n 26) 158. 
28 Fourie and Meyer (n 24) 100; Mbali (n 20) 121. 
29 Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”’ (n 26) 139. 
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2001).30 Six weeks later, on 19 April 2001, the PMA withdrew the matter.31 The international 
pressure which was exerted on the pharmaceutical companies also resulted in their bringing 
down the cost of various ARVs in South Africa by two-thirds.32 Moreover, and to further erode  
the South African government’s defence that ARVs were unaffordable, Boehringer Ingelheim, 
nevirapine’s manufacturer, offered the government a free supply of the drug for five years.33 
Up to this point in time, the South African government had suggested that affordability 
was the ‘sole barrier’ preventing the provision of ARVs on the public health system.34 Thus, it 
was reasonable to assume that given the TAC’s string of successes in making ARVs more 
affordable, ARVs would now be made available on the public system to those who needed them. 
Nevertheless, the South African government maintained its refusal to provide ARVs on the 
public system.35 Although the defence of affordability lingered for ARVs other than nevirapine 
(since their cost of one-third their original price was still relatively high), now, the government 
was also questioning the safety and efficacy of ARVs (despite the preponderance of evidence in 
this regard supporting ARVs generally and nevirapine specifically).36 In fact, immediately after 
the PMA withdrew its case, the then-Minister of Health, Dr. Manto Tshbalala-Msimang, 
indicated that the government had ‘no immediate plans to use the landmark legal victory’ to 
obtain ARVs.37 She said: ‘We never said we want to use antiretrovirals. But we have to place our 
options on the table to see what we will use’.38 The health minister explained that ARVs were 
‘still too expensive, too dangerous and too difficult to manage for the government to incorporate 
them into its AIDS-fighting plans’. 39  With respect to nevirapine (for which affordability 
presented no issue because it was made available for free by its manufacturer), she announced 
that before the drug could be offered on the public system, it would be tested for a period of 
two years at two pilot sites in each province of South Africa.40 Simultaneously, the government’s 
pilot programme imposed restrictions on physicians working in the public system who were not 
located in the relevant sites, prohibiting them from offering nevirapine to their pregnant patients 
living with HIV.41 It is the latter PMTCT programme which was challenged in the TAC case. 
                                               
30 ibid 140-41, 160. 
31 ibid 160. 
32 ibid 157. 
33 Marcus and Budlender (n 16) 74-75. 
34 Mbali (n 20) 121. 
35 Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”’ (n 26) 156. 
36 Fourie and Meyer (n 24) 99-100. 
37 HIV Treatment Bulletin, ‘Drug companies withdraw HIV drug lawsuit against South Africa’ (2001) <http://i-
base.info/htb/4380> accessed 4 November 2016. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 Marcus and Budlender (n 16) 76-77. 
41 TAC [4]. 
 
139 
 
The Illustration 
The relationship between PWLHIV and the South African government with respect to PMTCT 
represents a case of the citizen-government relationship. As such, it satisfies the three elements 
of – and so may be characterised as – a trust relationship. I will not spend too much time on this 
characterisation (as I think by this point it is self-evident). But in brief: the South African 
government had control over ARVs (including nevirapine) which PWLHIV needed; the 
government had discretion in providing those ARVs, thereby leaving PWLHIV uncertain of how 
the government would exercise its control; and owing to their need for ARVs, coupled with the 
government’s control and discretion thereover, PWLHIV were vulnerable to the government. 
The network conception of trust posits that as a trust relationship, this relationship 
between PWLHIV and the South African government was embedded in a network of 
interdependent relationships. That network of relationships consisted of the many parties which 
I identified in Chapter 3 to define the boundaries of the social rights network (eg lawyers, legal 
aid bodies, non-governmental and international organisations, foreign governments, etc). In the 
factual background which I have provided in this chapter, we can already begin to see how 
various parties such as the TAC, international organisations (eg Médecins Sans Frontières, 
Oxfam International and Health-Gap), the PMA as well as several pharmaceutical manufacturers 
may have formed part of the network. Pursuant to the network conception of trust, PWLHIV’s 
trust in the South African government also depended on these other relationships. Or, as I have 
otherwise put it, we can expect that such relationships were able to impact PWLHIV’s trust. 
Obviously, this illustration cannot cover everything in this thesis. However, I will try my 
best to illustrate this thesis’s central points. I have chosen to divide this illustration up by party. 
Specifically, it will mirror my description of the social rights network from Chapter 3. 
Accordingly, this illustration will centre around the same subset of parties which I used there: 
private providers of social goods and services, the media and, of course, the courts. In this 
example of PMTCT in South Africa, those parties translate into: the physicians who worked in 
South Africa’s private health system, the South African media and the South African courts. 
With respect to the latter party, I will focus this illustration specifically on the South African 
Constitutional Court. Additionally, since the focus of this thesis is political trust (and more 
specifically, trust in the citizen-government relationship), I will also centre this illustration around 
the relationship between PWLHIV and the South African government with respect to PMTCT. 
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Physicians in the Private Health System 
Like most countries in the world, South Africa had (and continues to have) a two-tiered health 
care system.42 On one hand, there is the private health system. It is made up of well-paid 
physicians (including general practitioners and specialists) as well as modern medical facilities.43 
Although it served/serves only 20 percent of South Africa’s population, it accounted/accounts 
for the majority of national spending on health.44 On the other hand, there is the public health 
system. While it served/serves more than 80 percent of the population, it accounted/accounts 
for a much smaller percentage of national spending (20 percent as of 2001). Problematically, the 
South African private and public health systems divide not only across socio-economic lines 
(which is the case in most countries), but also across racial lines: the public system served/serves 
mostly black people whereas the private system served/serves mostly white people.45 
The relationship between PWLHIV and physicians who worked in South Africa’s private 
health system represents a case of the “alternative source” relationship from Chapter 3. As with 
alternative sources more generally, physicians in South Africa’s private system had control over 
the very social good or service which the South African government also had control in its trust 
relationship with PWLHIV (ARVs, including nevirapine). Given their control in this regard, 
these physicians served as an alternative source of ARVs (including nevirapine) for PWLHIV. In 
concise terms, PWLHIV had two potential sources of ARVs (at least technically speaking): the 
South African government and these physicians who worked in the private health system. 
Now, for those PWLHIV who had access to the private health system, physicians who 
worked in that system were not just a technically available source – but a practical one. And thus, 
their relationship with these private physicians served to mitigate their vulnerability. To be clear, 
even the relevant subset of PWLHIV, who had access to the private system, were (at least to 
some extent) vulnerable to the South African government. This is so because in the South 
African health system, patients with private health insurance are not barred from the public 
system.46 They may, and often do, use both systems, relying on the public health system in order 
to prevent exhausting their coverage under their private policies. In other words, despite having 
access to the private system, the South African government remained a potential source of ARVs 
for these PWLHIV. However, because these PWLHIV also had access to the private system, 
                                               
42 Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”’ (n 26) 136. 
43 Lisa Forman and Jerome Amir Singh, ‘The Role of Rights and Litigation in Assuring More Equitable Access to 
Health Care in South Africa’ in Colleen M Flood and Aeyal Gross (eds), The Right to Health at the Public/Private Divide: 
A Global Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2014), 293. 
44 In 2001, Heywood explained that it accounted for 80 percent of spending: Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-
Talk”’ (n 26) 136. In 2014, Forman and Singh explained that it accounted for 60 percent: ibid 293. 
45 Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”’ (n 26) 136. 
46 Forman and Singh (n 43) 295. 
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they, unlike those PWLHIV who were limited to the public system, had access to an alternative 
source of ARVs via their relationship with private physicians. So, despite being vulnerable to the 
government, due to this relationship, they were not wholly dependent on the government for the 
ARVs they needed. If the South African government refused to provide ARVs, these PWLHIV 
had the option of turning to the private system and, more specifically, to the physicians therein 
who also had control over ARVs. 
The latter scenario is precisely what happened in this case. In the period leading up to the 
TAC decision (as well as for years after the decision), whereas patients who were using the 
private health system were able to get ARVs (including nevirapine) from their physicians, those 
using the public system could not.47 This was so for at least two reasons. First, as is commonly 
the case with health care treatments in a public health system, it was due to the high cost of 
ARVs. According to the South African government, ARVs’ high price tag made the drugs 
unaffordable to offer on South Africa’s public health system. In fact, prior to 2001 (when, in 
response to international pressure, pharmaceutical manufacturers reduced the cost of various 
ARVs in South Africa by two-thirds), the prices of ARVs were so high that even many patients 
who were using the private health system did not have access to them: ARVs were accessible 
only to those patients who were wealthy and could afford to pay the exorbitant costs directly out 
of pocket, or those patients with very well-funded insurance policies (eg politicians and members 
of the judiciary).48 Post-2001, due to their reduced cost, ARVs became accessible to a greater 
proportion of patients using the private system.49 Moreover, and as I pointed out earlier, there 
was an additional reason why patients using the public system could not get ARVs. Physicians 
who were working in that system were prohibited by law from offering their patients nevirapine. 
No such prohibition existed for physicians who worked in the private system. Therefore, even 
when nevirapine became affordable (ie when it was offered for free by its manufacturer), patients 
on the public health system still did not have access to the drug. As we will see shortly, a number 
of factors underlay the South African government’s decision to implement this prohibition. 
 
South African Media 
Not surprisingly, the relationship between PWLHIV and the South African media represents a 
case of the “citizen-media relationship”. As with the media more generally, the South African 
media represented an important source of political information for South Africans. For example, 
                                               
47 That is, of course, with the exception of the pilot sites for the nevirapine programme developed in 2000 and 
adopted in 2001: TAC [41-42]. 
48 Ida Susser, AIDS, Sex, and Culture: Global Politics and Survival in Southern Africa (Wiley-Blackwell 2009), 99. 
49 Heywood, ‘Debunking “Conglomo-Talk”’ (n 26) 157. 
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and with respect to HIV/AIDS and PMTCT specifically, Sean Jacobs and Krista Johnson have 
pointed out that ‘as a result of their elevated role in politics after apartheid’, the South African 
media ‘attained a central role in shaping the discourse about HIV/AIDS’.50 Further, as a case of 
the citizen-media relationship, we can expect, based on the network conception of trust from 
Chapter 3 as well as the empirical research which I cited in that chapter, that the South African 
media was able to impact PWLHIV’s trust in their government with respect to PMTCT. 
 In Chapter 3, I suggested that James Coleman’s “advisor” as an intermediary in trust 
offers a fitting model to explain the mechanics of this category of impact. I will now use the 
PMTCT example to illustrate this point. In so illustrating, I will focus primarily on print media 
(ie newspapers and magazines) as it has been the focus of media research in this area. Coleman 
has argued (it will be recalled) that where a truster has a relationship with a third party (“the 
advisor”) who advises her to trust a trustee, to the extent that the truster trusts the advisor’s 
judgment, that relationship fosters trust between her and the trustee.51 Presumably the reverse is 
also true. If the advisor advises the truster not to trust the trustee, to the extent that the truster 
trusts the advisor’s judgment, her relationship with the advisor will hinder trust between her and 
the trustee. In the PMTCT case, a number of South African publications served as such advisors. 
They essentially advised PWLHIV not to trust the South African government with respect to 
PMTCT. And therefore, to the extent that PWLHIV trusted those publications, we can expect 
that such publications hindered trust between PWLHIV and the South African government. 
How did these South African publications serve as such advisors? I suggest that they did 
so by portraying the South African government – in their news stories, editorials and cartoons – 
as untrustworthy. That is, they portrayed the South African government as not likely to fulfil 
citizens’ expectations of good will, fiduciary responsibility and competence. To be clear, the 
illustration in this section should not be taken as an exhaustive analysis of South African print 
media during the relevant time. For instance, there were presumably a few publications which 
portrayed the South African government as trustworthy (and such publications, to the extent 
that they were trusted by PWLHIV, can be expected to have fostered trust in government). But 
media scholars (as well as anthropologists) have argued, and empirically demonstrated, that 
during the PMTCT debate in South Africa, the media’s portrayal of the South African 
government was overwhelmingly negative.52 For example, Nicola Spurr (at the time a research 
                                               
50 Sean Jacobs and Krista Johnson, ‘Media, Social Movements and the State: Competing Images of HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa’ (2007) 9 African Studies Quarterly 127, 128. 
51 James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Harvard University Press 1994), 194. 
52 Fassin (n 1); Fourie and Meyer (n 24); Jacobs and Johnson (n 50); Mia Malan, ‘Exposing AIDS: Media’s Impact in 
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fellow in the HIV/AIDS and the Media Project at the University of Witwatersrand) conducted a 
retrospective monitoring exercise of South African newspapers during 2000, 2002 and 2004, 
using a broad range of English-language newspapers.53 In her exercise, she coded newspaper 
articles which addressed the PMTCT debate according to the “key message” which they 
conveyed. Spurr observed a ‘generally negative portrayal of government’ in those articles, with 
many of the articles’ key messages casting the South African government in a negative light.54 
Accordingly, in my illustration here, I focus on this negative portrayal and therefore, on the 
media as an advisor so as to not trust the South African government with respect to PMTCT. 
First, many publications portrayed the South African government as untrustworthy by 
casting doubt on its competence to deal with South Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic. Specifically, 
these publications did so by revealing a key motivation behind the South African government’s 
refusal to provide ARVs on its public health system – the adoption of HIV/AIDS denialism by 
the then-president, Thabo Mbeki – and challenging that motivation’s scientific foundation.55 In 
doing so, these publications essentially presented the South African government as not acting (as 
well as not likely to act in the future) in accordance with the principles of EBPM. 
Mbeki’s denialism wove together two major ideologies.56 The first was one of African 
nationalism and anti-imperialist, postcolonial thinking. This ideology saw ARVs ‘as profiting 
Western drug manufacturers and injuring Africans, while ignoring the sociohistorical roots of the 
epidemic in apartheid’s generations of poverty and neglect’. 57  The second ideology was a 
dissident view on HIV/AIDS. The dissident view rejected the evidence linking HIV and AIDS 
(which the vast majority of the scientific and medical community had accepted at that point), saw 
the AIDS epidemic in Africa as more likely caused by a compound of factors, including 
malnutrition and poverty (and that other illnesses were being mis-described as HIV-related in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Partnership with the HIV/AIDS and the Media Project, 2005) 
<https://www.nelsonmandela.org/uploads/files/Baby_Steps.pdf> accessed 6 June 2017, 11; Susser (n 48). 
53 Spurr notes that articles were collected ‘from a news clippings service run by the University of the Free State’ and 
that the exercise was ‘restricted to English language print media’: Spurr (n 52) 12. The SA Media collection – most 
likely the one to which Spurr is referring – currently covers 120 South African newspapers and periodicals: 
<http://library.ukzn.ac.za/TopNav/ElectronicResources/newspaperarticles749.aspx> accessed 21 July 2017. 
Moreover, with respect to the date range of Spurr’s exercise, she explains that these calendar years were chosen 
because ‘of important events around PMTCT that unfolded then’: Spurr (n 52) 12. 
54 Spurr (n 52) 15. 
55 William Forbath, ‘Cultural Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and ESR Practice: South Africa’s 
Treatment Action Campaign’ in Lucie E White and Jeremy Perelman (eds), Stones of Hope: How African Activists 
Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty (Stanford University Press 2010), 57-58; Mark Heywood, ‘Preventing 
Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action 
Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 278, 282; 
Heywood, ‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign’ (n 26) 20. 
56 Forbath (n 55) 57-58. 
57 ibid 57-58. 
 
144 
order to generate markets for ARVs), and consequently, argued that ARVs (which were seen as 
dangerous rather than life-saving interventions) were an improper use of scarce resources.58 
 Mbeki became President of South Africa in June 1999, succeeding Nelson Mandela. 
Mbeki’s denialist views came to light later that year when, during an address to the National 
Council of the Provinces (NCOP) in October, he began to question the safety of AZT.59 In his 
address, he made reference to ‘legal cases pending’ in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the 
United States ‘against AZT on the basis that this drug is harmful to health’, noted that there was 
‘a large volume of scientific literature alleging that, among other things, the toxicity of this drug 
is such that it is in fact a danger to health’, and revealed that, based on such, he had tasked the 
health minister with investigating AZT further.60 In May 2000, the health minister formally 
announced that a Presidential Panel would be held to investigate the science behind AIDS.61 
When these denialist views came to light, the story of Mbeki and his HIV/AIDS 
denialism made the rounds of various press agencies.62 As Mandisa Mbali has pointed out in her 
historical tracing of AIDS activism in South Africa, from May 2000, ‘the debate, as it played out 
in the media, revolved around Mbeki’s questioning of the link between HIV and AIDS, which 
was emerging as a major barrier to the government’s adoption of a PMTCT programme’.63 The 
media lambasted the president for his denialist views, especially in light of rumours circulating at 
the time that Mbeki spent his nights surfing the net (where he apparently learned about AIDS 
dissidents) and used that “research” as the basis for his policies.64 For example, Mbali, in her 
work, refers to a cartoon which appeared in the 20 July 2000 edition of the Johannesburg 
newspaper The Star wherein Mbeki is shown sitting at a computer, smoking a pipe with the 
caption: ‘Now, if I can only find a connection between HIV and cigarettes, I’ll have another 
diversion’.65 Similarly, Didier Fassin, in his anthropological examination of the AIDS crisis in 
South Africa, describes an opinion column by political analyst Sipho Seepe in the 14 December 
2001 edition of the Johannesburg newspaper the Weekly Mail and Guardian.66 In it, Seepe called 
the South African President ‘Professor Mbeki (PhD.www)’ and awarded him the title ‘instant 
graduate of the Internet Medical School’. Seepe summarised the then-state of the South African 
government as follows: ‘If anything, South Africa has become, at government level, a purveyor 
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and compost heap of discredited ideas’.67 Fassin also references a caricature published by the 
cartoonist Dr. Jack in the 19 April 2002 Weekly Mail and Guardian.68 That caricature, as Fassin 
describes it, ‘shows the head of state in his pajamas and slippers facing his computer on whose 
screen one can see the homepage “virusmyth,” one of the main websites of AIDS heterodoxy; 
leaning languorously on the computer, the famous reporter is smiling down at him’.69 
Furthermore, the media did not spare the health minister, who had been doing the 
president’s bidding and had supported the president’s dissident views well after the TAC 
decision in July 2002. For instance, following the 2006 International AIDS Conference in 
Toronto wherein the health minister’s official stand in the conference exhibition hall focused on 
remedying HIV with ‘beetroot, garlic, lemon juice and olive oil’ rather than ARVs, many 
publications dubbed the health minister pejorative names.70 These names included “Dr. Garlic”, 
“Dr. Beetroot”, “Dr. No” and “Dr. Doolittle”.71 Similarly, in a 25 May 2006 opinion piece in the 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, written by a staff reporter and titled ‘We must kill this cancer now’, the 
author summarised the denialists’ views as ‘vegetarian quackery’ and referred to a group of well-
known denialists (whose advice the health minister had sought) as a ‘network of denialist 
loonies’.72 The author, in turn, criticised the health minister as well as the president, explaining 
that these well-known denialists ‘are not the real problem. In most societies, they would simply 
be ignored, and would continue feeding each other’s sad delusions in small cult groups … The 
problem in South Africa is that they have the ear of the president and the health minister’.73 
In summary, these publications presented the South African government as basing its 
PMTCT policies and programmes on the president’s late-night internet research which turned up 
‘discredited ideas’ and ‘dangerous quackery’ being pushed by ‘denialist loonies’. This is in stark 
contrast with what would be expected of a competent government, basing such policies and 
programmes on knowledge derived from scientific research (in accordance with the principles of 
EBPM). Moreover, it is arguable that these publications also called into question the South 
African government’s competence more broadly in governmental policy-making – in other 
words, and to again use Brian Head’s terms, its “political knowledge” and “practical 
implementation knowledge”. As Sipho Seepe commented in a 2001 interview, ‘When someone is 
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as stubborn as the president about a field he is not expert in, it makes one wonder how reliable 
his opinions are in the areas he is supposed to know about – such as economics’.74 
Second, many South African publications challenged whether the government was 
exercising (and would likely exercise in the future) good will toward its people. In this regard, 
these publications challenged both of the sub-expectations of good will: that is, good intentions 
and fair procedures. First, owing to the president and health minister’s refusal to accept 
prevailing scientific and medical opinion on ARVs’ safety and efficacy, the government was 
portrayed as lacking the political will to deal with South Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic – in other 
words, it was portrayed as behaving intransigently. Both Spurr and Mia Malan have noted this 
trend in their empirical research.75 In Spurr’s study, for instance, three of the top ten key 
messages which she observed in newspaper articles related to the government’s will. These 
messages were: ‘The government is too stubborn in the face of scientific evidence and public or 
other pressures’ (representing 4.2 percent of all key messages), ‘An impediment to effective 
PMTCT is political will’ (representing 3.0 percent of all key messages) and ‘The government 
lacks the political will to deal with HIV/AIDS’ (representing 2.5 percent of all key messages).76 
Additionally, certain publications attacked the fairness of the government’s procedures in 
making decisions on PMTCT and ARVs. A good example is their challenge to the transparency 
of the government’s decision-making.77 The issue of transparency is best seen in the relationship 
between the executive and South Africa’s Medical Research Council (MRC). The MRC is a 
parastatal medical research organisation funded primarily by the National Department of 
Health.78 Its mandate is ‘to promote the improvement of the health and the quality of life of the 
population of [South Africa] through research, development and technology transfer’.79  In 
September 2001, the MRC produced a report titled ‘The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Adult 
Mortality in South Africa’.80 In it, the MRC concluded that in 2000, AIDS ‘accounted for about 
25% of all deaths’ and accordingly that it had ‘become the single biggest cause of death’ in South 
Africa.81 Up to that point in time, President Mbeki had denied that the HIV/AIDS epidemic was 
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the leading cause of death in South Africa.82 And subsequent media coverage challenged the 
government’s – and in particular the health minister’s – behaviour regarding the MRC’s report 
on transparency grounds. For instance, in one article, Lynne Altenroxel, a former reporter for 
The Star, filed a story titled ‘Witchhunt for AIDS whistleblower’ wherein she reported that the 
MRC report had actually been leaked to the media without the government’s permission (the 
government had apparently put a hold on its release because it disagreed with the MRC’s 
findings).83 She also summarised a letter in her possession which had been written by the health 
minister to the MRC. In that letter, as Altenroxel reported, the health minister demanded that 
the “anti-dissident” who had leaked the report be found and dealt with, writing that ‘since mid-
February, an investigator has been tracking down, interrogating – and even suggesting lie-
detector tests on – a host of people who might have had access to the controversial document’.84 
In another article, this time in You magazine, Charlene Smith, a freelance correspondent, 
reported that the government had ‘threatened three times to withdraw the MRC’s funding if it 
[did not] toe the [government’s] line on AIDS’.85 Such articles conveyed the message that the 
government was not being transparent; on the contrary, it was actively trying to hide from the 
South African public relevant research which had been produced by medical research scientists. 
Lastly, many publications challenged the South African government’s sense of fiduciary 
responsibility to its people. They did so by highlighting potential conflicts of interest held by 
various government officials. The best example of such conflicts is the so-called “Virodene 
saga”. In 1997, the South African government decided to champion a purported anti-AIDS drug 
called Virodene P058.86 The drug had been accidentally discovered by a laboratory technician, 
Olga Visser, and patented by a company her husband, Zigi Visser, had registered, 
Cryopreservation Technologies. 87  Though Virodene had not been approved by the South 
African Medical Control Council (MCC) (the South African equivalent of the FDA) (the MCC 
concluded that the drug had not been sufficiently tested and declared it unfit for human 
consumption), the government championed it nonetheless. 88 This championing began in January 
1997 when the then-Minister of Health, Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma, facilitated a meeting 
between the Vissers and the full Cabinet.89 Their presentation was received by the Cabinet with a 
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standing ovation. Thereafter both the National Department of Health and the Office of the 
Deputy President (then Thabo Mbeki) advocated Virodene as the better alternative to ARVs, 
touting Virodene as ‘a possible African solution to an African problem’.90 And despite significant 
doubts by scientists and AIDS activists about the efficacy and safety of Virodene, the health 
minister publicly urged the MCC to ‘work with researchers to resolve the status of Virodene’.91 
It was in early 1998 that the South African media conveyed to the public that there was a 
potential conflict of interest. The Democratic Party (DP) (now the Democratic Alliance (DA)) 
claimed that the government’s promotion of Virodene was motivated by the financial interests of 
the African National Congress (ANC) – the party in power – rather than the best interests of the 
South African people. On 2 March 1998, DP MP Mike Ellis called a press conference in 
Parliament at which he released a memo which suggested that the ANC – and the health 
minister and deputy president in particular – had been promised a six percent share in the 
manufacturer of Virodene, Cryopreservation Technologies.92 The media ran with the story. As 
Pat Sidley, a medial journalist in Johannesburg, has summarised, ‘press reports suggested that the 
government’s interest in the “miracle” drug was financial and that it did not want to see any 
discovery of this nature in the hands of drug companies’.93 For example, a 4 March 1998 article 
in the Cape Town newspaper Cape Argus reported that Hugo Snyckers, acting manager of 
Cryopreservation Technologies, had claimed that ANC members who helped promote Virodene 
‘were to be rewarded with company shares … as part of a “black empowerment” initiative’.94 
Similarly, a 13 March 1998 article in the Weekly Mail and Guardian repeated Ellis’s allegations.95  
Even though – following an inquiry by the Public Protector – the health minister and deputy 
president were found not to be involved in business transactions around Virodene, as Fassin has 
aptly noted, ‘the rumo[u]r had produced its deleterious effects on the government’s integrity’.96 
In my view, the cumulative effect of the foregoing negative media coverage – speaking to 
the South African government’s competence to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, its good will 
toward its people and its sense of fiduciary responsibility thereto – was to portray the 
government as untrustworthy. These publications presented the South African government as 
unlikely to fulfil their expectations of trust in the future. And to the extent that PWLHIV trusted 
                                               
90 ibid 97. 
91 Mbali (n 20) 114. 
92 ibid 114. 
93 Pat Sidley, ‘Miracle AIDS cure hits the South African press’ (1997) 314 British Medical Journal 450. 
94 Glynnis Underhill, ‘South Africa: Virodene shares for ANC were a “black empowerment” move’ Cape Argus 
(Cape Town, 4 March 1998) <http://allafrica.com/stories/199803040067.html> accessed 12 August 2017. 
95 Mbali (n 20) 114. 
96 Fassin (n 1) 46. 
 
149 
these publications, we can expect, following from the network conception of trust and 
Coleman’s work, that these publications hindered trust between PWLHIV and their government. 
 
Constitutional Court of South Africa 
As with citizens and courts more generally in social rights matters, there existed a relationship 
between PWLHIV and the Constitutional Court. That relationship followed from two factors: 
first, the justiciability of South Africa’s constitutional social rights (which, by the time of TAC, 
had been fully recognised by the Court); and second, the reality that at the relevant time, social 
rights cases had been brought to the Court by South Africans (including PWLHIV in the TAC 
case itself). In this thesis, I have suggested that a court, in enforcing constitutional social rights, 
can, and should, mediate government trustworthiness by imposing trustworthiness-promoting 
constraints on government in exercising its discretion over social goods and services. In this 
section, I will illustrate this suggestion with reference to the TAC decision. Specifically, I will 
address the following question: did the Court mediate the South African government’s 
trustworthiness (and if not, how could it have)? In addressing this question, I will also illustrate 
the other two forms of judicial constraint (vulnerability-mitigating and reliability-promoting) 
which I outlined and distinguished from trustworthiness-promoting constraints in Chapter 4. 
 The TAC litigation stemmed from a constitutional challenge launched by the TAC 
(together with other members of civil society) in August 2001.97 The TAC had been threatening 
litigation for a few years as part of its mobilisation efforts. However, by this point in 2001, it had 
become apparent that the government would not cede to the TAC’s demands for the widespread 
provision of nevirapine in the public system nor respond to its requests for legally valid reasons 
justifying its decision in this regard.98 Also, by this point, the TAC had put in place the necessary 
elements which ensured that it had the strongest possible claim (eg communications with the 
government had been documented, various obstacles to legal action had been removed, etc).99 
The TAC challenged the constitutionality of the government’s PMTCT programme principally 
under two provisions of South Africa’s Constitution: sections 27 and 28(1)(c). It will be recalled 
from earlier in the chapter that section 27(1) guarantees ‘the right to have access to … health 
care services’ and section 27(2) obliges the state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of that right. As 
the government’s PMTCT programme necessarily affected the babies of PWLHIV, it also 
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engaged section 28(1)(c) which guarantees every child ‘the right … to basic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care services and social services’. Accordingly, the TAC sought a declaration that the 
government’s PMTCT programme was unconstitutional as an infringement of both provisions. 
Further, it requested that the government be ordered to make nevirapine available to PWLHIV 
who gave birth in public health facilities (and to their newborn babies) and that the government 
plan and implement in a reasonable manner an effective national PMTCT programme.100 
The court of first instance, the High Court of South Africa, ruled in favour of the TAC, 
granting an order which was substantially in accordance with what the TAC had sought.101 Thus, 
the government appealed to the Constitutional Court, which heard the appeal in May 2002 and 
issued its unanimous decision two months later on 5 July 2002. As the Court phrased it, the 
appeal raised two main, inter-related issues: (i) whether the government was ‘constitutionally 
obliged and had to be ordered forthwith to plan and implement an effective, comprehensive and 
progressive programme’ for PMTCT in South Africa; and (ii) the constitutionality of the 
government-imposed ‘restrictions on the availability of nevirapine in the public health sector’.102 
The Court focused its decision substantially on section 27 (rather than section 28(1)(c)); 
therefore, I will equally focus on section 27 in my summary here as well as my later analysis. 
The Court held that ‘section 27(1) does not give rise to a self-standing and independent 
positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations mentioned in section 27(2)’.103 
Instead, it concluded that the two must be read together with the ultimate effect of imposing a 
“reasonableness” obligation on the South African state.104 In drawing this conclusion, the Court 
relied on the interpretation it had made in its earlier Grootboom case in respect of the parallel 
provisions of sections 26(1) and 26(2). There, the Court decided that sections 26(1) and 26(2) 
‘are related and must be read together’ such that section 26 imposes an obligation on the state ‘to 
devise and implement a coherent, co-ordinated programme’; and a court’s role, in its 
enforcement of section 26, is to subject such programmes to a standard of reasonableness.105 
Applying its reasonableness standard to the facts of TAC, the Court resolved the two 
main issues in the case as follows. On the first issue, the Court held that section 27 imposed a 
constitutional requirement on the state to provide ‘reasonable measures within available 
resources for the progressive realisation of the rights of [PWLHIV and their] newborn babies’.106 
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It thus issued a declaratory order to this effect, namely that ‘[s]ections 27(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution require the government to devise and implement within its available resources a 
comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise progressively the rights of pregnant 
women and their newborn children to have access to health services to combat [MTCT]’.107 It 
also declared that the programme had to include ‘reasonable measures for counselling and testing 
pregnant women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant women on the options open to 
them to reduce the risk of [MTCT], and making appropriate treatment available to them for such 
purposes’.108 With respect to the second issue, the Court held that the government’s policy of 
confining nevirapine to the applicable pilot sites was indeed not reasonable.109 In so holding, it 
placed significant weight on the fact that the drug’s cost was not a factor (because as noted 
earlier it was offered for free by its manufacturer). The Court also rejected the various concerns 
(which the government had set out to justify its confined policy) relating to nevirapine’s efficacy 
and safety, the public health system’s capacity, and the possibility of drug resistance to nevirapine 
and other ARVs in the future. Accordingly, the Court issued a declaratory order that the 
government’s PMTCT programme fell short of compliance with the above-described 
constitutional requirements in that ‘doctors at public hospitals and clinics other than the research 
and training sites were not enabled to prescribe nevirapine’ and in that it ‘failed to make 
provision for counselors at hospitals and clinics other than at research and training sites’.110 
Further, the Court issued a mandatory order (with which the government had to comply 
‘without delay’). That order had four parts: (i) that the government ‘remove the restrictions that 
prevent nevirapine from being made available for the purpose of [PMTCT] at public hospitals 
and clinics that are not research and training sites’; (ii) that it ‘permit and facilitate the use of 
nevirapine for the purpose of [PMTCT]’ and ‘make it available for this purpose at hospitals and 
clinics’ (where the drug was medically indicated); (iii) that it ‘make provision if necessary for 
counselors’ at such hospitals and clinics who are ‘trained for the counselling necessary for the 
use of nevirapine to reduce [MTCT]’; and (iv) that the government ‘[t]ake reasonable measures 
to extend the testing and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics throughout the public 
health sector to facilitate and expedite the use of nevirapine for the purpose of [PMTCT]’.111 
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Did the Court Mediate the South African Government’s Trustworthiness? 
Based on my analysis from Chapter 4, the Constitutional Court did in fact mediate the South 
African government’s trustworthiness. However, and unfortunately in my view, it did so only to 
an absolute minimal extent. As I will explain very shortly, the Court could have done so much 
more in its TAC decision in order to serve as a mediator of government trustworthiness. 
Consistent with the trustworthiness standard, the Court in TAC did lay down a broad 
rule of interpretation for section 27 of the Constitution. That broad rule – which was drawn 
from Grootboom and which imposes an obligation of reasonableness on the South African state – 
does, in accordance with the trustworthiness standard developed in Chapter 4, expressly define 
the South African government’s obligation to citizens in exercising their control over social 
goods and services. In doing so, it lets citizens (and their representatives) know what their 
entitlements are (at a very abstract level) and it provides lower courts with a standard (though as 
I will elaborate, not a very good standard) by which they can hold the government accountable 
in subsequent social rights cases. Additionally, in furtherance of trustworthiness-promoting ends, 
that broad rule constrains the process by which the government exercises discretion over social 
goods and services (rather than the outcome of that process). In essence, the Court’s rule obliges 
the government, in exercising its discretion in this regard, to adopt ‘reasonable measures’.112 
 The problem with the Court’s judgment vis-à-vis trustworthiness promotion is that the 
Court, in laying down as well as applying that broad rule to the facts of TAC, does very little 
work to provide a principled basis upon which to assess the notion of reasonableness.113 In 
Grootboom (the case from which the notion of reasonableness originally derives), Yacoob J. 
(writing for the Court) outlined a set of considerations which speak to the reasonableness of a 
governmental programme. Those considerations are the following: (i) the programme must be 
‘comprehensive and coordinated’; (ii) it must be ‘balanced and flexible’; (iii) ‘appropriate financial 
and human resources’ must be made available for the programme; (iv) it must ‘make appropriate 
provision for … short, medium and long term needs’; (v) it must be ‘reasonably implemented’; 
and (vi) it must cater to ‘[t]hose whose needs are the most urgent’. However, as several social 
rights scholars have criticised, quite rightly in my opinion, these considerations leave the notion 
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of reasonableness extremely vague.114 Owing to the use of ambiguous terms like “appropriate”, 
“balanced” and “comprehensive”, the reasonableness approach is left, as David Bilchitz has put 
it, “empty”, standing ‘in for whatever the Court regards as a desirable feature of state policy’.115 
Because of the vagueness (or “emptiness” if you will) of the Constitutional Court’s 
reasonableness approach, it holds very little promise for promoting government trustworthiness. 
First, because the Court does little to detail precisely what it means by “reasonable”, there is no 
reason to believe that the concepts of reasonableness and trustworthiness overlap. Second, even 
assuming an overlap, an accountability measure – such as the reasonableness approach – is only 
likely to change a government’s behaviour in a trustworthy direction and so, likely to promote 
trustworthiness, if that government knows the ‘criteria or standards’ by which they will be held 
accountable (and thus, that for which they will be censured or punished). In my view, the 
reasonableness approach fails in this respect. To borrow Bilchitz’s apposite words, it leaves the 
government ‘without clear guidance as to the nature of their obligations’.116 From the Court’s 
vague articulation of reasonableness, the government cannot know these ‘criteria or standards’.  
To be fair, in TAC the Court did expand upon the list of reasonableness considerations 
laid down in Grootboom so as to impose a constraint which is both clearly articulated and goes to 
government trustworthiness. That constraint is a requirement of transparency (and as will be 
recalled from Chapter 2, transparency is an element of procedural fairness which is, in turn, 
central to trust’s constituent expectation of good will). Specifically, the Court explained that for a 
governmental programme to be “reasonable”, it must be transparent such that ‘its contents must 
be made known’ to all concerned.117 Applying that requirement to the facts of TAC, it stated: 
The magnitude of the HIV/AIDS challenge facing the country calls for a 
concerted, co-ordinated and co-operative national effort in which government in 
each of its three spheres and the panoply of resources and skills of civil society 
are marshaled, inspired and led. This can be achieved only if there is proper 
communication, especially by government. In order for it to be implemented 
optimally, a public health programme must be made known effectively to all 
concerned, down to the district nurse and patients. Indeed, for a public 
programme such as this to meet the constitutional requirement of 
reasonableness, its contents must be made known appropriately.118 
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Unfortunately, the Court did not go any further than this small step so as to incorporate 
other trustworthiness-promoting constraints (ie other than transparency) into its reasonableness 
approach. As a mediator of government trustworthiness, the Court would have gone further, 
defining reasonableness in terms of the three expectations of trust (including the various 
elements of each expectation). For example, in furtherance of trust’s expectation of competence, 
the Court could have incorporated principles of EBPM into reasonableness. Such an approach 
would demand that for a governmental programme (including South Africa’s PMTCT 
programme) to be “reasonable”, it be rooted in the best available evidence from scientific 
research. In this way, reasonableness would have presented an obstacle for South Africa’s 
government basing its PMTCT policy on the president’s and health minister’s HIV/AIDS 
denialist views, instead demanding that it be based on prevailing scientific opinion in the field. 
Or as yet another example, this time in furtherance of the expectation of good will, the Court 
could have incorporated into reasonableness a requirement of participation. Such a requirement 
would add to the list of reasonableness considerations laid down in Grootboom, whether those 
impacted by a governmental programme were able to express their views thereon and whether 
those views were sincerely considered by the relevant government authorities. In fact, this is 
precisely what the Court did five years later in its decision of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of 
Johannesburg. 119  In that case, occupiers of two buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg 
challenged an order granted by a lower court which authorised the City of Johannesburg to evict 
the occupiers on the basis that those buildings were unsafe and unhealthy. As part of its 
resolution of that case, the Court issued an order ‘aimed at ensuring that the City and the 
occupiers engaged with each other meaningfully on certain issues’, including on the issue of how to 
make ‘the buildings as safe and as conducive to health as is reasonably practicable’.120 In other 
words, it demanded that the occupiers of the buildings be given an opportunity to participate in 
the City’s decision-making process around eviction and the safety/health of the buildings. Of 
note, the Court rooted this “meaningful engagement” requirement in the government’s 
overarching obligation to take ‘reasonable measures’.121 Consequently, the effect of the Olivia 
Road decision was, as Anashri Pillay has stated, to include as a ‘factor for a court to consider in 
evaluating the reasonableness of government action’, ‘the question of meaningful engagement’.122 
                                               
119 [2008] ZACC 1, 2008 (3) SA 208. 
120 ibid [5] (emphasis added). 
121 ibid [9-10]. 
122 Anashri Pillay, ‘Towards Effective Social and Economic Rights Adjudication: The Role of Meaningful 
Engagement’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 732, 745. 
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 Interestingly, instead of mediating the government’s trustworthiness (ie by imposing 
trustworthiness-promoting constraints on the government) – which may, in turn (based on my 
discussion in Chapter 4), be expected to impact citizens’ trust in government – the Court seems 
to have taken steps to impact citizens’ trust in another way: by assuming a sort of “advisor” role, 
akin to that which I described in respect of the media. It did so by using its judgment in TAC as 
an opportunity to express confidence in the South African government – specifically, confidence 
in the government’s good will toward its people (and the courts). This expression of confidence 
arose out of the Court’s consideration of whether it should exercise supervisory jurisdiction over 
the implementation of its order. In deciding that supervision was unnecessary, the Court stated: 
‘The government has always respected and executed orders of this Court. There is no reason to 
believe that it will not do so in the present case’.123 In expressing such confidence, I suggest that 
the Court effectively portrayed the government as trustworthy (specifically, as likely to fulfil the 
expectation of good will) and, in turn, it effectively advised PWLHIV (and South Africans more 
generally) to trust their government. Problematically, the Court’s intervention in this regard (not 
rooted in the concept of trustworthiness as were the transparency requirement or other 
constraints noted above), promoted trust in government which may not have been warranted. 
Put simply, there was no external reason – other than the Court’s assurance itself – for PWLHIV 
and South Africans to believe that the government would behave in a trustworthy fashion.124 
In fact, the facts leading up to this expression of confidence by the Court demonstrate 
that trust in this case was not warranted. For one thing, research conducted on the 
implementation of the Court’s Grootboom order showed that at the time the TAC decision was 
handed down (and indeed even years after that) the government had failed to implement the 
Court’s order therein.125 Thus, there was little reason to expect the results to be any different for 
the TAC case. For another thing, just prior to the release of the Court’s TAC decision, the 
health minister threatened on national television – clearly and unequivocally – to disobey any 
order that the Court would make in the case.126 When explicitly asked whether she would ‘stand 
by whatever the Court decides’ she repeatedly responded “no”, explaining that it was her view 
that ‘the judiciary cannot prescribe from the bench’. 127  Moreover, the South African 
                                               
123 TAC [129]. 
124 Of note, Mark Heywood has said that its request for supervision ‘was a signal of … the degree of distrust that 
existed between civil society and government over the management of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, particularly 
government’s opposition to the use of anti-retroviral drugs’: Heywood, ‘Contempt or Compliance?’ (n 97) 8. 
125 Kameshni Pillay, ‘Implementing Grootboom: Supervision Needed’ (2002) 3 ESR Review 13. See also David 
Bilchitz, ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1, 24-25. 
126 Bilchitz, ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach’ (n 125) 23-24; Heywood, ‘Preventing Mother-to-Child’ (n 55) 308. 
127 Lynne Altenroxel, ‘More Damage Control after Manto Says No’ The Star (Johannesburg, 25 March 2002), cited in 
Heywood, ‘Preventing Mother-to-Child’ (n 55) 308. 
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government’s response to the Court’s judgment and order in TAC confirm that trust therein was 
indeed not warranted. Mark Heywood (the former treasurer of the TAC) has repeatedly stressed 
that the government did not immediately comply with the Court’s order.128 An ARV programme 
was only implemented in mid-2004 – two years after the TAC order was made. As well, the 
order was actively defied in some provinces for years thereafter. In provinces like Gauteng and 
Western Cape (which include Johannesburg and Cape Town, respectively) ‘where there was 
already a commitment to establishing a comprehensive PMTCT programme … the judgment 
unshackled health departments and politicians and opened the door to implementation’; but in 
other provinces (eg Mpumalanga), there was no such implementation.129 Thus, as Heywood has 
explained, the TAC’s advocacy and legal team had to effectively force them into compliance. 
 
Did the Court Instead Mitigate Citizens’ Vulnerability or Promote the Government’s Reliability? 
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to take a brief moment to consider the other two 
forms of judicial constraint which I outlined in Chapter 4 and to illustrate them using TAC. 
Consistent with the vulnerability-mitigating form of constraint, the Court did issue a 
mandatory order with the effect of (or at least it should have had the effect of) granting the 
claimants access to the social good or service which they sought – nevirapine. That order (it will 
be recalled) required the government to, among other things, ‘permit and facilitate the use of 
nevirapine for the purpose of [PMTCT]’ and ‘make it available for this purpose at hospitals and 
clinics’ (where the drug was medically indicated). Therefore, theoretically speaking at least, the 
TAC decision could very well have served as a precedent whereby the Court had shown itself 
willing to exert control over social goods and services and, in turn, had established itself as an 
alternative source for citizens of those goods and services. And if so, we could conclude that the 
Court mitigated citizens’ vulnerability to the South African government (at least the vulnerability 
of citizens who had the financial means to bring their cases before the Constitutional Court). 
However, practically speaking, several factors in TAC militate against it mitigating 
citizens’ vulnerability. First, TAC is not a traditional social rights case. The governmental 
conduct which was at issue was primarily that of interference (ie the government prohibiting, or 
interfering with PWLHIV’s ability to gain access to, nevirapine whose cost was negligible) as 
opposed to omission (ie the government refusing to cover the cost of a social good or service). 
As such, TAC did not offer an ideal precedent from a vulnerability-mitigating standpoint: from 
the case, it was unclear how far the Court would go in future social rights cases where a more 
                                               
128 Heywood, ‘Contempt or Compliance?’ (n 97) 9-10; Heywood, ‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign’ (n 
26) 27. 
129 Heywood, ‘Contempt or Compliance?’ (n 97) 9. 
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traditional, positive claim to a social good or service would be advanced.130 Second, owing to the 
interference nature of the challenged conduct, the Court’s mandatory order contained both 
positive dimensions (those noted above) as well as negative dimensions (that is, the requirement 
that the government ‘remove the restrictions that prevent nevirapine from being made available 
for the purpose of [PMTCT] at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and training 
sites’). And militating against the mitigation of citizens’ vulnerability, the government, in 
implementing that order, chose to ignore (or in Heywood’s diplomatic words, “misunderstood”) 
its positive dimensions, focusing exclusively on the negative dimensions.131 It was through those 
positive dimensions of the order that the Court would have mitigated citizens’ vulnerability: 
through those positive dimensions, the Court exerted control over the social good or service at 
issue in the case (nevirapine) and, in turn, granted it to the claimants. Without those positive 
dimensions (which the order – as implemented by the government – effectively was), TAC does 
not represent a vulnerability-mitigating precedent. And the final factor which militates against 
TAC being vulnerability-mitigating is the Court’s choice, as I alluded to earlier, to not exercise 
supervisory jurisdiction over the order’s implementation. Although the government ignored (or 
“misunderstood”) the positive dimensions of the order, if the Court had chosen to supervise its 
implementation, such defiance (or misunderstanding) could have been corrected. But the Court 
did not and so, while the Court’s order should have theoretically granted the claimants access to 
the nevirapine which they sought, for many (as noted) it did not (at least not for some time).132 
Likewise, I would say that the Court did not promote the South African government’s 
reliability. Consistent with the reliability-promoting form of judicial constraint, the Court in TAC 
did lay down a broad rule of interpretation for section 27 of the Constitution. However, as I 
have already explained and contrary to this form of constraint, that rule did not target the 
outcome of the government’s exercise of discretion over social goods and services (but rather 
the process by which said discretion is exercised). The reliability-promoting form of constraint 
would have had the Court interpret section 27 as a right to a specific social good or service. For 
example, the Court, using this constraint form, would have interpreted section 27 as including a 
specific right to nevirapine or a more general right to ARVs. Such an interpretation would be 
                                               
130 Heinz Klug, ‘Access to Health Care: Judging Implementation in the Context of AIDS’ (2002) 18 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 114, 123. 
131 As Heywood has diplomatically explained, the government ‘seems to have … misunderstood [the Court’s order] 
as simply a negative injunction to remove the restrictions on the availability of Nevirapine. The positive dimensions 
of the order, such as permitting and facilitating the use of Nevirapine and the taking of reasonable measures to 
extend access to it, seem to have been misunderstood’: Heywood, ‘Contempt or Compliance?’ (n 97) 9. In fact, in a 
statement issued on the day the TAC decision was released, the health minister went so far as to suggest that the 
Court had “confirmed” the government’s PMTCT approach: Heywood, ‘Preventing Mother-to-Child’ (n 55) 278. 
132 Heywood, ‘Contempt or Compliance?’ (n 97) 9-10. 
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reliability-promoting since it would have dictated the outcome of future interactions between 
citizens and the government and, in turn, enabled citizens to predict the outcome of those 
interactions. As the government would consequently have a constitutional obligation to provide 
nevirapine or ARVs (as the case may be), it would have to, in the future, ensure that nevirapine 
or ARVs are made available to citizens. And assuming government compliance with the Court’s 
ruling, the ultimate effect of the Court’s judgment would be to promote government reliability. 
 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have used the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in South 
Africa (and the South African Constitutional Court’s controversial TAC decision) to illustrate 
the arguments which I have made in this thesis. This includes, of course, this thesis’s central 
argument about social rights enforcement. In the next and final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 
6), I provide a second illustration – the reduction of wait times in Canada’s public health care 
system (which for reasons detailed there, I think offers a good counterbalance for this chapter). 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Reduction of Wait Times in the Canadian Public Health System 
In the starkest terms, Chaoulli obliges all Charter-watchers to accept … that Charter 
adjudication is energised by a political ideology which emphasises, among other things, 
that individual entitlements are much more important than social responsibilities, that 
negative liberty is to be promoted at the expense of positive liberty, that people’s capacity 
to exercise their rights is a matter of choice rather than circumstance, and that legislatures 
are not only not to be trusted, but are the breeding grounds of capricious and arbitrary 
decision-making. 
– Allan Hutchinson1 
 
In this final chapter, I provide a second illustration of the arguments made in this thesis 
(including, of course, its central argument about social rights enforcement); this time I use the 
example of wait times in the Canadian public health system during the late 1990s and early 
2000s. As with PMTCT in South Africa, I have chosen this example for several reasons; but I 
will once again re-emphasise only a few of them. First of all, this example generated a highly 
controversial decision by the Supreme Court of Canada – Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General) 
(“Chaoulli”) – wherein the Supreme Court was confronted with, in Allan Hutchinson’s words, a 
challenge to ‘the very nature of both Canadian health care and Canadian democracy’.2 Second, 
because the Court’s decision was so controversial, as well as surprising to most people, the case 
and its surrounding facts were the subject of much academic debate across disciplines. 3 
Therefore, owing to the wealth of literature arising out of this debate, this example is, much like 
PMTCT in South Africa, ideal for illustrative purposes. And lastly, I think that wait times in 
Canada’s public health system – generally and in respect of the Chaoulli decision in particular – 
offer a good counterbalance for the illustration offered in Chapter 5. Why? Because unlike the 
TAC case where a vulnerable group challenged a governmental decision which had a negative 
impact on that group, Chaoulli involved the reverse: a relatively less vulnerable group challenging 
a decision which had a positive impact on the most vulnerable segments of society. 
 
                                               
1 Allan C Hutchinson, ‘“Condition Critical”: The Constitution and Health Care’ in Colleen M Flood, Kent Roach 
and Lorne Sossin (eds), Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada 
(University of Toronto Press 2005), 109. 
2 ibid 109. 
3 By way of example, Chaoulli was the subject of an entire edited collection published by the University of Toronto 
Press (Colleen M Flood, Kent Roach and Lorne Sossin (eds), Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over 
Private Health Insurance in Canada (2005)) as well as a special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal in 2006. 
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Constitutional Background 
Unlike its South African counterpart, the Canadian Constitution does not expressly provide a list 
of protected social rights. 4  Nonetheless, as several scholars, advocates and jurists have 
emphasised, there is significant scope for social rights protection in Canada’s Constitution. In 
particular, there are two principal sections of the Canadian Constitution which may be, and 
indeed have been, argued as the basis for a constitutional guarantee of social rights in Canada.5 
 The first is section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). Section 
7 guarantees everyone ‘the right to life, liberty and security of the person’ as well as ‘the right not 
to be deprived [of those rights] except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’. 
It has frequently been argued that the right to life, liberty and security of the person should be 
interpreted as guaranteeing the necessities of life, including medically necessary health care and a 
certain level of social assistance in order to meet basic needs.6 In this regard, it has been 
advocated that the Supreme Court of Canada follow the lead set by courts in other jurisdictions, 
including the Indian Supreme Court (which has interpreted the right to life in its constitution as 
encompassing a ‘right to livelihood’),7 as well as the Israeli Supreme Court and the German 
                                               
4 That is, with the exception of minority language education provisions: see section 23 of the Charter. As Wayne 
MacKay has explained, this omission was not accidental. When the Charter was drafted, its drafters saw social and 
economic policy as outside the purview of courts. Accordingly, social rights advocates opposed the Charter as 
promoting an illusion of rights. Thus, rather than lobby to be included in the Charter text (as other groups including 
women, persons with disabilities and Aboriginals did) these advocates largely boycotted the process: Wayne 
MacKay, ‘Social and Economic Rights in Canada: What are They and Who Can Best Protect Them?’ in B Adell and 
J Magnet (eds), Canadian Rights and Freedoms: 25 Years under the Charter (Butterworths 2009) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2123479> accessed 16 August 2017. 
5 I say “principal” because there is scope for social rights protection in other provisions as well. For example, the 
often-overlooked section 36(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, may provide the basis for constitutional social rights. 
This provision states that ‘without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures’, 
the federal and provincial governments ‘are committed to (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of 
Canadians; (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) providing essential 
public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians’: Patrick Macklem, ‘Social Rights in Canada’ in Daphne Barak-
Erez and Aeyal M Gross (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing 2007), 225-26. 
Additionally, social rights may arguably be protected under the Canadian limitations provision – section 1 of the 
Charter. Section 1 states that the Charter ‘guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. Scholars have 
suggested that provisions like section 1 have scope for social rights protection: for Canada specifically, see Martha 
Jackman and Bruce Porter, ‘Socio-Economic Rights Under the Canadian Charter’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2008), 220. For a 
more general argument in this regard, see Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou, ‘Social Rights in the Age of 
Proportionality: Global Economic Crisis and Constitutional Litigation’ (2012) 10 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 660; Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis, 
and Legal Doctrine: A Reply to David Bilchitz’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 740. 
6 Louise Arbour, ‘Freedom From Want – From Charity to Entitlement’ (Dominion Institute, LaFontaine-Baldwin 
Lecture, 2005) < http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/elibrary/Arbour_Charity-Entitlement_.pdf> accessed 
11 August 2017; Martha Jackman, ‘The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter’ (1988) 20 Ottawa Law 
Review 257; Martha Jackman, ‘Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada’ (2010) 18 
Health Law Journal 1; Margot Young, ‘Section 7 and the Politics of Social Justice’ (2005) 28 UBC Law Review 539; 
Margot Young, ‘Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice’ (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 669. 
7 Olga Tellis & Ors v Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] 2 Supp SCR 51. 
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Constitutional Court (both of which have interpreted the right to human dignity in their basic 
laws as guaranteeing a minimum subsistence).8 For example, Martha Jackman has repeatedly and 
forcefully argued that interpreting section 7 as encompassing social rights is necessary both to 
reflect the values, aspirations and traditions of the Canadian community, as well as to comply 
with Canada’s international obligations (as a signatory to the ICESCR).9 In Jackman’s words, ‘A 
Charter interpreted to deny constitutional protection for welfare rights, a Charter which therefore 
fails to take into account this fundamental aspect of our national character, will be a truncated 
shadow of who we are, an unfaithful reflection of who we wish to be’.10 In a similar fashion, 
Margot Young, though wary that progress will be made on this front imminently due to the 
dominant political consensus in Canada, has said that section 7 has ‘transformative potential’ and 
accordingly, that it ‘offers hope … for anchoring a fundamental entitlement of well-being’.11 
 Second, there is scope for social rights protection under section 15 of the Charter – the 
equality provision. Section 15(1) guarantees that every individual ‘is equal before and under the 
law’ and guarantees them ‘the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination’ (including discrimination based on the enumerated grounds of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age and mental or physical disability).12 Much like with section 
7, it has frequently been argued that section 15 should be interpreted as encompassing social 
rights.13 This argument is rooted in the notion of substantive equality – a notion which the 
Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed as an underlying vision for section 15.14 As the Supreme 
Court has put it, substantive equality ‘entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in 
the knowledge that they are recogni[s]ed at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, 
respect and consideration’.15 Thus, the argument (which has been similarly advanced in other 
                                               
8 Hartz IV, BVerfG, Case No 1 BvL, 1/09, 125 BVerfGE 175; Hassan v National Insurance Institute [2012] HCJ 
10662/04. 
9 Jackman, ‘The Protection of Welfare Rights’ (n 6); Martha Jackman, ‘The Last Line of Defence for [Which?] 
Citizens: Accountability, Equality, and the Right to Health in Chaoulli ‘ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 349; 
Martha Jackman, ‘Reality Checks: Presuming Innocence and Proving Guilt in Charter Welfare Cases’ in Margot 
Young et al (eds), Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism (UBC Press 2007); Martha Jackman, ‘Charter 
Remedies for Socio-Economic Rights Violations: Sleeping Under a Box?’ in Robert J Sharpe and Kent Roach (eds), 
Taking Remedies Seriously (Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice 2010); Jackman, ‘Charter Review as a 
Health Care’ (n 6); Jackman and Porter (n 5). 
10 Jackman, ‘The Protection of Welfare Rights’ (n 6) 338. 
11 Young, ‘Section 7 and the Politics’ (n 6) 540, 560. See also Young, ‘Social Justice and the Charter’ (n 6). 
12 Please note that section 15 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include grounds analogous to those 
enumerated, including citizenship status, sexual orientation, marital status and off-reserve band member status. 
13 Jackman, ‘Charter Remedies for Socio-Economic Rights’ (n 9); Bruce Porter, ‘Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social 
Rights, Equality, and Citizenship’ in Margot Young et al (eds), Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism 
(UBC Press); Young, ‘Social Justice and the Charter’ (n 6). 
14 Jackman, ‘Charter Review as a Health Care’ (n 6) 20. 
15 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 [171], affirmed in R v Kapp 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 
483 [15]. 
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jurisdictions) essentially provides that the promotion of substantive equality necessitates positive 
action by government – in the form of social rights – so as to empower the most disadvantaged 
‘to participate meaningfully both in political and legal processes, unshackling them from the 
benevolence and whim of the powerful, and enabling them to control their own destinies’.16 
 Despite such scope for social rights protection, in the period leading up to Chaoulli (and 
indeed to the present) the Supreme Court had/has been extremely hesitant (or “timid”, to use 
Louise Arbour’s words) to read positive social rights into the Canadian Constitution; and in turn, 
it had/has refused to impose a corresponding positive obligation on the state in respect of social 
goods and services.17  This hesitancy is rooted in the Court’s insistence on maintaining a 
distinction between positive and negative rights – with the Court fearful of the former. The fact 
that this distinction has been ‘long abandoned under international human rights law and 
increasingly rejected in other constitutional democracies’ – not to mention the intense criticism it 
has received in Canadian academic circles – has done very little to sway the Court in its position 
or to calm its fears about positive rights.18 Thus, in the lead-up to Chaoulli (and again to the 
present), the Court had/has interpreted the Charter as overwhelmingly protecting negative rights. 
 
Factual Background 
The Canadian public health system has long suffered from a wait time “problem”. As early as 
2002, former Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow in his report as part of a commission on the 
‘Future of Health Care in Canada’ pointed out: ‘Waiting for health care is a serious concern for 
Canadians and it has become a preoccupation for health care professionals, managers, and 
governments’.19 However, health care wait times are not in and of themselves problematic. In 
fact, wait times are said to be a necessary characteristic of an efficient health care system.20 As 
Colleen Flood and Tracey Epps have explained, ‘It would be extremely inefficient to run a 
                                               
16 Arbour (n 6) 14. 
17 ibid 11; Lorne Sossin, ‘Towards a Two-Tier Constitution? The Poverty of Health Rights’ in Colleen M Flood, 
Kent Roach and Lorne Sossin (eds), Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press 2005), 170-71. 
18 Jackman, ‘The Protection of Welfare Rights’ (n 6) 281. Moreover, international bodies, including the CESCR have 
criticised Canada with respect to its courts’ treatment of economic, social and cultural rights: Jackman, ‘Charter 
Review as a Health Care’ (n 6) 26-27; Bruce Porter and Martha Jackman, ‘Introduction: Advancing Social Rights in 
Canada’ in Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter (eds), Advancing Social Rights in Canada (Irwin Law 2014), 2. See also 
Bruce Porter, ‘Enforcing the Right to Reasonableness in Social Rights Litigation: The Canadian Experience’ in 
Malcolm Langford, César Rodriguez-Garavito and Julieta Rossi (eds), Social Rights Judgments and the Politics of 
Compliance: Making It Stick (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
19 Roy J Romanow, ‘Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada’ (Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada, 2002) <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP32-85-2002E.pdf> accessed 16 
August 2017, 138 [“Romanow Report”]. 
20 Colleen M Flood and Tracey Epps, ‘Waiting for Health Care: What Role for a Patients’ Bill of Rights?’ (2004) 49 
McGill Law Journal 515, 552. See also Chaoulli [2]. 
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system at a capacity that could meet all health needs the moment they arise (hospitals would be 
often empty, hospital beds would be unused or used by people who do not really need to be 
there, and health care professionals would be underutili[s]ed, all at great expense)’.21 
In Canada, wait times are problematic in two respects.22  The first problem is the length 
of time which people wait for health care services. Of course, wait times vary by service, 
provider/institution and geographical location;23 however, that being said, Canadians (including 
physicians, political officials and members of the media) have frequently challenged wait times in 
their public health systems as, on average, “unreasonable” or “excessive”. 24  For example, 
Romanow in his report noted that ‘[t]ime and time again, [his] Commission heard that, when it 
comes to access to specific diagnostic procedures and some surgical procedures, wait lists … and 
waiting times … are too long’.25 Similarly, former Senator Michael Kirby (as Chair of the 
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology), in a response to the 
Romanow report, emphasised that ‘excessively long waiting times’ are ‘the health care issue of 
greatest concern to Canadians’.26 The second problem with wait times in Canada’s public health 
system is the improper management of waiting lists.27 Romanow criticised waiting lists for being 
‘handled in a somewhat haphazard manner’.28 He stressed that as of 2002, waiting lists were 
managed by individual physicians or hospitals with little coordination between those 
physicians/hospitals, there were few rules which governed when and whether a patient should be 
put on a waiting list or ‘when the clock starts ticking’, and there was no serious procedure in 
place for auditing lists. 29  Kirby’s response, similarly again, urged the development and 
implementation of ‘clinical, needs-based waiting list management systems’ across Canada.30 
Given Canada’s wait time problem, a cohort of individuals and organisations (what I will 
call the “pro-privatisation movement”) suggested – or more accurately, advocated – increased 
privatisation of health care services. They suggested that such increased privatisation was the 
                                               
21 Flood and Epps (n 20) 552. 
22 Romanow Report (n 19) 141. See also ibid 552. 
23 Timothy Caulfield, ‘Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General): The Supreme Court of Canada Deals a Blow to Publicly 
Funded Health Care’ (2015) 
<https://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/September2005/(TC)ChaoulliComment.pdf> accessed 9 
December 2016, 2-3. 
24 Michael Kirby, ‘Response to the Romanow Report’ (Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology, 2002) <https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/372/soci/press/04dec02-e.pdf> accessed 16 
August 2017, 20 [“Kirby Response”]. 
25 Romanow Report (n 19) 138. 
26 Kirby Response (n 24) 20. 
27 Romanow Report (n 19) 141-44. 
28 ibid 143. 
29 ibid 141-43. 
30 Kirby Response (n 24) 22. 
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“solution” to the wait time problem. To adequately explain the movement’s suggestion in this 
regard, I will first take a step back and describe the basic structure of the Canadian health system. 
Canada’s public health system is probably best described as ‘publicly funded yet privately 
delivered’.31 This means that although health care services in the public system are state-funded, 
the hospitals and physicians delivering those services are private actors: hospitals are private not-
for-profit entities which are heavily regulated by government, and physicians are private for-
profit contractors. Thus, the public health system in Canada is only “public” with respect to its 
funding, not its delivery. As Canada is a federal state, that funding comes from the Canadian 
provinces via the federal government. Under the Canadian Constitution, jurisdiction over health 
care largely rests with the provinces.32 In exercise of this jurisdiction, each of the Canadian 
provinces administers its own public health insurance plan. The federal government, though 
constitutionally granted a few areas of direct responsibility, mostly exercises indirect power over 
health care via its spending power. Specifically, the federal government provides funding to the 
provinces for health care services; and by attaching requirements to such health care funding, the 
federal government indirectly exercises power over health care. Its vehicle in this respect is the 
Canada Health Act (the CHA). Effectively, the CHA serves two principal ends: (i) it requires the 
provinces – via their respective health insurance plans – to provide first-dollar coverage of all 
hospital and physician services which are considered “medically necessary” (a term which is not 
defined in the CHA and which has been the subject of significant academic and political 
debate);33 and (ii) it establishes a set of criteria which the provinces must satisfy in their insurance 
plans in order to receive full federal funding in respect of those hospital and physician services.34 
At the same time, and like most other countries, Canada has a private health system. In 
fact, only 70 percent of all health care expenditures in Canada are paid from public funds; the 
remaining 30 percent come from private sources (ie either private insurance or out-of-pocket 
spending).35 For example, in 2004 (when the Supreme Court heard the Chaoulli case), of the 130 
                                               
31 Colleen M Flood and Bryan Thomas, ‘Blurring of the Public/Private Divide: The Canadian Chapter’ (2010) 17 
European Journal of Health Law 257, 260. 
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33 Colleen M Flood and Sujith Xavier, ‘Health Care Rights in Canada: The Chaoulli Legacy’  (2008) 27 Medicine and 
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billion Canadian dollars in total health care spending in Canada, 91 billion dollars came from the 
public purse and the remaining 39 billion dollars was privately funded.36 However, Canada’s 
private health system is unique from those of other countries in a very significant respect: in 
Canada, those services which are covered by the public system (ie medically necessary hospital 
and physician services) attract close to 100 percent public financing; therefore, as Colleen Flood 
has put it, there is virtually no duplicative private tier for medically necessary services in Canada.37 
This lack of a duplicative private tier is owed to active steps which have been taken by 
the provinces (and the federal government) to prevent such a tier from developing. First off, the 
majority of provinces (six in total) expressly prohibit private insurance for medically necessary 
hospital and physician services.38 For example, in the province of Quebec, such prohibitions are 
found in section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act (the “HOIA”) and section 15 of the Health 
Insurance Act (the “HEIA”) (the provisions challenged in Chaoulli). 39  But as Flood has 
convincingly argued, such express prohibitions on private insurance are only part of the reason 
why there is no duplicative private tier for medically necessary services in Canada.40 She has 
suggested that the absence of such a tier is attributable to a myriad of provincial legislative 
provisions which ‘cumulatively provide disincentives for a flourishing duplicative private tier’.41 
Among other things, these provisions prohibit physicians from subsidising private practice from 
the public plan, as well as prohibit physicians from relying on the public sector for the bulk of 
their income while using the private sector to top up their incomes.42 An example of the latter 
are prohibitions on so-called “user charges” and “extra billing” for medically necessary services.43 
As Flood and Sujith Xavier have explained it, the above provisions limit ‘the extent to which 
physicians can or are willing to work in the private sector by requiring them to be fully in or fully 
out of the publicly-funded payment system’.44 In support of her argument, Flood has pointed to 
the fact that although four provinces (Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Nova 
                                                                                                                                                  
(2016) <https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/files/document/nhex-trends-narrative-report_2016_en.pdf> accessed 
16 August 2017, 31. See also Flood and Thomas (n 31) 259; Gilmour (n 32) 329. 
36 Gilmour (n 32) 329. 
37 Flood and Thomas (n 31) 259, 265. 
38 Colleen M Flood and Tom Archibald, ‘The Illegality of Private Health Care in Canada’ (2001) 164 Canadian 
Medical Association Journal 825, cited in Colleen M Flood, ‘Chaoulli’s Legacy for the Future of Canadian Health 
Care Policy’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 273, 298-99. 
39 Specifically, these provisions prohibit contracting for private health insurance. 
40 Flood (n 38) 298-99. 
41 ibid 298. 
42 ibid 298-99. 
43 Note that “user charges” and “extra billing” are also prohibited under the CHA itself. 
44 Flood and Xavier (n 33) 623. 
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Scotia) do not expressly prohibit private insurance for medically necessary services, no significant 
private sector has developed therein. These provinces do, however, use the above disincentives.45 
Now, let us return to the pro-privatisation movement and its suggestion vis-à-vis the wait 
time problem. The pro-privatisation position had (and still has) a strong support base in Canada, 
including powerful actors like private insurance firms, pharmaceutical companies and bankers – 
all who stand to gain financially, in a significant way, from increased private health care.46 As Dr. 
Marie-Claude Goulet, chair of Médecins Québecois pour le Régime Public [Quebec Physicians 
for a Public System], has explained, the ‘privati[s]ation strategy … [is] driven by financial 
interests. Health represents a huge market with a vast potential for profit. Everybody needs 
health care at some point in their lives, and people are prepared to pay when it has to do with 
their health’.47 It was also supported by some physicians and patients (including, as I will explain 
shortly, the claimants in Chaoulli) who grew tired of what they considered to be “unreasonable” 
or “excessive” wait times. The pro-privatisation movement’s argument vis-à-vis privatisation 
offering a “solution” to the wait time problem is a rather simple one: introducing a private tier 
for medically necessary services in Canada should reduce wait times in the public system by 
reducing demand for publicly-insured services, thereby shortening waiting lists for such services. 
To be sure, this argument has intuitive appeal. However, the provinces, for a number of 
reasons, refused to turn to privatisation in order to solve their wait time problem. First, the 
privatisation of medically necessary health care services was seen to violate how the majority of 
the Canadian public views health care. As Romanow stressed in his 2002 report, most Canadians 
subscribe to the principle that health care should be based on need, not ability to pay.48 They 
view quality and timely health care as ‘a right of citizenship, not a privilege of status or wealth’.49 
Allowing patients to use their money to gain access to better or faster health care is in direct 
opposition to this principle. Second, there was a longstanding concern that introducing a 
duplicative private tier would threaten the quality and sustainability of Canada’s public system.50 
Contrary to suggestions by pro-privatisation actors, this concern was not anecdotal; it was rooted 
                                               
45 That is, with the exception of Newfoundland. In Flood’s words, presumably in Newfoundland ‘the potential 
private market is insufficient to flourish even in the absence of laws suppressing it’: Flood (n 38) 289. 
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47 ibid 125. 
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to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (University of Toronto Press 2005), 528. 
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in well-established health care system research which makes clear that such parallel financing of 
services increases (rather than decreases) overall costs and raises serious questions of fairness.51 
Thus, allowing a duplicative private tier to develop in Canada would, based on this research, 
increase costs in the public system and leave the patients remaining therein – likely low-income 
and unhealthy/uninsurable citizens – with an inefficient, unfair and unsustainable system. 
Finally, a compelling body of research conducted across a range of jurisdictions 
established that while intuitively the introduction of a duplicative private tier should reduce wait 
times (as pro-privatisation actors had suggested), experience had proven that said benefit is not, 
in actuality, realised. For example, as documented in a 2004 OECD report, in the case of Ireland 
(where private health insurance has grown steadily since its introduction in 1957, reaching 48 
percent of the Irish population as of 2002), wait times have not decreased.52 Similar patterns are 
observable in Australia and Great Britain.53 Researchers have offered, supported by empirical 
data, several explanations for such patterns. They include: (i) the introduction of a private tier 
diverts resources away from the public system; (ii) given that the private system is most likely 
more lucrative than the public system, introducing such a tier creates incentives for physicians to 
maintain long waiting lists; and (iii) rather than shift demand from the public to the private 
system, the introduction of such a tier increases overall demand for health care services.54 
Moreover, there was evidence to support the conclusion that more than not reduce wait times in 
the public system, the introduction of a duplicative private tier could actually – and quite 
perversely – have the opposite effect.55 This is so since healthier patients would be drawn to the 
private health system, thereby increasing the average complexity of cases in the public system.56 
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For the foregoing reasons, no public report published in Canada leading up to Chaoulli 
had formally recommended privatisation.57 Roy Romanow found there was ‘no evidence these 
solutions will deliver better or cheaper care, or improve access (except, perhaps, for those who 
can afford to pay for care out of their own pockets)’; he also stressed that ‘the principles on 
which these solutions rest cannot be reconciled with the values at the heart of medicare or with 
the tenants of the Canada Health Act that Canadians overwhelmingly support’.58 Michael Kirby 
concluded that ‘Canada’s single public funder model must be maintained for hospital and doctor 
services’; in his Committee’s view, ‘Not only does a single public insurer/funder mean that 
everyone gets treated equally, but it is also enormously more efficient than the often-advocated 
funding model that mixes public pay and private pay patients, that is, the “two-tier” model’.59 
Accordingly, Canada’s provinces never moved in the direction of a duplicative private tier. 
Because the pro-privatisation position was not gaining the desired traction in political 
circles, in the early 2000s the movement turned to the courts. Kirby, in expressing concern with 
the wait time problem, predicted this response. He noted: ‘Unless Canadians are guaranteed 
timely treatment, the future of publicly funded health care is likely to be at risk, most probably as 
a result of a constitutional challenge based on the right of individual Canadians to have access to 
timely care and to purchase private health insurance to provide it’.60 Such challenges also ‘took 
advantage of a period when the health system was being heavily critici[s]ed, particularly in the 
media’.61 The essential argument underlying these challenges is the following: owing to the wait 
time problem in Canada’s public health system, the legislative provisions which the provinces 
have enacted (so as to prevent a duplicative private tier from developing) are unconstitutional. 
Specifically, due in significant part to the mental and physical suffering associated with waiting 
for treatment, these provisions, it has been argued, violate Canadians’ rights to life and security 
of the person as protected by section 7 of the Charter (among other rights in other sections). 
Chaoulli was the first of such challenges in Canada. At issue in the case were section 11 of 
the HOIA and section 15 of the HEIA – both of which, it will be recalled from earlier, prohibit 
private health insurance for medically necessary health care services in Quebec. The challenge 
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was lodged by two individuals in the province of Quebec: Jacques Chaoulli and George Zeliotis. 
Chaoulli was a physician who had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a licence to operate an 
independent private hospital in Canada. Zeliotis was an individual patient who had suffered a 
number of health problems over the years and had complained about delays in accessing care in 
the public health system.62 Unlike the TAC case in which an activist organisation (the TAC) was 
behind the litigation (and indeed was the main claimant in the case), Chaoulli had no such formal 
organisational backing. Chaoulli and Zeliotis joined forces for the specific purpose of the legal 
challenge; and Chaoulli both financed the litigation and was self-represented therein.63 But in 
light of the pro-privatisation movement, there was, of course, sizeable support for their cause. 
 
The Illustration 
Much like the case of PMTCT in South Africa, this example of wait times in Canada’s public 
health system may be thought of as a network of interdependent relationships. Again, this 
network configuration follows from the fact that the relationship between Canadians and their 
government with respect to wait times – a case of the more general citizen-government 
relationship (of course, with the exception of the fact that social rights are not constitutionalised 
in Canada) – may be accurately characterised as a trust relationship: the government had control 
over the medically necessary services for which Canadians were waiting; the government had 
discretion in providing those services (including the use of waiting lists as a means of rationing 
and/or prioritising those services’ delivery), thereby leaving Canadians uncertain of how the 
government would exercise its control; and owing to their need for the services at issue, coupled 
with the government’s control and discretion, Canadians were vulnerable to their government.64 
 Paralleling my analysis in Chapter 5, I will use this example to illustrate this thesis’s 
arguments, centring around the same parties and relationships which I analysed there. In this 
example of wait times in Canada, the relevant parties translate into: physicians who worked in 
Canada’s private health system, the Canadian media and the Canadian courts. And with respect 
to the courts, I will again focus my illustration on an apex court: the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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Physicians in the Private System 
Owing to the structure of Canada’s health care system, physicians working in the private system 
played (and still do play) a very different role than their South African counterparts. Because 
Canada does have a parallel private health system but that system is not duplicative in nature, 
while there were (and are) physicians who work in the private system, they did not offer (since 
either they legally could not offer or there were disincentives in place to discourage them from 
offering) the same medically necessary health care services as physicians in the public system. 
 This lack of duplication in the Canadian public health system meant that physicians in 
the private system did not serve as an “alternative source” of the social goods and services which 
Canadians sought in their relationship with their government – medically necessary health care 
services. Accordingly, and in contrast to the wealthy South African PWLHIV from Chapter 5, 
for wealthy Canadians who had access to the private health system, physicians in that system did 
not mitigate their vulnerability to the Canadian government.65 Owing to the system’s structure, 
wealthy Canadians could not turn to the private health system to obtain medically necessary care 
should the Canadian government refuse to provide it (or, as is the case here, should it fail to 
provide it as quickly as Canadians would like). Therefore, every Canadian (regardless of her 
financial means) was wholly dependent on the Canadian government for medically necessary 
health care. The public system was intentionally designed to achieve that outcome. By not 
discriminating based on wealth – that is, furthering the principle that health care should be based 
on need, not ability to pay – the public health system was rendered an equaliser of vulnerability.66 
 
Canadian Media 
The relationship between Canadians and the Canadian media represents yet another case of the 
more general “citizen-media relationship”. And it follows from this, based on both the network 
conception of trust and the relevant empirical research cited in Chapter 3, that we can expect the 
Canadian media to be able to impact Canadians’ trust in their government with respect to health 
care wait times. Additionally, there is a body of specific empirical media research from Canada 
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which lends further support to this conclusion.67 Put concisely, that body of research suggests 
that the Canadian media’s reporting on public health care (including with respect to wait times) 
can and does impact public perceptions regarding the state of health care services in Canada. 
 As with the PMTCT case in Chapter 5, I will use this example of wait times in Canada’s 
public health system to illustrate how the media can operate as an “advisor” in the relationship 
between citizens and their government. Specifically, I will demonstrate how many publications in 
Canada advised Canadians not to trust their government with respect to wait times by portraying 
the latter as untrustworthy. And following from that, to the extent that Canadians trusted these 
publications, we can expect that they hindered Canadians’ trust in their government. However, 
before I get into this illustration, I should point out that the same limitations which I set out in 
my Chapter 5 illustration equally apply here. First, I focus my illustration again on print media 
(and more specifically still, on newspapers) for the same reason which I provided there: most of 
the relevant media research which has been conducted in Canada has focused primarily on 
newspapers. Second, I centre my illustration on these newspapers’ portrayal of the Canadian 
government as untrustworthy (rather than trustworthy) because, as I will demonstrate shortly, the 
relevant empirical work establishes that during the relevant time, newspapers’ portrayal of the 
Canadian public health system and the Canadian government vis-à-vis health care and wait times 
was, generally speaking, highly negative in nature. That said, there were many publications which 
did portray the Canadian government in a positive light; and therefore, to the extent that 
Canadians trusted those publications, they may have instead fostered their trust in government. 
And lastly, I would like to stress again that my illustration in this section is precisely that – an 
illustration. It should not be taken as an exhaustive analysis of Canadian newspapers and their 
impact on the Canadian public’s trust in government during the relevant time period. 
 My choice to focus the illustration in this section on newspapers’ portrayal of the 
Canadian government as untrustworthy is based on the findings made in Canadian media 
research. First of all, that research has found that during the relevant period, Canadian 
newspapers portrayed the public health system in an increasingly negative manner. For example, 
Stuart Soroka, Antonia Maioni and Pierre Martin, in a content analysis of articles published in 
the Toronto-based newspaper, the Toronto Star, have shown that the public system was with 
increasing regularity portrayed as in a state of “crisis”. Their study specifically examined, in the 
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period from 1995 to 2010, the coincidence of the terms “wait lists” (and various derivatives 
thereof) and “crisis”. Their results established a clear increase in the coincidence of these two 
terms over time, with an especially clear increase following the year 2000.68 In another study, 
Kelly Blidook arrived at a similar finding.69 Using a sample of five English-language newspapers 
from across Canada, she conducted a similar analysis of the coincidence of the terms “health 
care” and “crisis” between 1994 and 2000. Blidook observed a substantial increase in the two 
terms appearing together, with the majority of that increase taking place in 1999 and 2000.70 
 In addition to how the public system was portrayed, there is evidence to suggest that the 
politicians responsible for that system were also portrayed negatively. For such evidence, we may 
consider again Blidook’s work. In a study related to the previous (but focusing this time on 
television media coverage around the time of the 2000 Canadian federal election), Blidook 
analysed how the five major political parties were portrayed in health-related stories as compared 
with non-health-related stories.71 Her findings are quite revealing. She found that across all news 
stories where at least one party was mentioned, one or more of the parties was portrayed more 
negatively in health stories than in non-health stories (although not to a statistically significant 
extent). However, where there was a statistically significant difference was with respect to the 
governing party – the Liberals – who had been in power for seven years prior. The Liberal party 
was 28 percent more likely to be portrayed negatively in health stories than in non-health stories. 
Moreover, of those cases in which the Liberal party was portrayed non-negatively in health 
stories, the vast majority were neutral (as opposed to positive). Negative coverage of the Liberals 
in health stories outpaced positive coverage thereof by a ratio in excess of 10:1. For Blidook, 
these research findings, taken together, ‘strongly suggest[] that the frame of health care coverage 
portrayed a problem with the system’.72 Although I acknowledge that Blidook’s study did not 
directly address newspaper coverage of health issues nor wait times per se, I think that her 
findings and her conclusions may be appropriately extended for my purpose – that is, to support 
the suggestion that Canadian newspapers’ portrayal of the government with respect to wait times 
was, generally speaking, highly negative in nature. First, although television news and newspaper 
coverage are distinct, I do not think that it is unreasonable to relate them. In this regard, I am 
supported by media research.73 Also, research which has been conducted on newspaper coverage 
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has yielded similar findings to those of Blidook. For example, Christen Rachul and Timothy 
Caulfield, in a content analysis of newspaper articles across Canada dealing with government-
related health care and access thereto between 2003 and 2012, found that many of the underlying 
themes of articles were negative towards the government.74 In particular, they found that the 
‘Canadian print news media was overwhelmingly sympathetic towards patients and increasing 
government funding for medication, procedures, and other treatments’.75 Moreover, one of the 
most common themes which they observed in the articles they reviewed was ‘the government is 
letting its citizens and residents down by not providing access’ (accounting for 14.3 percent of all 
articles).76 Second, it is true that Blidook’s study did not focus specifically on wait times (nor did 
Rachul and Caulfield’s study for that matter). But research conducted by Stuart Soroka has 
shown that from 1997 to 2009 (which necessarily includes the 2000 time period of Blidook’s 
study and most of the time period in Rachul and Caulfield’s study), a significant number of 
health news stories centred on the issue of wait times.77 To quote Soroka, health care wait times 
were a ‘major public concern’ and played ‘a prominent role in media coverage’ at that time.78 
So, how did these publications – via such negative coverage – portray the government as 
untrustworthy (and so, advise Canadians not to trust government with respect to wait times)? I 
suggest that they did so in two principal ways: by challenging the fairness of governmental 
procedures around wait times (an element which, it will be recalled, speaks to the government’s 
good will) and by questioning the government’s competence to deal with the wait time problem. 
And by doing so, these publications suggested that the government was not likely, in future 
interactions, to fulfil Canadians’ expectations of good will and competence vis-à-vis wait times. 
First, many publications challenged the fairness of governmental procedures around wait 
times on equality grounds.79 Specifically, waiting list administration procedures were portrayed as 
unfairly advantaging certain groups of patients (eg the wealthy and the socially connected) to the 
disadvantage of the less wealthy/less socially connected. For instance, in an article published in 
the national newspaper The National Post titled ‘Swap a favour, treat a friend’, Heather Sokoloff 
reports on how certain patients frequently jump to the front of waiting lists.80 This select group 
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of patients includes, according to Sokoloff’s sources, friends of hospital administrators, 
physicians and other health care professionals, and those who have something to offer these 
actors in exchange for preferential treatment (what she calls “favour-swapping”). Sokoloff 
describes this practice as ‘Canada’s little-discussed, unofficial two-tier medical system, where 
those with education, connections – and sometimes plain old tenacity – can jump to the front of 
the queue’. Another example is an article written by well-known health reporter André Picard in 
the national newspaper The Globe and Mail.81 Picard describes a study conducted by a team of 
researchers at the University of Manitoba which found that Canada’s wealthy have greater access 
to diagnostic imaging procedures, including CT scans and MRIs. As Picard explains it, this is so 
because wealthy Canadians know ‘how to work the system’: they are more likely to have access 
to physicians (both family physicians and specialists who can refer them), to be well-educated 
about such technologies and to be an assertive health consumer. Extrapolating from the study to 
the wait time problem in Canada, Picard suggests that though the ‘research did not look at wait 
times per se’ it ultimately ‘implies that wealthier patients do not wait as long as the less affluent’. 
In essence, these articles depicted the procedures in place for administering waiting lists 
in Canada’s public health system as unequal (an element which, it will be recalled from Chapter 
2, is central to procedural fairness and, in turn, good will). Specifically, these procedures were 
portrayed as discriminating on the basis of wealth (as well as social status). And since the 
government has responsibility for the public system (at least ultimately, through its financing 
thereof as well as its regulation of the hospitals which are administering the waiting lists), such 
articles, by necessary implication, challenged the government’s good will toward Canadians. 
Second, several publications portrayed the Canadian government as untrustworthy by 
casting doubt on its competence to deal with the wait time problem. How so? Put simply, they 
represented the government’s decision to prevent a duplicative private tier from developing in 
Canada (in the ways I described earlier) as not rooted in the relevant evidence (and so, as not 
consistent with the principles of EBPM).82 As I have explained, there is a wealth of health care 
system research to support the conclusion that parallel financing of health care services increases 
(not decreases) costs and raises serious questions of fairness. Accordingly, there was/is good 
reason to believe that if the Canadian government were to allow a duplicative private tier to 
develop in Canada, the public system (in which low-income and unhealthy/uninsurable citizens 
would have no choice but to remain) would be inefficient, unfair and unsustainable. Despite the 
existence of this body of research, many reporters who covered the Chaoulli decision and 
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addressed the wait time problem made no mention of it. These reporters instead, usually 
advocating some form of two-tier system for medically necessary services, presented their own 
“evidence” pertaining to the experiences of foreign jurisdictions.83 In a nutshell, they suggested 
that since jurisdictions other than Canada have parallel public and private health systems which 
seemingly work well, Canada could and should do the same. Problematically, as Colleen Flood 
has explained, these reporters, in presenting such foreign experiences, omitted important 
contextual details which have significant bearing on the comparability of these jurisdictions to 
Canada.84 As a consequence, these reporters, as Flood has put it, ‘grossly oversimplified the 
debates about public and private health insurance’, thereby demonstrating a ‘poor grasp of health 
policy’.85 So, how did these reporters portray the government as incompetent to deal with the 
wait time problem? In my view, they did so through such oversimplification. By presenting 
foreign experiences in the way they did (decontextualised and thus, grossly oversimplified), they 
suggested to Canadians that there was/is evidence to support the efficacy of a two-tier health 
care system in Canada (ie their “evidence” from foreign jurisdictions); and because this evidence 
was not resulting in reforms to the system, that their government was either unaware of it or 
chose to ignore it (rather than the actual reason – its validity based on the health care system 
research). Either way, the government’s policy on wait times, according to the suggestions of 
these reporters, did not account for important evidence; and as such, it was not evidence-based. 
To illustrate my point, consider an article to which Flood refers which was published by 
Lysiane Gagnon (a regular columnist in the Montreal-based newspaper La Presse) in the 14 
November 2005 edition of The Globe and Mail.86 In it, Gagnon criticises Canada’s public health 
system and, consistent with what I have said, advocates a parallel private system for medically 
necessary care in Quebec. But in so advocating, she makes no mention of the health care system 
research which I have noted. Nor does she make reference to the many health policy and health 
law scholars who, in commenting upon the Chaoulli decision, emphasised this research and the 
majority’s failure to understand it. Rather, she simply highlights that ‘[a]ll of Western Europe 
allows the co-existence of private and public medical services’ and without taking any steps to 
contextualise the relevant jurisdictions, argues that Quebec should draw inspiration from the 
systems in France, the UK and Sweden. In making her argument, Gagnon directly attacks the 
Quebec government for not emulating such jurisdictions, stating, ‘Only a diehard ideologue, or 
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someone who hasn’t travelled much, can argue that countries like France and Sweden, whose 
institutions were built by a succession of socialist governments, have an unfair system’. Another 
example is an article published by well-known columnist Margaret Wente in the 11 June 2005 
edition of The Globe and Mail (only two days after the Chaoulli decision was released).87 Like 
Gagnon, Wente is critical of Canada’s public system and uses systems in other jurisdictions 
(France and Germany being specifically mentioned) to support her argument in favour of a two-
tier system. But again, making no effort to contextualise those jurisdictions’ systems, she simply 
notes that they ‘have private as well as public medicine’ and that they ‘manage to provide 
universal access without waiting times for treatment’ (a suggestion with which I am fairly certain 
many health policy experts would disagree).88 And then, attacking what she sees as a failure on 
the part of the Canadian government to not develop a two-tier system, Wente pejoratively states 
that via Chaoulli, the ‘Supreme Court has handed us permission to grow up. We should take it’. 
In summary, I submit that the foregoing negative media coverage – which challenges the 
fairness of Canada’s waiting list administration procedures and the government’s competence to 
solve the wait time problem – portrayed the government as untrustworthy. These publications 
depicted the Canadian government as unlikely to fulfil Canadians’ expectations of trust 
(specifically good will and competence) and, in turn, advised them not to trust their government 
with respect to wait times And so again, to the extent that Canadians trusted these publications, 
we can expect, based on the network conception of trust as well as Coleman’s theory, that their 
effect was to hinder trust between Canadians and their government with respect to wait times. 
 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Lastly, let us turn to the Supreme Court. Like the relationship between PWLHIV and the South 
African Constitutional Court, Canadians and their Supreme Court had a relationship which 
followed from two factors: first, as with the South African example, the reality that Canadians 
had brought social rights cases to the Supreme Court (including in respect of wait times in 
Chaoulli); and second, from how the Supreme Court had approached social rights. On the latter 
factor, the Canadian Supreme Court is very different from its South African counterpart. 
Whereas the South African Constitutional Court furthered it relationship with South Africans by 
pronouncing upon (specifically, recognising) the justiciability of the express social rights 
provisions contained in their constitution, the Canadian Supreme Court – because the Canadian 
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Constitution does not have such express social rights provisions – did not have to make, and so, 
did not make, an equivalent pronouncement. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had, in its Charter 
jurisprudence, expressly left open the possibility of such recognition, specifically in section 7.89 In 
Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) (which was decided only two years prior to Chaoulli), the Court 
decided that it would leave ‘open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty or 
security of the person may be made out in special circumstances’ (even though the majority of 
the Court concluded that such “special circumstances” did not exist in that particular case).90 In 
my view, this express opening contributed to the relationship between the Court and Canadians. 
It signalled the Court’s openness to its mediating the relationship between Canadians and their 
government with respect to social rights (even if such mediation remained theoretical for the 
moment); and if nothing else, it may have encouraged Canadians to litigate before the Court. 
 Chaoulli involved a constitutional challenge to the two Quebec provisions which I 
identified earlier (section 15 of the HEIA and section 11 of the HOIA) – both of which 
prohibited private health insurance for medically necessary services. The claimants argued that 
these provisions violated their rights under both the Charter and the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms (the “Quebec Charter”) (a statutory bill of rights which applies exclusively in 
Quebec and under which courts have the power to review legislation for consistency 
therewith).91 More specifically, they claimed under the Quebec Charter a violation of section 1 (the 
rights to life and to personal security, inviolability and freedom) and under the Charter, violations 
of section 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), section 12 (the right not to be 
subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment) and section 15 (the right to equality). 
Chaoulli and Zeliotis did not challenge the constitutionality of the prohibition on private 
health insurance per se. Rather, they challenged the prohibition as set against the backdrop of 
the wait time problem in Canada. They argued that the prohibition in these provisions – 
combined with the wait time problem – yielded a violation of the above-mentioned rights. 
Without the wait times in the public health system, the prohibition in section 15 of the HEIA 
and section 11 of the HOIA, according to their challenge, would not be unconstitutional. Their 
challenge rested on the reasonable assumption that a private system for medically necessary care, 
if permitted by governments in Canada, would come with no or significantly reduced wait times 
when compared against the public system. Thus, as Deschamps J. summarises in her opinion, the 
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claimants contended that ‘the prohibition [in the HEIA and the HOIA] deprives them of access 
to health care services that do not come with the wait they face in the public system’.92 
The importance of the wait time backdrop of the claimants’ challenge is key to my trust-
based analysis of the Chaoulli decision. Because the challenge was brought against this backdrop, 
the Chaoulli case could have been – but unfortunately was not – framed by the parties as well as 
the Court in an alternative, positive manner. That alternative was as a challenge to the wait time 
problem itself. Such a challenge would have been in line with more traditional claims in social 
rights litigation (as we saw, for example, in the Grootboom and TAC cases): that the government 
has a positive obligation under the Constitution to provide a social good or service – in this case, 
medically necessary care in a timely manner. Therefore, Chaoulli and Zeliotis, on behalf of all 
Canadians, could have challenged the government’s management of wait times in the public 
health system, and the Supreme Court could have determined the government’s constitutional 
obligations vis-à-vis its management of wait times. But that did not happen. As Bruce Porter has 
critically, but correctly in my view, suggested, the Court ‘insists on framing the case exactly as the 
more advantaged [claimants] and their many supporters among the private healthcare providers 
would have the Court frame it: as a challenge to government interference with the “rights” of the 
more affluent to avoid waiting lists, rather than as a challenge to ensure that waiting lists do not 
violate the rights of those in need of care’.93 I will return to this framing of the case shortly. 
At first instance, the Quebec Superior Court dismissed the matter. The trial judge found 
that neither section 12 nor section 15 of the Charter was engaged. As for section 7, she held that 
while the provisions deprived the claimants of their right to life, liberty and security of the 
person, said deprivation was ‘in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’. On this 
front, the trial judge concluded that the purpose of the prohibition was to discourage the 
development of a parallel private system for medically necessary care, a purpose motivated by 
considerations of equality and human dignity.94 The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appeal brought by the claimants. Thus, the claimants further appealed the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada which heard the appeal in June 2004 and issued its decision on 9 June 
2005. The Court focused its decision substantially on section 7 of the Charter and section 1 of the 
Quebec Charter; accordingly, I will equally focus my analysis in this chapter on these sections. 
Chaoulli was decided by a seven-member panel (rather than the full Court which has nine 
members). The Court’s judgment is divided into three opinions: the opinion of McLachlin C.J. 
and Major and Bastarache JJ. (delivered by McLachlin C.J. and Major J.); an opinion by 
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Deschamps J. (concurring in part); and a dissenting opinion (delivered by Binnie and LeBel JJ.). 
McLachlin C.J. and Major J. concluded that the impugned provisions violated both section 7 of 
the Charter and section 1 of the Quebec Charter, and that neither violation could be justified under 
the charters’ respective limitations sections (section 1 of the Charter and section 9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter). With respect to section 7, they said that the impugned provisions deprived the claimants 
of their rights to life and security of the person due to the ‘psychological and physical suffering’ 
which follows from waiting lists – suffering which would not be sustained ‘but for the 
prohibition on medical insurance’ imposed by the impugned provisions.95 McLachlin C.J. and 
Major J. also held that the impugned provisions were “arbitrary” and, as such, their deprivation 
of the rights to life and security of the person did not accord with the principles of fundamental 
justice.96 On the issue of arbitrariness, the government argued (supported by expert evidence 
which summarised and was in line with the health care system research to which I referred 
earlier) that the impugned provisions’ objective in prohibiting private health insurance was to 
ensure the quality of public health care in Canada. McLachlin C.J. and Major J. largely rejected 
this argument, discrediting the government’s expert evidence as based on ‘assertions of belief’ 
and instead choosing to rely on so-called “evidence” of the ‘experience of other developed 
countries with public health care systems which permit access to private health care’.97 And as I 
have already said, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. reasoned that the violation could not be justified 
under section 1.98 On section 1 of the Quebec Charter, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. concurred with 
the conclusion drawn by Deschamps J. in her separate opinion (which I consider next). 
Deschamps J. decided the case exclusively under the Quebec Charter.99 As she points out in 
her opinion, section 1 of the Quebec Charter is similar to section 7 of the Charter: the major 
distinction between them being the absence of any reference to the principles of fundamental 
justice in section 1. Accordingly, for reasons which parallel those provided in McLachlin C.J. and 
Major J.’s opinion with respect to section 7, Deschamps J. concluded that the impugned 
provisions violated the claimants’ rights to life and security under section 1 of the Quebec Charter. 
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In her opinion, she stresses that ‘[w]aiting lists are real and intentional’ (employed by the 
government as a form of health care rationing); she, like McLachlin C.J. and Major J., describes 
the evidence regarding the physical and psychological consequences of waiting lists; and, 
ultimately, she arrives at the conclusion that the impugned provisions denied Quebeckers, 
including the claimants, ‘a solution that would permit them to avoid waiting lists’.100 Deschamps 
J. also reasoned that the government’s violation of the rights to life and security could not be 
justified under section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter. Like section 1 of the Charter, section 9.1 obliges 
Quebec courts to consider the importance of the government’s objective in enacting the law 
which infringes the right or freedom, the rationality of the connection between that objective 
and the law in question, whether the law in question infringes the right or freedom as minimally 
as possible, and the proportionality of the infringement vis-à-vis the objective. 101  While 
Deschamps J. accepted the government’s objective (defined above) as important and rationally 
connected with the impugned provisions, she concluded that said provisions did not minimally 
impair the rights to life and security. In support of this conclusion, she points to alternative 
measures which Quebec could have adopted (but did not adopt) to protect the public health care 
system, such as those adopted by other Canadian provinces and by other OECD countries.102 
The dissenting justices disagreed with McLachlin C.J. and Major J.’s conclusion that the 
impugned provisions were arbitrary. For them, ‘the prohibition against private health insurance 
is a rational consequence of Quebec’s commitment to the goals and objectives of the Canada 
Health Act’.103 They found this conclusion to be supported by the evidence.104 Binnie and LeBel 
JJ. explained that ‘there is nothing in the evidence to justify our colleagues’ disagreement with 
[the trial judge’s] conclusion that general availability of health insurance will lead to a significant 
expansion of the private health sector to the detriment of the public health sector’.105 In 
opposition to McLachlin C.J. and Major J., they rejected the claimants’ arbitrariness argument as 
‘based largely on generali[s]ations about the public system’ which, for them, were rooted in an 
overly optimistic and oversimplified view of the benefits of private health insurance and its 
adverse effects on the public system.106 Moreover, the dissenting justices decided that the courts 
were not the proper forum to decide the reasonableness of wait times in the public system. 
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According to Binnie and LeBel JJ. the claimants’ ‘case does not rest on constitutional law but on 
their disagreement with the Quebec government on aspects of its social policy. The proper 
forum to determine the social policy of Quebec in this matter is the National Assembly’.107 
In the end, the legal impact of Chaoulli was limited to the province of Quebec.108 Because 
McLachlin C.J. and Major J.’s opinion concurred with that of Deschamps J. on the Quebec Charter 
but the reverse is not true – that is, Deschamps J. did not concur with McLachlin C.J. and Major 
J. on the Charter, deciding the case exclusively under the Quebec Charter – the majority holding was 
ultimately that of Deschamps J. In other words, the Court ultimately held and declared, in a 4-3 
split, that the impugned provisions (section 15 of the HEIA and section 11 of the HOIA) 
constituted a violation of the Quebec Charter. However, the Court did not specify a remedy for the 
adjudged violation. It essentially offered the Quebec government a choice: reduce wait times in 
the public system to a “reasonable” level or remove the prohibitions on private insurance.109 
As I indicated earlier, in the period leading up to Chaoulli, the Supreme Court had never 
read positive social rights into the Canadian Constitution. And that did not change in Chaoulli.110 
Accordingly, my analysis of the Chaoulli decision will proceed slightly differently from that of 
TAC. Specifically, my normative argument applies in a slightly different way here. Because social 
rights (including a right to health) have not been constitutionalised in Canada (in contrast to 
South Africa, which constitutionalised the right to health in section 27), I cannot, in my analysis 
of Chaoulli, directly apply my courts as mediators of government trustworthiness argument to the 
Supreme Court. Unlike in Chapter 5 (where I showed how the Constitutional Court could have 
mediated government trustworthiness in enforcing its constitutional right to health), here, I will 
instead show how the Supreme Court could have mediated government trustworthiness if it had 
recognised a right to health in its constitution. Hence, as I explained in the thesis’s Introduction, in the 
case of Canada, my normative argument, in addition to addressing how the right to health should 
be enforced, indirectly acts as an argument in support of the constitutionalisation of such a right. 
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Did the Court Mediate the Canadian Government’s Trustworthiness? 
I suggest that unlike the Constitutional Court in TAC, the Supreme Court in Chaoulli did not, in 
any respect, mediate the Canadian government’s trustworthiness. Why is that the case? Because 
the Court laid down no broad rule which defined the government’s obligations to Canadians in 
its exercise of control over medically necessary health care – and therefore, it could not (and so, 
did not) increase the likelihood that the government would, in its future interactions with 
Canadians, fulfil their three expectations of trust. 111  Granted, the majority did, as the 
Constitutional Court did in TAC, use the concept of reasonableness to assess the 
constitutionality of the impugned provisions; but fundamentally distinct from the Constitutional  
Court’s reasonableness approach, it did not use that concept as a basis for developing an 
overarching obligation on the state. Rather, it used reasonableness as a basis for invalidating 
those provisions, concluding that the government could not impose exclusivity on Canadians if it 
failed to provide the services which were the object of the exclusivity within a “reasonable” time. 
Most likely, the Court did not lay down such a broad, obligation-defining rule because 
the right to health had not been constitutionalised. Whereas in TAC the Constitutional Court 
laid down its reasonableness obligation in interpreting section 27 (which, as we know, contains a 
right to health), the Supreme Court did not have a comparable provision to interpret. So, 
because the Court was not obliged to – it accordingly did not – lay down any such rule. And the 
Court, exercising its usual hesitancy (or “timidity” if you prefer) to read positive social rights into 
its constitution, refused to judicially recognise a right to health in other constitutional provisions. 
That said, if a right to health were constitutionalised in Canada (either via constitutional 
amendment or, as is more likely the case in Canada, via judicial interpretation), how could the 
Court have mediated the government’s trustworthiness in Chaoulli? In my view, it could have 
done so via two inter-related steps. First, it could have employed the constitutional right to 
health to frame the case in positive terms. As I explained earlier, the Court chose to frame the 
case (in line with how the claimants framed it) as a matter of government interference with 
constitutional rights rather than as a positive right to medically necessary care in a timely manner. 
But as several social rights scholars in Canada have argued, the Court could have instead framed 
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the case in the latter, positive way.112 The claimants’ decision to frame the case negatively in no 
way obliged the Court to accept that framing.113 I contend that a positive framing of the case is 
consistent with the mediation of government trustworthiness. This is so because such a framing 
would have enabled the Court to consider the government’s obligations to Canadians vis-à-vis 
the social good or service at issue in the case (medically necessary health care services); and 
following from that consideration, the Court could have – in parallel to the Constitutional 
Court’s reasonableness obligation in TAC – laid down a broad rule in relation thereto so as to 
increase the likelihood of the government fulfilling Canadians’ expectations of trust. However, 
by framing the case negatively (and following therefrom, the majority finding that the impugned 
provisions were unconstitutional), Chaoulli did little more than enable those Canadians who were 
in a position to exit the public system (financially and with respect to their health) to do so. 
 As a second step, the Court, in considering the government’s obligations and laying 
down a broad rule, could have imposed requirements vis-à-vis the process by which the Canadian 
government employs waiting lists in its exercise of control over medically necessary services. 
Such requirements would, again, have been such so as to increase the likelihood that the 
government would, in its future interactions, fulfil Canadians’ expectations of trust (ie act with 
good will toward Canadians, fulfil its fiduciary responsibility thereto and exercise the requisite 
competence). In other words, they would have promoted trustworthiness. For example, in 
furtherance of trust’s expectation of competence, the Court could have required that the 
government’s policies and programmes pertaining to waiting lists be based on the best available 
evidence from research.114 This includes the issue of whether to introduce a duplicative private 
tier to help reduce wait times. Thus, the Court could have compelled the government – in 
deciding whether to introduce such a private tier as a solution to the wait time problem – to base 
that decision on the relevant evidence. Ironically, the government had been doing that. 
Therefore, as a mediator of government trustworthiness, the Court would have essentially 
sought to reinforce the kind of EBPM in which the government had already been engaging. 
 The approach which I am suggesting would not have been completely unfamiliar for the 
Court. In parallel to it, the Court, in its 1997 Judges’ Remuneration Reference wherein it defined the 
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obligations of provincial governments in setting the salaries of provincial court judges pursuant 
to section 11(d) of the Charter, interpreted that section as imposing a number of procedural 
requirements.115 These included a requirement that governments, prior to proceeding with any 
proposal, refer said proposal for review to a “judicial compensation commission” which must be 
independent (such that the commission is not controlled by a single branch of government),  
objective (such that the commission will ‘make recommendations on judges’ remuneration by 
reference to objective criteria, not political expediencies’) and effective (such that, among other 
things, the government will not change or freeze judicial remuneration until the commission’s 
report has been received and that the commission’s reports will ‘have a meaningful effect on the 
determination of judicial salaries’).116 Moreover, the Supreme Court recommended that in the 
aims of ensuring the objectivity of such commissions, the enabling legislation or regulations 
include ‘a list of relevant factors to guide the commission’s deliberations’ which might include 
‘increases in the cost of living, the need to ensure that judges’ salaries remain adequate, as well as 
the need to attract excellent candidates to the judiciary’.117 David Wiseman has argued, quite 
rightly in my view, that the Supreme Court should impose similar requirements in its 
adjudication of social rights cases.118  In his words, ‘if the validity of governmental action 
affecting judicial salaries depends upon conformity to this process, why not demand that the 
validity of governmental action affecting the adequacy of social assistance conform to a similar 
process?’119 To my mind, the procedural requirements which the Supreme Court laid down in the 
Judges’ Remuneration Reference are very similar to those which I have described as trustworthiness-
promoting: they require procedural fairness (speaking to the expectation of good will) as well as 
reliance on appropriate evidence/data (speaking to the expectation of competence). Thus, as 
Wiseman has argued more generally, the Court in Chaoulli could have imposed the same (or at 
least similar) procedural requirements on the government vis-à-vis medically necessary care. 
 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not do that. Interestingly again, much like the 
Constitutional Court in TAC, the Court’s limited impact on Canadians’ trust was to assume a 
sort of “advisor” role for Canadians, advising them on whether to trust their government with 
respect to wait times. But unlike the Constitutional Court (which used their judgment to express 
confidence in South Africa’s government, albeit without warrant therefor), the Supreme Court in 
Chaoulli used their judgment to express a lack of confidence in the Canadian government with 
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respect to wait times. And in doing so, again like in TAC, it portrayed the government as 
untrustworthy. How? Specifically, Deschamps J. does so when she justifies the Court’s 
intervention in the case. In setting out her justification, she not only highlights the wait time 
problem (as McLachlin C.J. and Major J. do), but goes on to stress the government’s refusal to 
remedy the problem despite them having, in her view, ample time and evidence to do so (not to 
mention having made many promises to Canadians in this regard). Deschamps J. explains: 
The government had plenty of time to act. Numerous commissions have been 
established … and special or independent committees have published reports … 
Governments have promised on numerous occasions to find a solution to the 
problem of waiting lists. Given the tendency to focus the debate on a 
sociopolitical philosophy, it seems that governments have lost sight of the 
urgency of taking concrete action.120 
It is my opinion that, in making this statement, Deschamps J. effectively calls into question the 
government’s good will toward Canadians in addressing the country’s wait time problem. Now, 
of course, Deschamps J. was well within her powers to so criticise the government. However, 
her criticism in this regard is problematic because after so criticising the government, she takes 
no real steps to correct the failings she identifies (other than to declare the impugned legislative 
provisions unconstitutional). And so, rather than promote government trustworthiness, the 
effect of Deschamps J.’s critique is to show the government to be untrustworthy. Canadians are 
effectively being told that the government had everything it needed to remedy the wait time 
problem (including ample time and evidence), had promised to remedy it, and yet, it did not. In 
my view, this strongly implies a lack of good will on the part of government. The situation would 
have been different if Deschamps J. had highlighted these failings but then, through her 
judgment and remedy granted, addressed them. But she did not. Without judicial intervention to 
correct the problem, why should Canadians expect anything to change? Why should they expect 
the government, going forward, to exercise good will toward them with respect to wait times?121 
 
Did the Court Instead Mitigate Citizens’ Vulnerability or Promote the Government’s Reliability? 
As I did in Chapter 5, I will conclude this chapter with a brief consideration and illustration 
using Chaoulli of the other two forms of judicial constraint which I outlined in Chapter 4. 
 With respect to the vulnerability-mitigating form of judicial constraint, Chaoulli is a rather 
interesting case. Chaoulli does not fit this form of constraint as I described it in Chapter 4. While 
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the Court did grant the claimants that which they sought in the case – a declaration that the 
impugned provisions were unconstitutional – because the Court chose to frame the case in 
negative terms, it did not order the government to provide the claimants with the social good or 
service which was at issue – medically necessary care (in a timely manner). Thus, I do not think 
that we can reasonably say that the Court, through Chaoulli, showed itself willing to exert control 
over social goods and services or established itself to citizens as an alternative source thereof. 
However, the Court did mitigate (or at least it had the potential to mitigate) citizens’ 
vulnerability in another sense. By declaring the impugned legislative provisions unconstitutional 
and effectively opening up the possibility for a private market for medically necessary care, the 
Court’s decision had the potential to mitigate the vulnerability of a certain group of citizens: the 
wealthy and healthy Canadians who would have access to that private market.122 It will be 
recalled that owing to the lack of a duplicative private tier for medically necessary care, 
physicians in Canada’s private health system did not serve as an alternative source of the social 
goods and services which Canadians sought from their government (medically necessary health 
care services). The majority’s decision in Chaoulli cast doubt over whether that would continue to 
be the case. To be fair, the majority did not expressly demand that private health insurance be 
allowed; rather, it offered the government a choice between that and reducing wait times in the 
public system. But as many scholars have suggested, this legal effect must be distinguished from 
Chaoulli’s political effect – which was to legitimise privatisation.123 In the words of Colleen Flood, 
the majority decision ultimately gave the pro-privatisation position ‘the normative imprimatur of 
legitimacy (indeed superiority) from no lesser body than the Supreme Court of Canada’.124 
For the wealthy and healthy in Quebec, the potential for mitigated vulnerability was very 
tangible. The Quebec government was obliged to respond to Chaoulli; if it did not, section 15 of 
the HEIA and section 11 of the HOIA would have been struck down after 12 months. And 
further to the legitimation which the majority’s decision provided the pro-privatisation position, 
it also offered the Quebec government a relatively easy way out of the wait time problem. Based 
on the majority’s decision, the Quebec government was under no obligation to tackle the 
unenviable task of reducing wait times in the public system; it sufficed to give Quebeckers the 
option to buy private insurance. And as commentators have suggested, the latter option was the 
more appealing one for the Quebec government. Privatisation is, as Flood has said, ‘a tempting 
solution for many governments as it diminishes accountability – the wealthy can exit to the 
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private tier and there are fewer powerful people to hold the governments’ feet to the fire for 
improvements in public Medicare’.125 If the Quebec government had decided to take this easy 
way out, the effect of the majority’s decision would have been to mitigate wealthy and healthy 
Quebeckers’ vulnerability. Rather than the Court itself serving as an alternative source of social 
goods and services, it would have generated an alternative source in physicians working in the 
private health system. Those Quebeckers in a position to take advantage of the new private 
market for medically necessary services would have had their vulnerability mitigated.126 Such 
Quebeckers would have no longer been wholly dependent on the Quebec government for 
medically necessary health care services (in parallel to South Africans from Chapter 5). And thus, 
speaking to Octavio Ferraz’s concerns which I raised in Chapter 4, it would have worsened the 
inequities between Quebeckers vis-à-vis access to medically necessary care. Fortunately, the 
Quebec government’s response to Chaoulli was more ambitious and sophisticated than this easy 
way out. It indeed decided to lift the ban on private health insurance – but only for three areas 
which were identified in Chaoulli as having unreasonable wait times (hip and knee replacement 
surgery, and cataract surgery).127 And it coupled this selective ban lift with measures to cap or 
guarantee wait times in those areas so as to significantly reduce incentives to buy private health 
insurance. Therefore, while the potential for mitigated vulnerability among wealthy and healthy 
Quebeckers was realised to some extent (with private insurance being made available in respect 
of those three areas), it was much less than the majority’s decision had the potential to allow. 
For Canadians outside Quebec, this potential for mitigated vulnerability was less tangible 
but still present. Although the legal impact of Chaoulli was limited to Quebec, three members of 
the Court also concluded that the impugned provisions violated section 7 of the Charter. This 
implied that the prohibitions on private insurance which exist in five Canadian provinces outside 
Quebec would not withstand constitutional scrutiny for these justices. This, coupled with 
Chaoulli’s political effect of legitimising privatisation, made it very likely that challenges similar to 
that in Chaoulli would be commenced in other Canadian provinces.128  And indeed related 
challenges have since been lodged in the provinces of Alberta (Murray v Alberta),129 Ontario 
(McCreith and Holmes v Ontario),130 and most recently, British Columbia (Cambie Surgeries Corp. et al v 
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British Columbia).131 The latter case – which, at the date of writing, is being heard by a trial court 
in the province of British Columbia – is spearheaded by Dr. Brian Day, a former president of the 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) and a long-time advocate for increased private health care 
in Canada. If challenges like that commenced by Dr. Day are successful in their respective 
provinces, the effect may be the opening of a private market in health care in Canada. As Colleen 
Flood and Bryan Thomas have summed up the current situation, because of Chaoulli, it seems 
‘more like a matter of “when” Canada will move formally from its position of one-tier medicine 
[to two-tier medicine] rather than “if”’.132 And if that is indeed what transpires, the ultimate 
impact will be mitigated vulnerability for the wealthy and healthy in Canadian society. 
Moreover, since the Court did not lay down any broad rule regarding the government’s 
exercise of control over medically necessary services, it also could not promote the Canadian 
government’s reliability. Based on my analysis from Chapter 4, the reliability-promoting form of 
constraint would have had the Court lay down such a rule – specifically with respect to outcome. 
It would have had the Court interpret one of the constitutional provisions at issue in Chaoulli as 
encompassing a specific social good or service. For instance, the Court could have interpreted 
section 7 as a right to medically necessary health care in a reasonable time, or as a right (where 
the government chooses to provide medically necessary care) to have said care delivered in a 
reasonable time; and in so doing, it could have defined “reasonable” time as some fixed amount. 
Such an interpretation would have enabled Canadians to predict how their interactions with the 
Canadian government vis-à-vis wait times would transpire in the future – that is, the length of 
wait times they should expect in their future encounters with the public health care system. 
Some have argued that the Court should have taken this approach. For example, Bruce 
Porter has claimed that the Court should have addressed questions like ‘What is treatment within 
a reasonable time?’ and ‘How short a waiting list is short enough?’ – questions which the Court, 
under the reliability-promoting form of constraint, would have raised and answered.133 For him, 
these ‘are the very issues that a court must be prepared to consider – and to give government 
direction on – in assuming their role of guardians of the constitutional rights of all, including 
those who rely on the state for access to necessary health care.’134 However, such an approach 
would have suffered from many problems: it would have violated the separation of powers 
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(about which Binnie and LeBel JJ., in their dissent, seem to have concerns) and, of course, for 
the reasons set out in Chapter 4, it would have failed to promote government trustworthiness.135 
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CONCLUSION 
Cases like Chaoulli and TAC are not all that exceptional. As I have stressed throughout this 
thesis, constitutional social rights litigation is on the rise globally. Granted, the rate of increase 
varies across jurisdictions, but, with that said, the trend overall is upward. With increasing 
regularity, citizens are seeking to constitutionally challenge their governments’ resource allocation 
decisions and are requesting that courts grant them the social goods and services which the state 
has denied them – either by enforcing the social rights provisions contained in their constitutions 
or, where no such provisions exist, by reading social rights into vague constitutional provisions. 
And in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, with the imposition of austerity measures 
following therefrom, such litigation is likely to become even more common than it is at present. 
 
Synthesising the Thesis’s Central Argument 
In this thesis, I have used the concept of political trust as a dominant structuring principle to 
carve out a defensible role for courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. I have argued that 
courts can, and should, in so enforcing social rights, hold the elected branches of government to 
a standard of trustworthiness – a concept which, as we now know, follows on directly from trust. 
They do so by imposing what I have described as trustworthiness-promoting constraints on the 
elected branches in their exercise of control over social goods and services. And I have labelled 
the foregoing role for courts in this area: mediators of government trustworthiness. 
 Chapters 1 and 2 offered the conceptual groundwork for this argument, defining what it 
means to say that citizens “trust” their government with respect to social rights. That definition 
not only provided the three constituent expectations of trust – good will, competence and 
fiduciary responsibility – around which I constructed my proposed role for courts, but it also 
yielded two points which are pivotal to this role’s defensibility in legal terms: first, that trust (and 
by necessary implication, trustworthiness) necessitates governmental discretion over social goods 
and services; and second, that trust (and trustworthiness) focuses on the process – as opposed to 
the outcome – by which governments make decisions vis-à-vis such goods and services. 
Owing to the necessary discretion and procedural focus of trust and trustworthiness, 
courts as mediators of government trustworthiness strikes the delicate balance between the two 
enforcement wrongs of judicial abdication and judicial usurpation. On one hand, by holding the 
elected branches to a standard of trustworthiness, courts ensure that governmental resource 
allocation decisions are made fairly, competently and in the best interests of the public. And that, 
at least in my view, affords courts a meaningful role to play in social rights protection. For 
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instance, as we saw in Chapter 5 as applied to TAC, the Constitutional Court could have barred 
the South African government from basing its PMTCT policies on the suspect theories of 
HIV/AIDS denialists and ensured – or at least made it more likely – that such theories would 
not serve as the basis of future social policy. And applied to Chaoulli in Chapter 6, the Supreme 
Court could have obliged the Canadian government to address the wait time problem, rather 
than give privileged Canadians a way to exit a failing health system. Thus, I think that it is fair to 
say that as mediators of government trustworthiness, courts do not abdicate their responsibilities 
as constitutional guardians. But at the same time, in fulfilling this role, courts also do not 
intervene to such an extent that they may be said to usurp the elected branches’ policy-making 
role. Since this role has courts principally reviewing the procedure by which the elected branches 
exercise control over social goods and services (rather than the outcome thereof), courts do not, 
as judicial usurpation implies, interpret or apply social rights ‘in such a manner that [they assume] 
control of the political system … crowding out … the democratically elected branches’.1 While 
governments’ allocation decisions must be made fairly, competently and in the public’s best 
interests, those decisions are ultimately left with the elected branches. In this way, courts as 
mediators of government trustworthiness finds parallels in other procedural approaches to social 
rights enforcement (but, in my view, as I argued in Chapter 4, it mitigates the principal concerns 
which have been raised by scholars with respect to those procedural approaches). 
Chapter 3 augmented the defensibility of this role for courts. It did so by laying the 
foundation for a claim that courts as mediators of government trustworthiness can help generate 
the valuable ends following from political trust and its tie to public cooperation: social stability, 
economic welfare and effective governance. That foundation was the network conception of 
trust. Applied to the relationship between citizens and their governments with respect to social 
rights, that conception yielded the conclusion that courts, through social rights adjudication, 
should be able to foster citizens’ trust in their governments. And in Chapter 4, supported by the 
trust literature, I argued that courts can so foster political trust by imposing the trustworthiness-
promoting constraints by which courts as mediators of government trustworthiness is defined. 
As a result, this judicial role has the added benefit of furthering public cooperation, including, as 
I documented at the outset, promoting public tax compliance and support for social policies. 
Moreover, to further strengthen the defensibility of my proposed role for courts in enforcing 
constitutional social rights, I set out in Chapter 4 a set of additional arguments – both theoretical 
(rooted in the fiduciary nature of the citizen-government relationship and, in line with a standard 
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defence for constitutional review, the role’s potential to support democracy) as well as pragmatic 
(pertaining to the many difficulties which constitutional social rights adjudication is said to raise). 
 
Limitations of the Thesis and Avenues for Future Research 
As with any research, this thesis is not without its limitations. For starters, the scope of this 
thesis has not permitted me to develop the courts as mediators of government trustworthiness 
role in the detail which I think it requires (and ultimately deserves). Specifically, I have not been 
able to set out precisely what trustworthiness-promoting constraints entail or how courts can 
impose them. In Chapter 4 (as well as the illustrations in Chapters 5 and 6), I described such 
constraints with reference to the three expectations of trust (as explicated in Chapter 2), and I 
submitted that courts, in imposing the constraints, would use those expectations to define the 
elected branches’ obligations to citizens, and hold them accountable where they fail to fulfil 
those obligations (thereby enforcing the expectations). Those two forms of judicial intervention, 
I suggested in that chapter, amount to the courts holding the elected branches to a standard of 
trustworthiness. However, and I think predictably, translating the three constituent expectations 
of trust into judicially enforceable obligations will necessarily come with complications which 
must be addressed. Hence, future research can be directed at providing greater depth into each 
of these expectations of trust as they fulfil their function as judicially enforceable obligations. 
 To elaborate, consider first, the expectation of good will which encompasses an 
expectation that the elected branches will exhibit good intentions (ie not act intransigently) 
toward citizens in exercising their control over social goods and services. As mediators of 
government trustworthiness, courts would define the elected branches’ obligations in terms of 
the exhibition of good intentions (or non-intransigence). But what happens if the elected 
branches have repeatedly refused to fulfil that expectation – that is, they have exercised said 
control in an intransigent manner and have offered no indication that they will change their 
conduct in the future? Presumably the courts would need to escalate their response in such cases, 
imposing constraints of the reliability-promoting form. But are such constraints justifiable from 
the perspective of promoting government trustworthiness? In answering that question, future 
research could make use of the work of John Braithwaite on regulatory pyramids.2 According to 
Braithwaite, we “enculturate” trust by nurturing trust until we have been given reason to escalate 
to interventions based on distrust. As he has put it, ‘The problem with institutions that assume 
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that [actors] will not be virtuous is that they destroy virtue’.3 By starting from a position of trust, 
we give those actors reason to exhibit good intentions. But at the same time, by ‘signalling very 
clearly a preparedness to escalate intervention to progressively less trusting interventions when 
trust is abused’ (and following with such escalation where necessary), those who may be so 
inclined to not exhibit good intentions are likely to be deterred from acting in that way. Applying 
Braithwaite’s framework to social rights adjudication, it could be argued that in enforcing the 
expectation of good intentions, courts could start from the assumption that the elected branches 
will exhibit good intentions toward citizens; but should make clear that such conduct is expected 
and that they are prepared to escalate to more intrusive interventions (eg mandatory, coercive 
and supervisory orders) if it proves necessary. And though we know that such interventions are 
not trustworthiness-promoting, once this point has been reached, arguably trustworthiness (and 
trust) should no longer be the objective. As Canadian Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci 
once said, at this point, the elected branches ‘have proven themselves unworthy of trust’.4 
Or what about the expectation of fiduciary responsibility? Relying in large part on the 
fiduciary political theory literature, particularly the work of Evan Fox-Decent, I defined the 
fiduciary expectation, at least at its core, as an expectation that the elected branches will exercise 
their power exclusively for ‘other-regarding purposes’ – that is, to pursue only citizens’ interests 
and not those of their staff. But based on that literature, we also know that it encompasses more 
broadly duties of loyalty, care, fairness and reasonableness. Thus, how do we translate those 
duties so as to be useable for social rights enforcement purposes? Future research can seek to 
answer this question with reference to both the fiduciary political theory literature as well as the 
literature and jurisprudence on the enforcement of fiduciary duties in the private law context. 
And lastly, the same can be said for the expectation of competence. This expectation, it 
will be recalled, translates into an expectation of evidence-based policy-making (EBPM): courts 
oblige the elected branches to exercise their control over social goods and services on the basis 
of the best available evidence from research. But incorporating EBPM into adjudication raises its 
own set of questions. For instance, one noteworthy question is the extent to which courts, in 
enforcing the expectation of EBPM, should evaluate the evidence which is at issue on its merits. 
That is, is it enough that the elected branches consult such evidence even though they misapply 
or refuse to follow it? Or should courts assess the evidence itself? And related thereto, how 
should scientific evidence be balanced against the other two forms of EBPM knowledge? These 
questions have close links with a recent body of scholarship into the ‘novel cross-national 
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phenomenon’ which has been termed “evidence-based judicial review” (EBJR).5 EBJR basically 
describes a recent trend observed across jurisdictions wherein courts, in reviewing governmental 
decision-making, engage with EBPM principles. Of note, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov has made the 
argument that EBJR can come in one of two forms: where courts themselves engage in 
‘independent … evidence-based decision-making’; and where courts, rather than so engage with 
the evidence, ‘require evidence that [the decision-making which is under review] was a product 
of … evidence-based decision-making’.6 I would imagine that the boundary between these two 
forms is a fuzzy one and the direction in which courts should lean will depend, intertwining with 
the expectation of good will, on a government’s prior conduct (ie its intransigence). That said, 
these questions and hypotheses are best left as the topic for a future research project. 
 Another (at least arguable) limitation of this thesis is its theoretical nature. In particular, 
my conclusion that courts, through social rights adjudication, should be able to foster citizens’ 
trust in their governments is not an empirical one. Rather, it has been extrapolated from the 
network conception of trust as applied to the social rights context. As I suggested in Chapter 3, 
empirical evidence would certainly bolster this conclusion. Therefore, that kind of empirical 
investigation may serve as the basis for future research. And this thesis has done much of the 
conceptualisation work for such research. However, I will stress once again that significant 
challenges would be in store for such an investigation. As with much of the empirical scholarship 
on trust, it would likely prove difficult to accurately measure trust (as I have conceptualised it) 
and to control for the singular impact of the courts. On the latter point, if we accept the network 
conception, trust in the citizen-government relationship will depend on not only the relationship 
between courts and citizens arising out of adjudication, but other relationships (involving, for 
instance, private providers and the media); and there are likely to be interaction effects. Having 
said that, if such challenges can be overcome, this line of research would be a worthwhile one. 
 
Contribution of the Thesis to the Social Rights Literature 
I conclude this thesis by returning to the conversation which I identified at its outset: the proper 
role of courts in enforcing constitutional social rights. It is this conversation, specifically in its 
“second wave” of how courts should go about enforcing such rights (ie judicial approaches), to 
which I have sought to contribute. Hopefully via this thesis I have succeeded in that endeavour. 
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Political trust offers a new, and I think helpful, perspective from which to examine social 
rights adjudication. It allows us to assess the impact of different forms of judicial intervention in 
such adjudication in terms of a concept whose value social scientists have stressed for decades – 
both generally and in specific relation to social policy. And in the current global economic 
climate, given political trust’s ties to public tax compliance as well as support for social policies, 
such value should not be underestimated. While undoubtedly social rights should protect the 
marginalised members of society, at the same time, we cannot forget that the social goods and 
services which are the subject of social rights are ultimately funded by citizens’ taxes. Hence, to 
the extent that we can reinforce such tax compliance and support for policies, I think we should.  
Now, of course, as I explained at the outset of the thesis, political trust does present a 
sort of danger: that is, that citizens will support regressive social policies (where such policies are 
not absolutely necessary). And this may, in turn, lead to the erosion of social welfare. For this 
reason, we must be cautious in our embrace of political trust as a tool for social rights 
enforcement. In my view, however, my proposed role for courts – by focusing on the concept of 
trustworthiness (rather than that of trust alone) – does introduce a degree of caution. It ensures 
that governments, in exercising their control over social goods and services (including the 
introduction of regressive social policies), act in a trustworthy manner. As such, it creates 
conditions which foster citizens’ trust in the elected branches with respect to social rights (rather 
than seek to increase such trust without any foundation for it).7 Consequently, any trust which 
citizens hold in governments with respect to social rights as a result (including vis-à-vis 
regressive policies) would not be blind or indiscriminate – but instead warranted. And in this 
way, my proposed role for courts may be said to support democracy. Furthermore, because the 
protection of social rights does not – and should not – stop at the courts, the other means by 
which social rights are protected (and realised) (which will not centre on political trust) can help 
mitigate the dangers which the concept presents, including its potential to erode social welfare. 
Moreover, throughout this thesis, I have identified many justifications in support of my 
proposed role for courts as mediators of government trustworthiness. To that list I add one 
more. And I add it here because, in my view, it highlights the crux of this thesis’s contribution. A 
recurring theme in the second wave literature is the need for innovation or creativity – both in 
the procedures by which courts enforce social rights as well as in the remedies they grant for 
violations thereof.8 To my mind, courts as mediators of government trustworthiness fits the bill 
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in this regard. Not only is trust itself an innovative concept for social rights adjudication (as I 
have explained), but by filling this role, courts are not limited to the bilateral choice between 
deference and policy-making. They can and do review social welfare legislation and government 
action on several intermediate grounds, including the fairness of the procedures which were 
followed, the evidence upon which decisions were made, as well as potential conflicts of interest. 
However, innovation/creativity must be balanced against considerations of pragmatism. 
It makes little sense to advocate a role for courts which either they cannot, or they will not, fill. 
This is especially true in newer democracies where courts are likely to lack the legal legitimacy 
which comes with decades of deciding cases. 9  Courts as mediators of government 
trustworthiness, I think, strikes an appropriate balance here. While trust and trustworthiness as 
concepts themselves (and as legal standards) are new to courts, the concepts which they engage 
are not. Those concepts, to recap, include transparency, participation, equality, evidence-based 
decision-making, and fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, fairness and reasonableness. Accordingly, 
as mediators of government trustworthiness, courts would not be venturing into completely 
unchartered waters. Therefore, political trust (with its resulting courts as mediators of 
government trustworthiness role) offers us an approach to enforcing constitutional social rights 
which – although innovative – is ultimately rooted in extremely pragmatic considerations. 
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